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JPRS-UWE-88-010
6 OCTOBER 1988



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 5, May 1988

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH-DU-NARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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WORLD ECONOMY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 5, May 1988

English Summary of Major Articles

18160009a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 158-159

[Text] E. Pozdnyakov in the article "National, State and Class Interests in International Relations" examines three groups of interests: national, state and class in their interconnection and interdependence. The article explains the distinctions and similarities between national and state interests, considers some cases when such interests coincide or differ. As far as class interests are concerned the author assigns them a proper place in the system of state interests comes out against a simplified interpretation of international interests as sphere of class struggle. In the author's opinion such an attitude to international relations can be explained by an uncritical, as a matter of fact, mechanical application of class struggle laws from the sphere of internal social relations to interstate ones. Such an attitude means in reality an acknowledgment of the impossibility of peaceful coexistence of the two socio-economic systems—socialism and capitalism. The author believes that in the epoch of nuclear-missile weapons when humanity is faced with alternative: either further exacerbation of tension in relations between states or a constructive search for mutually acceptable agreements for the sake of peace, an artificial transfer of ideological disagreements and laws of class struggle to the sphere of interstate relations doom the latter to permanent confrontation, depriving them of a perspective of development on the basis of principles of peaceful coexistence.

A. Arbatov in the article "Deep Reduction of Strategic Weapons" continues the idea of the need to develop the theory of strategic weapons reduction and its application in practice. The author cites the point of view of scientists of different orientation, conditionally called "politicians" and "technocrats" by him. He deals with the problem of political and military means capable of contributing to such a reduction, considers the strategic stability problem and that of reducing strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent. The author notes that the problem of complete reduction of strategic weapons makes it possible to draw certain preliminary methodological conclusions. The security problem, or to be more precise, the disarmament problem as one of its aspects, embraces a wide range of international, political, economic, social and psychological themes. This is a specific highly original field of science on the junction of and exact sciences, the intersection of political and economic research, military science, history etc. which in practice is closely connected with diplomatic talks, whereas different systems of weapons, strategic conceptions, methods of military balance evaluation, different levels and sublevels of reduction of weapons are only means attributed to them.

A. Galkin in the article "New Political Thinking and Problems of the Labor Movement" seeks to show that a turn to the new political thinking opens a broad field for discussions on the given issues. The new political thinking directly accords with the sum total of socio-political problems in different countries, class struggle included, hence with the labor movement problems. The need in the new political thinking is due to the large-scale changes which took place in human society at the end of the XX century. The author examines certain acute issues confronting of late different trends of the labor movement. He goes on to study the new political thinking as a means of solving conflicts. Taking into consideration the existence of states with differing social structures and other essential parameters the author seeks to bring to the readers' attention the direction and strength of the main tendencies, determining such a development, its perspectives in the zone of developed capitalism and third world countries. The author states his opinion on the realignment of the world social and political forces from the viewpoint of the new political thinking, the labor movement's place within it and the peculiarities of the tasks facing it. The author notes the particular necessity of theoretical searches carried out by the communist parties of non-socialist countries and all Marxist forces. The task of such searches is to comprehend the essence of the given situation, evaluate the trend and depth of processes taking shape, and seek ways for tackling the new problems facing the working class and all working people.

A. Vasilyev and M. Gerasyev in the article "Certain Results of Military-Political Course of R. Reagan's Administration" examine the results of Reagan administration's activities. While comparing administration's declared aims with the practical results and the volume of expenditures the authors seek to single out the main landmarks and instruments of the military-political course of the present-day American leadership. Particular attention is given to an analysis of its politico-psychological components. Proceeding from the analysis the authors assert that the politico-psychological aspect in the 80s has been, we may say, almost the principal one in the political course of the Reagan administration. At the same time the accentuated militarist phraseology combined with a policy of sharp budget increases is aimed at a psychological impact both on the frame of mind in the USA and on its allies and opponents abroad.

V. Ivanov and P. Minakir in their article "Pacific Regions of the USSR: Role of External Economic Relations in Their Development" say that in accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government the Maritime Territory and the Far East are to be turned into a highly developed national economic complex, fundamentally incorporated into the system of the all-union and international division of labour. These plans are not only of national economic but international and political importance. On their fulfillment will depend the position of the USSR in Asia and Pacific region—a shaping and rapidly growing centre of World economy. The authors focus on the need to utilize external economic relations for the solution both of structural long-term as well as urgent social issues, the

expansion of exports and improvement of its structure. The authors give their point of view concerning the perspectives of development of the Pacific region of the USSR. Attention is concentrated on the role of external economic relations as the most urgent reserve of the outlined economic transformations. The authors lay special stress on the need for a well-thought strategy aimed at a stage by stage entry into the structure of international division of labour, at a definition both of branches of industry and geographic priorities, orientated at a wide spectre of methods and forms of external economic ties.

A. Poletayev and I. Savelyeva in the article "Long Waves in the Development of Capitalism" sum up the basic results of a long waves study (so-called Kondratyev's cycles). The article traces the revolution of the concept, the main stages of its development and singles out contraversial and unsettled questions of the long waves theory. A scheme of division into periods, based on the data of economic crises is proposed. The authors examine three major trends of long wave research in the economy. The first is connected with the dynamics of prices when long waves were observed from the XVII till the beginning of the XX century and in the author's opinion were connected with the agrarian crises. The second studies the fluctuations of the rate of economic growth where long waves innovations played the principal role. The third trend is connected with an examination of long waves in the dynamics of the rate of profit. The authors cite some new appraisals, confirming the existence of long waves. The study of the dynamics of the rate of profit is connected with the waves in the indicators of the financial position of the working people whose peaks coincide with the start of a long wave instability phase. The authors arrive at the conclusion that the long waves concept is an important instrument of long-term analysis' trends and make it possible to synthesize the process, springing up in the course of interaction of economic, social and political structures of capitalist society.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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National, State, Class Interests in International Affairs

18160009b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 3-17

[Article by Elgiz Abdulovich Pozdnyakov, doctor of historical sciences, leading research fellow of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO: "National, State and Class Interests in International Relations"]

[Text] *What are national and state interests, are state interests identical to the interests of the ruling classes—such and similar questions are still without a clear answer.*

The answers which exists in present-day scholarship cannot be deemed completely satisfactory inasmuch as they are frequently based on evolved stereotypes and dogmatic ideas fixes. The author attributes to these primarily the notion concerning international relations as a sphere of the class struggle. Without claiming a comprehensive investigation of the said set of problems, he analyzes some of its aspects of importance primarily for an understanding of the processes occurring in the sphere of states' foreign policy activity and relations between them.

The success of the perestroika under way in the USSR, specifically in the sphere of the social consciousness, will depend to a considerable extent not only on the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory but to an even greater extent, perhaps, on deliverance from evolved stereotypes, frozen dogmatic outlines and cliches, received propositions and a set of serviceable quotations. Yet for many people they have become a customary and convenient means of viewing reality relieved of the need to constantly comprehend the rapidly changing world.

Today the process of the new recognition of domestic socioeconomic relations is proceeding quite rapidly and boldly. However, it has barely affected the sphere of study of foreign policy and interstate relations. What is perceived primarily is a lack of theory, not the "insipid, flaccid theory concerned with how, as it were, to serve practice somewhat more craftily" (1) but a harmonious and developed concept of the modern world based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and a profound understanding of what is happening. Whereas Soviet diplomacy is presenting far-reaching, radical proposals and solutions changing before our very eyes notions which have been settled for decades, the study of international relations continues tranquil as yet and the "sacred cows" of dogmatism and conformism continue to placidly graze here, completely unruffled.

We have grasped not from theory but from life itself that treating the laws of economics arbitrarily is just as impermissible as, for example, the laws of physics. We were given notice of the first by the stagnation phenomena in our economy, of the second, by Chernobyl. But the system of international relations has its laws also, and violating them, particularly in our time, is fraught with danger of a considerably greater scale than an accident at a nuclear reactor. Nothing can be done here, as in the economy, merely with some appeals, abstract formulas and starry-eyed wishes. After all, it is a question of a self-adjusting system of states' interaction distinguished by a high degree of interdependence: it has not nor in principle can it have isolated phenomena or processes—each affects in one way or another the entire system of relations and entails the corresponding consequences both for itself and for individual states. In turn, states take as the basis in their activity **interests**, which are determined by many and various internal and external circumstances. To the extent that these circumstances differ for each state, their interests differ also—

they may frequently be opposite and antagonistic. At the same time, however, states live and operate in a system of relations common to all. States' interaction within the framework of this system inevitably engenders also certain goals and tasks which are identical for them and a greater or lesser community of foreign policy interests forcing them—voluntarily or involuntarily—to act in many instances together, particularly in questions of the preservation and assurance of peace and security. Without this community of interests, interstate relations would be reminiscent of a "war of all against all"; without it, states' cooperation and realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence would be impossible.

The expansion in our time of the objective basis of this community does not, however, detract from the significance of states' particular, national interests and does not, consequently, remove the differences and contradictions between them. As long as states exist, their special interests will exist also, and thereby clashes and confrontation both between them and between their national and common interests. It is all a matter of degree. In former times states' foreign policy activity was geared predominantly to securing merely intrinsic national interests, frequently counter to the interests of other states. If as a result of this wars broke out, even given the broadest scale and devastation thereof, they did not threaten the loss of all mankind. Today, however, given the availability to the contending parties of nuclear weapons capable, if used, of wiping out everything living, defense only of one's own interests and disregard for the close interdependence of all phenomena and processes in the system of interstate relations could lead to fatal consequences and confront the world with the threat of annihilation.

The new situation dictates also a new logic of political thinking and new content and forms of the foreign policy activity of states, particularly those on which the fate of the world primarily depends.

In this connection there arises in the sphere of the theory of international relations also the task of a more in-depth investigation of such key concepts as national and state interest, their correlation both with one another and with class interests and the relationship of states' national and common interests.

National and State Interests

In the sense in which it is employed the "national interest" concept most often coincides with the "state interest" concept and usually acts as a synonym thereof. At the same time, however, the "separation" of these concepts and their counterpoise even may be encountered in literature and the press. Who has not seen, say, the following expression from a newspaper analysis: "the foreign policy of such and such a state does not correspond to its national interests"? As a whole, it may be observed that two interpretations of the "national interest" concept have come about in day-to-day practice: as

a synonym of state interest and as the interest of the nation, which is not only distinct from but also opposed to state interest to a certain extent. Which interpretation is correct? There is no unequivocal answer here, I believe. Both are correct—and there is no contradiction here: it all depends on the specific historical circumstances (both internal and external) in which the state in question finds itself and which are grounds for judging the concurrence or, on the other hand, divergence of both interests. Something else should be emphasized. Their possible concurrence in practice is by no means the equivalent of their identity: under all conditions they are as different as are the "nation" and "state" concepts. Although the "nation" concept is employed in political literature as a synonym of the state no less rarely than the "national interests" concept as a synonym of state interests, their identity by no means follows from this.

A distinction is drawn between the "state" and "nation" concepts mainly when it is wished by the first to express the idea that a given people constitutes a political organism under the administration of a common government, and by the second, to emphasize the intrinsic unity of the population of a state and the homogeneity of its living conditions and attributes. However, even this distinction is sustained far from always—and not only in common usage but in special literature even (2).

The identification of national and state interests is particularly apparent in matters concerning a state's foreign relations: state aspirations assume a national form and are in the majority of cases characterized thus. This applies primarily to the so-called national states, that is, states in which the population or the majority thereof belongs to a single nationality. In these foreign policy goals and interests frequently coincide with national goals and interests to such an extent that they can only be demarcated with difficulty.

Strictly speaking, foreign policy motives and interests are undoubtedly of a state and not national nature. However, they are inaccurately called national interests in political literature and the press (sometimes specially, but at times out of habit and as a cliché). In theoretical research, however, it is obviously essential to strictly demarcate national and state interests, specifying on each occasion the special conditions whereunder the two may coincide. They may, for example, complement and strengthen one another, but may differ sharply also. The confusion of these concepts and, even more, their intentional identification leads to distorted evaluations of both. The aspiration, say, of some state to economic or political expansion and an extension of the spheres of its influence or a desire to incorporate within it kindred groups of the population living on the territory of other states have frequently been called and continue to be called today also a "national tendency," "national aspiration" to unification and unity and so forth, whereas in fact the aspiration of a given state to extend the limits of its authority or its economic sphere under unaging national slogans is usually expressed here to a far greater extent.

But although foreign policy is implemented by the state, it cannot fail to reflect to this extent or the other common national interests concerning primarily questions of security, territorial integrity and sovereignty and also common sentiments and evolved stereotypes and ideas concerning the place and role of one's state in the system of other states associated with them (which are shared, as a rule, if not by the whole population of the country, by the majority thereof at least, regardless of domestic social stratification). The nation (people) as a historically evolved community is the basis on which any state authority relies at the time of the molding and implementation of its foreign policy activity. These decisions and actions to obtain "popular" support must correspond, if only outwardly, to the perceptions, tendencies, religious beliefs and values, in other words, to the philosophical stereotypes of a given nation.

The nation and the state are born of the process of historical development, and their relations in different phases thereof change. If, say, under given historical conditions national interest coincides with state interest, it by no means follows from this that this will always be the case.

The State and Civil Society

Hitherto we have regarded national interest as something uniform, as the interest of the whole nation, which state authority has supposedly taken as the basis in its foreign policy. But is the view that a state's foreign policy activity expresses the interests of the "whole nation" on whose behalf it allegedly operates correct in principle and is there in practice a common national interest, interest of the whole nation?

If it may yet be acknowledged that the nation as some unity, as a community, exists in relation to what is for it the outside world, it does not represent such a unity in itself. The nation is discrete in respect of many characteristics—class, political, economic, ideological, ethnic, religious, professional and others. Various clashing, opposed and contending or coincident interests correspond to them. And it is now not so much the "nation" concept as the "civil society" concept which corresponds to this kaleidoscope of various interests. And true interaction on both domestic and foreign issues occurs not between the state and the nation but between the former and civil society (3). Besides the nation, it unites within it many other collectives also; besides the national, there also exist therein feelings of a different kind, which at times achieve even greater force (class feelings, for example).

It is with the civil society (or simply society) concept and not the nation concept that many realities of contemporary and future world development are currently linked. The social environment, social issues, public opinion, social defects, public interests and so forth—all these and

many other concepts reflect in full measure the particular features of contemporary social development, at the basis of which are social processes.

The social component is increasingly becoming the predominant component in the life of peoples and nations, penetrating all walks of life and spheres of activity and breaking down national barriers and national narrowness.

And this component assumes the greater proportions and significance in the life of this people or the other the more profoundly it is encompassed by the process of democratization. For this reason, to be scientifically stricter and more objective, it is necessary to study the correlation not of the nation and the state (not national and state interests) but of the civil society and the state and, accordingly, social and state interests (4).

According to Marxist teaching, the state and civil society represent a dialectical unity of form and content, in which form is represented by the political state, and content, by the civil society (5). As the form, the state is the expression of community, whereas the civil society, on the contrary, is the expression of difference. The purpose of the state is the general interest, and "without this purpose the state is not a real state" (6). The state "is based on the contradiction between public and private, the contradiction between common interests and private interests." The mutual relations between the state and the civil society are therefore characterized by a hidden or overt "conflict between the common interest and the private interest and the division between the political state and the civil society" (7) within the framework, however, of the inseparable dialectical unity of the two. Closely interweaving, both sides of the unity may for a certain time become a political community (8), in which the state becomes indistinguishable from the social.

It follows from these propositions primarily that study of the state and its interests (whether domestic or foreign) independently of society and its interests, in isolation from them, as, equally, the study of civil society and its interests independently of the state, is fundamentally just as mistaken as the identification of the two. Ignoring civil society as the basis of any state, the science of the state would inevitably prove to be the science of the form and not of the essence of the state. On the other hand, ignoring the state, the science of society would of necessity have to renounce actual reality inasmuch as society, modern society, at least, lives and develops within the framework of the state and its arrangement, its laws and its administration. And the state itself, in K. Marx's definition, is nothing other than the arrangement of society (9).

The state as the form must correspond to the intrinsic requirements of the civil society, and as long as it corresponds to them, it corresponds to the latter. Without the state the civil society cannot achieve the free

development of its forces; but without society also developing freely under the aegis of the state the latter gradually becomes degraded and loses its true meaning and purpose (10).

The civil society as such lives not by common but various, frequently opposite interests. But it is this that is the singularity of social life: any given historical peculiarity thereof is the result of the action not of one kind of interests but the product of the interaction and struggle of diverse interests. Granted all the difference in interests, however, there are also, of course, interests common to all of society inasmuch as joint life and activity are impossible without a certain order. It is this community which the state embodies as the form of the arrangement of society, thereby assuming the function of a kind of compromise between various social forces and their interests (11).

The activity of any exploiter state, K. Marx wrote, for example, "encompasses two aspects: both the execution of common affairs ensuing from the nature of any society and specific functions ensuing from the contrast between the government and the people's masses" (12). F. Engels, in turn, observed: "Society creates for itself a body for the defense of its interests against internal and external attacks. This body is state power" (13).

The civil society and the state are thus in a state of continuous contradictory interaction and mutual influence, the nature of which largely depends on the degree of development of the civil society and its institutions and the latter's capacity for controlling the actions of the political power. This point is particularly important, considering the nature of the state itself as power, as an external necessity in respect of the civil society, and thereby as a kind of instrument of coercion. The external necessity, however, can mean only, K. Marx observed, that the "laws" and "interests" of society must in the event of a clash yield to the "laws" and "interests" of the state, that they are subordinate to it and that its will and its laws are in relation to the "will" and "laws" of society a necessity (14).

Given the insufficient development of civil society, the state is capable of usurping its rights and privileges, as a consequence of which "an inversion of the functions of the state and civil society" could occur. The state assumes in this case not only the fulfillment of its own functions but also appropriates the functions of society, formulates society's tasks for it and demands of it the unquestioning realization of its decisions, believing that they most adequately reflect the interests of individuals and society as a whole (15). And this applies equally to both domestic policy and foreign policy decisions. There are reasons for such inversion. Without touching on all of them, we would note one common one: inversion arises most often in particularly tense periods of the historical development of society and, having arisen, are, by virtue of the independent movement of the form (state power), of this historical duration or the other. "At

moments of a particularly heightened sense of its power," K. Marx wrote, "political life endeavors to suppress its prerequisites—the civil society and its components—and constitute itself in the form of the real generic life of man free of contradictions. But it cannot attain to this merely by having entered into **forcible** contradiction with its own living conditions and merely by having declared a **continuous** revolution, and for this reason the political drama just as necessarily culminates in the restoration of religion, private property and all the components of civil society as war culminates in peace" (16). This idea ensues, naturally, from the proposition that the civil society is the basis and prerequisite of the state and that as such cannot therefore fail to sooner or later bring into line with it its form—the state—also. Practice invariably confirms this truth.

So the state as the form, as the arrangement of society, as the embodiment of community thereby also expresses certain common interests of the civil society as a whole. This conclusion is of importance upon an analysis of the nature of so-called "national interests" and their correlation with the interests of the state. At the same time, however, it is in no way contradictory to the well-known Marxist proposition that the state is the political organization of the ruling class and the "instrument" in its hands with which it defends its class interests. Nor does this conclusion contradict the understanding of national interest as the interest of that same ruling class, elevating its particular interest to the interest of the whole nation. Whatever kind of state it is in terms of class nature, the function of securing certain common, "national" interests is invariably reserved for it. The ruling class, F. Engels wrote, "merely by virtue of the fact that it is the **ruling class**, is responsible for the state of the whole nation and is obliged to display concern for common interests" (17).

Any state thus personifies both common interests (the interests of the nation or society as a whole) and special interests (the interests of the ruling class). The correlation and priority of one and the other differ in different historical periods. Ascertainment of this correlation requires on each occasion a specific-historical analysis.

Two Hypostases of the State

Hitherto we have examined the state predominantly in relation to its "own" civil society or, in other words, as "inward-directed". But it has another, no less important, aspect of activity pertaining to its relations with the outside world, with other states. The state, like the two-faced Janus, simultaneously looks in different directions and exercises two, albeit interrelated, nonetheless different, functions—internal and external (18). Nor can these differences fail to be reflected in the evaluation of the correlation of national, state and class interests in the case of a state which is "inward-directed" and the same state which is "outward-directed".

The differences between these two "faces" of the state are undoubtedly determined primarily by the differences of the environments which in each case the state confronts: in the one, a system of interstate relations, in the other, a system of internal socioeconomic relations (or the civil society). And although in both cases one and the same state is operating, the difference between the internal and external environments of its activity impress so ineradicable an imprint upon its two functions that the impression may at times be created that it is in each case different states which are operating.

The content of the state's domestic policy function is determined mainly by the endeavor of the ruling class to strengthen its power, use it in its own interests and consolidate the social relations which correspond thereto, using for this the machinery of state. The ruling class here, if we are speaking of societies which are antagonistic in a class sense, confronts such domestic political and socioeconomic factors as a domestic opposition, the struggle of classes and parties for power, a variety of antigovernment movements, domestic economic and social crises, unemployment and so forth. It has simultaneously to tackle a two-in-one task: securing its special class interests and national interests connected with the development of the economy, a strengthening of defense capability and law and order, the fight against crime, provision for the citizens' security and so forth.

The content of the foreign policy function is different. The object of its attention are international, primarily interstate, relations. Here the state encounters phenomena and processes which are not under its control and jurisdiction and is surrounded by other states engaged in their own foreign policy activity, which is frequently opposite and hostile even in respect of its own. It is in this case a question not of the retention or preservation of power by a given ruling class but of the assured integrity, independence and security of the state association as such in the face of an external actual or assumed danger and of the creation of external conditions conducive to the development of the economy, the exercise of domestic policy functions and the accomplishment of other domestic tasks.

Here the state acts as the representative now of the whole nation, the personification of the sovereignty of the people and the spokesman for the interests of all of society (19). Contributing to this is the fact that even the nation (or civil society), in turn, also appears in two hypostases, as it were: when it is taken in itself—and here it represents a **discrete whole**—it is one thing, when in relation to the outside world, when it acts now as a **single whole**, it is another (20). If this "community" of the nation in relation to the outside world may be termed illusory to a certain extent, it is illusory to no greater extent than the state itself in the sense of universality. Embodied, however, in a state's foreign policy and, correspondingly, in its state interests, this universality becomes perfectly real—whence the phenomenon of the concurrence of so-called national interests and state

interests. In fact, if a state by its statutes and laws is capable of converting particular goals into general ones, and the social consciousness, into a social force within itself (21), it is capable of doing this to an even greater extent in respect of its external aspirations.

It is by no means fortuitous that even class-opposite forces within society frequently come to agreement and reconciliation when it is a question of foreign policy issues—despite preservation of the polarity of positions on the foreign policy issues. It would therefore be a big mistake when evaluating the attitude of the population of this state or the other toward its foreign policy to take into consideration merely the social and class stratification factor and at the same time fail to take into consideration the fact that it is driven also by such feelings as patriotism, the perception of a link with one's nation, the sense of homeland and, finally, a state feeling expressed in recognition of the fact that the life and well-being of each citizen could depend on the strength and significance of one's own state in the world and on its economic and political power. These feelings are heightened particularly at the time of wars or serious international conflicts. Disregard for them has led in the past and is leading at the present time to serious mistakes in the evaluation of this domestic and foreign situation or the other. We would recall how German and other social democratic literature on the eve of WWI maintained that by virtue of their inherent internationalism the proletarian strata of various big nations were natural allies, that national contradictions would find no place among the proletariat and that the antinationalism of the working class would serve as a dependable bulwark against world war (K. Kautsky and others). However, the brutal struggle of the European states among themselves led to the complete collapse of all these illusions. The dogmatically and simplistically understood internationalism of the working class not only did not damp down national discord, on the contrary, the latter embraced the working class also, and to a considerable extent with the assistance, what is more, of the social democratic leaders who only the day before were proclaiming fidelity to internationalism. The force of national feeling has been revealed, and continues to be revealed to this day, not only among the bourgeoisie but among the workers also.

Nor, of course, can we disregard the fact that national feeling has always been and remains a subject of the speculation of political demagogues of all stripes and a convenient weapon in foreign policy matters. The entire arsenal of political demagoguery is set in motion here: playing on the feelings of national pride and patriotism, the incitement of jingoism, chauvinism and hostility toward other peoples and so forth. It has to be acknowledged that all these weapons have an impact, the more so in that they are landing in the propitious soil of national self-awareness. We would recall in this connection if only Washington's "Grenada action" or London's "Falklands operation," which were supported by the majority of the population of the two countries, regardless of its class

membership. Many other foreign policy actions of various states in this period of history or the other, when party (class) interests have given way before common, "national" interests, could be cited also.

What has been said, however, should not be understood in such a way that outside state and national interests always coincide and that the first are an expression of the second in all instances. There also continue to be here, as in domestic life, although in more concealed form, contradictions between the interests of the state and the civil society. They assume an open nature in cases where the state fails in its foreign policy actions or when it plunges the people into a protracted, unpopular war (the United States' war in Vietnam, for example) exhausting the people's vital and material resources. The conflict between the state and civil society is expressed in various forms of the manifestation of society's unhappiness with the policy of its government, acts of civil disobedience, the spread among the populace of defeatist or isolationist sentiments and an intensification of the class struggle and, in extreme cases, in the creation in the country of a revolutionary situation.

Interstate Relations and the Class Struggle

Regardless of whether state and national interests coincide outside, reducing both the one and the other to class interests and identifying them with the latter is both mistaken methodologically and in fact. A characterization of the state (and its interests) **only** as the instrument and expression of class domination, being one-sided in respect even of internal relations between the state and civil society and in respect of its foreign policy activity and the sphere of relations with other states, leads to mistaken judgments and insoluble contradictions in theory and practice.

One such judgment is the opinion, which has primordially been firmly established in our scholarship, that interstate relations are a sphere of the class struggle. The proposition concerning the class nature of interstate relations and the fact that they represent a sphere of the class struggle (albeit in a special, specific form) was born primarily of an uncritical, essentially mechanical transference of the laws of the class struggle from the field of domestic, social relations to interstate relations.

There are reasons for the appearance and establishment in theory of the above-mentioned view. Two points need to be noted here, I believe. The first is the gnosological, cognitive, so to speak. The point being that through the strivings of scholastics and dogmatists in our social science the class struggle has in many instances been turned from Marxism into a kind of scientific superstition. It has been prescribed behavior to view any sphere of social relations, its specifics notwithstanding, only from the angle of the class struggle and as a sphere of class relations. As a consequence the class approach, which in the hands of the founders of Marxism was a

means of genuinely scientific sociological analysis, has been "happily" transformed into an unthinking faith and vulgar social theorizing "à la Marxism" fit for all of life's occasions.

The second point is connected once again, we believe, with the mechanical, uncritical transference to relations between states of the well-known Marxist formula concerning the fact that any political struggle is a class struggle. The logic here is obvious: inasmuch as interstate relations are a sphere of political struggle, it is simultaneously, consequently, a sphere of class struggle also. Applying formal logic in this case means simply failing to understand the essence of Marx's teaching concerning the class struggle. By political struggle the founders of Marxism meant (in all cases where they employed this formula) domestic political struggle inasmuch as it is this, in whatever sphere it is conducted, which is the more or less clear expression of the struggle of social classes for its aim is the winning or retention by this class or the other of political power (22).

But it is not classes which operate in interstate relations but states. The class nature of a state is just one aspect of its characterization as a social institution. For this reason regarding interstate relations as a sphere of the class struggle means obvious one-sidedness in the view of the subject and essentially leads to an identification of these relations with intersocietal relations and a reduction of the laws of this sphere to the laws of the class struggle.

Denial of the proposition that interstate relations are a sphere of the class struggle by no means signifies a denial of the action therein of class interests. There are between states, of course, differences in social and class nature making for the existence in them of particular class interests also. The place and role of the latter depend on the specific-historical conditions, as a consequence of which it would be a mistake to give this group of interests priority in all cases (a priori). Indeed, at some moments of states' historical development born of revolutionary coups class interests could out of the totality of foreign policy interests come to the fore, coloring, as it were, all the remaining types of interests and contradictions and creating what might be called the social historical background. A revolutionary break with political, economic and social relations within a state inevitably affects foreign policy relations also and brings about serious changes in them also. As a result foreign policy contradictions assume a clearly expressed social and class nature and grow into a class-based interstate conflict. Reflected "while still hot" in the consciousness of ideologues in the form of theoretical propositions, these ideas concerning the class nature of foreign policy struggle continue their life now by force of inertia, in time becoming dogma. A particular feature of any dogma is its ease of assimilation; ease of assimilation leads to popularity; broad popularity creates the appearance of truth.

The erroneousness of the proposition in question becomes particularly apparent if one addresses the principle of peaceful coexistence, which has been made the

basis of the foreign policy activity of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. Equality, noninterference in one another's internal affairs, nonaggression and the renunciation of encroachments on other states' territorial integrity, respect for sovereignty and national independence and a strengthening of good-neighbor relations are totally unrelated to class struggle as understood by Marxism. The principles of peaceful coexistence mean also recognition of the peoples' right to themselves decide, without any imposition from outside, what kind of social system they wish to have (which also does not fit into the class struggle concept).

In our time the proposition concerning class struggle in the international arena means in practice recognition of the fact that the capitalist and socialist systems cannot coexist; immanent to it, as it were, is the idea of the permissibility of the "export" of revolution, as, equally, the "export" of counterrevolution; it creates the dangerous illusion that the contradiction between socialism and capitalism may be overcome by foreign policy means, including war. Allowing of such would mean subscribing to the proposition concerning the inevitability of war (thermonuclear included) between socialism and capitalism, rendering pointless any activity aimed at averting it and depriving people of any hope for the future.

The one precludes the other here, I believe: either we regard interstate relations as a sphere of the class struggle—and then the principles of peaceful coexistence are inapplicable to it—or, on the contrary, we consider the principles of peaceful coexistence universal in states' mutual relations—and then the view of interstate relations as a sphere of the class struggle is unacceptable.

It may be objected that the class struggle in the international arena acquired its true and manifest meaning only in the period following 1917, that is, following the creation of the world's first socialist state, which brought states of an opposite nature in the class respect into direct conflict. However, this argument does not, we are convinced, withstand criticism. Class struggle in the world runs to several millennia, as, equally, does the struggle of states, different in terms of their social and class nature included. Believing, therefore, that the proposition concerning the fact that interstate relations have been an arena of class struggle only for the last 70 years of man's history is correct means adapting Marxism to habitual views and outlines. In their analysis of international relations the classics of Marxism always proceeded from the realities and laws inherent in this field and never attempted to transfer to it the laws characteristic of a fundamentally different sphere, that is, laws of the class struggle. We would cite as an example F. Engels' article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism," written in 1890, in which he observed that the then situation in Europe was determined by three factors: 1) Germany's annexation of Alsace—Lotharingia, 2) tsarist Russia's designs on Constantinople and 3) the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which was hotting up increasingly in all countries. "The first two facts" (our

emphasis—E.P.), he continued, "are the reason for the current division of Europe into two big military camps. The German annexation has made France an ally of Russia against Germany, and the tsarist threat to Constantinople is making Britain and Italy even an ally of Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive struggle, for a war the like of which the world has not yet witnessed..." (23).

Were we to proceed from the laws of the class struggle, we could not explain the emergence of an alliance of bourgeois republican France with semifeudal, monarchical Russia, as also many other examples encountered in international practice of political alliances of states with different and even diametrically opposite social systems. In the example quoted F. Engels constructs his analysis on actualities, on a study of the correlation and alignment of forces in Europe which had naturally taken shape at that time, that is, on the basis of the material factors which have from time immemorial formed the basis of states' foreign policy actions and which have brought about the formation or disintegration of their alliances. It was for this reason that F. Engels' analysis and forecast was so brilliantly corroborated 25 years later.

In the prenuclear era the view of international relations as an arena of class struggle (albeit basically erroneous) was not, for all that, as dangerous as now, in the era of nuclear weapons. Mankind is faced with a choice: either the continued spurring of tension and confrontation or constructive quest for mutually acceptable accords. Such an approach is also dangerous for the added reason that it primordially contains, as it were, the unacceptability of any agreements with "imperialism," a dogmatic refusal to compromise and a conviction as to the validity merely of its own viewpoint and a kind of "presumption of infallibility" in the evaluation not only of domestic policy but also international phenomena and processes (24).

There is no doubt that class interests are manifested predominantly in the sphere of the ideological struggle between states. Any social struggle, whether between classes, estates and parties or between states in the form in which it has occurred in history until now, has always been and continues to be conducted with the help of ideology. Always, however, for real, material interests. Ideas, however, and interests may not coincide. By virtue of their specific features, this noncoincidence is in interstate relations rather the rule than the exception. But, as K. Marx observed, the "idea" has invariably disgraced itself as soon as it has become separated from the "interest" (25). It disgraces itself even more, it has to be assumed, when it comes into direct conflict with interest. As a result there is nothing for it other than to either give up the idea or the interest—an alternative which is encountered very frequently in interstate relations. Inasmuch as the basis of a state's outside-directed activity is, for all that, the totality of its foreign policy interests, it gives preference to precisely these, as a rule.

If desired, everyone could find in history and in the present day more than enough examples illustrating the idea concerning the priority of state foreign policy interests over ideological, philosophical interests.

We shall touch in this connection on the question of the states' social and class uniformity and its role in interstate relations. Together with such characteristics as "community of class interests" and "class solidarity" it sometimes serves as virtually the main argument designed to explain the foreign policy unity of this group of states or the other. Such characteristics are born of the same view of international relations as an arena of class struggle and, correspondingly, of the absolutization therein of class, ideological aspects. Thus the foreign policy unity of imperialist states in the confrontation with the socialist countries, as also the centripetal trend in their relations, is frequently attributed in our political literature mainly to their class uniformity. Escaping attention here is the following "detail," for example: half a century ago the existence of the same social uniformity by no means prevented imperialist states waging war with one another and unleashing WWII, which had begun precisely as an interimperialist war.

The USSR and China and China and Vietnam are also states which are of the same type in the class sense. However, this fact in itself by no means removes the serious disagreements and contradictions between them (there have been conflicts even) on a number of international issues.

If in interstate relations states' genuine interests are conditioned by a totality of many specific factors and circumstances (from their geopolitical position through the evolved system of the balance of forces in the world with the system of military alliances and groupings corresponding thereto and states' obligations connected with the latter in respect of the safeguarding of collective or individual security), the application to this sphere of the "social and class uniformity" and "class solidarity" concepts diverts us from an explanation and study of the actual causes of the complex phenomena and processes of international life into the sphere of the most general vulgar-sociological arguments or serviceable propaganda.

Inasmuch as interstate relations are not a sphere of the class struggle, the role therein of the ideological factor as an expression of class interests has its own specific features. States' foreign policy is, as already mentioned, determined to a considerable extent by interests connected with the functioning and development of the system of interstate relations as an external environment. The basis of ideology, however, is this philosophy or the other expressed in a system of particular values. Ideology is more sluggish and conservative than the system of interstate relations, which changes constantly under the impact of various world processes. As a consequence, foreign policy, "material" interests constantly conflict with ideological interests.

The inordinate impact of ideological aspects on practical policy and the sphere of the interaction of states' foreign policy interests frequently distorts the actual content of the latter and deforms them. It is this which explains the phenomenon of the so-called "ideologization" of foreign policy. The essence thereof is the fact that a kind of inversion of the role of political and ideological factors like that which occurs at times in relations of the political state and civil society takes place: ideological interests become an end in themselves, as it were, whereas "material" foreign policy interests become their "servants".

Such ideologization of foreign policy is frequently an obstacle to the development of normal relations between states based on a balance of actual interests and a reason for the kindling of hostility between them, suspicion and mistrust, engenders strong stereotypes of the "external enemy" and thereby prevents the rapprochement and mutual understanding of different peoples.

"It is the transference of ideological contradictions and struggle to the sphere of international relations, particularly the process of negotiations on problems of peace, which represents a sample of the old political thinking," V. Bilak, a leader of the CPCz, rightly emphasizes (26). Truly, the subordination of foreign policy to the demands of ideology would mean the worst type of idealism in foreign policy practice.

The idea concerning the impermissibility of the confusion and, even more, the identification of foreign policy and ideological aspects in states' international activity is not, in general, new. The Warsaw Pact Political Declaration (1983) observed that "in their policy the socialist countries strictly separate ideological issues from problems of interstate relations and organize their relations with capitalist states on the basis of peaceful coexistence" (27).

Today this idea is not only being confirmed but further developed. The impermissibility of the transference of ideological disagreements in the sphere of interstate relations and the subordination to them of foreign policy was spoken of with all certainty in M.S. Gorbachev's book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World". This same idea is also contained in the rejection of the former formula of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems which viewed it as a "specific form of class struggle".

A distinction is clearly drawn in all these propositions between the sphere of interstate relations (and the principles of peaceful coexistence corresponding thereto) and the sphere of class struggle (and the ideology corresponding thereto). The confusion of the two and their identification or the mechanical transference of the laws of one of them to the other will inevitably lead to mistakes both in theory and in practice. However, it is a question of more than just this. Acknowledging the soundness of the

proposition concerning the impermissibility of the transference of ideological disagreements to interstate relations, as also the legitimacy of the replacement of the former formula of peaceful coexistence, is possible only if it is acknowledged that interstate relations themselves are not a sphere of class struggle. Were they such in reality, any changes in wording would be simply absurd inasmuch as the laws of the class struggle are objective and, consequently, not subject to volitional decisions. A volitional decision or change in wording may alter only an incorrect idea concerning this sphere or the other of relations which objectively exist, but not these relations themselves. Were interstate relations in fact a sphere of class struggle, ideological disagreements would be an inalienable attribute thereof, and peaceful coexistence, a form of class struggle and nothing else. Rejecting, consequently, the former formula of peaceful coexistence, we thereby also reject the former idea concerning interstate relations as a sphere of class struggle.

Previously mistaken ideas were obscured and intensified by many circumstances of an internal and external nature. Today the problem of survival which has confronted mankind, as also the fact that the world has approached a dangerous frontier of its development, the brink of catastrophe, is forcing a reconsideration of many propositions which once seemed correct, an abandonment of frozen dogmas and a view of the world through other eyes free of accumulated prejudices and false stereotypes.

Today the antagonism between the two social systems is developing under conditions where interest common to all mankind has to prevail over class interest. Whereas Marxism's proposition that "the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat" and the "interests of all" are higher than the interests just of one's own nation (28) has always been correct, today it becomes an imperative.

The modern world continues to be divided by profound contradictions, and too much prejudice, distrust, fear and hostility has accumulated therein. The inertia of the old, "traditional" political thinking and political action and the power approach to the solution of international affairs continues to operate.

However, heartening changes for the better are occurring in this sphere also. The objective processes occurring in international relations are contributing to the change in the way of political thinking. The growing political and economic relationship and interdependence of states and peoples, the internationalization of production, the threat of the annihilation of mankind, ecological problems—all these are leading to an ever increasing intersecting of interests and a multiplication of states' points of contact on various issues and objectively engendering a community of their interests.

This community is a most important political prerequisite of the development of the cooperation of states with different social systems and prerequisite of their joint actions (29). However, community, although essential, is an insufficient condition for the development of normal relations between them. Any policy is realistic to the extent that it takes into consideration the interests of other parties. As the Soviet scholar V.F. Petrovskiy rightly observes, "the pursuit of a realistic foreign policy in our time is impossible without regard both for one's own interests and possibilities and those of other states. A balance of mutual interests is the basis on which the political solution of international problems should be built" (30).

The search for and consideration of elements of community presupposes a mastery of the art of compromise. Nothing can be achieved today by threats and force—they lead merely to the destruction of trust between states. The great art of living together on the basis of peaceful coexistence is built, consequently, on the no less great art of political compromise. An uncompromising policy is an antipolicy which is unwarranted even under exceptional, extreme conditions. Intelligent compromise in policy, on the other hand, means the search for and finding of the common in the particular and the varied. Without this all aspirations to the achievement of agreement between states, whether on questions of ensuring mutual security or in the establishment of mutually profitable, equal relations in the sphere of economic ties, are doomed to fail. "After all, if each state," M.S. Gorbachev observed, "pursues merely its own interests and is incapable of meeting a partner half-way, seeking points of contact and cooperating with him, it will be difficult to achieve an improvement in international relations" (31).

Considerable experience has been accumulated in the achievement of compromise, mutually acceptable solutions between socialist and capitalist states. This has been possible thanks to a considerable extent to the break with previous ideas concerning the principles of states' mutual relations and a change in the evolved stereotypes concerning an evaluation of priorities between national and general and state and class interests and between ideology and foreign policy. The ongoing changes reflect a process of the formation of new political thinking free of dogmatic outlines and simplistic views of the world and one's own role therein and of claims to possess a monopoly on truth.

Footnotes

1. See E.A. Shevardnadze's report at a meeting in the USSR Foreign Ministry on 3 May 1987 (VESTNIK MID SSSR No 1, 5 August 1987, p 19).

2. In the work "A Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" K. Marx reproached Hegel for, in particular, confusing two different concepts: the state, as the aggregate of the whole existence of the people, and the political state (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 1, p 309).

3. The "civil society" concept—a principal one in the theoretical legacy of Marxism—was for a long time undeservedly forgotten in our political and philosophical literature and reduced to the "production relations" concept. However, the "civil society" is a broader and more capacious concept than production relations: it incorporates the sum total of relations outside of the framework of the political state—economic, national, religious, spiritual-moral, family, cultural and so forth—and constitutes the actual basis of the state. We note with satisfaction that this concept is once again acquiring "citizenship". We would mention in this connection A. Migranyan's profound and interesting article "Relations of the Individual, Society and the State in the Political Theory of Marxism and Problems of Democratization of the Socialist Society" published in the journal VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 8, 1987.

4. Inasmuch as the "national interest" concept is now customary and has become a firm part of political vocabulary and literature we will continue to use it, but in the sense of the interests of this society or the other in their correlation with the interests of the political state, specifying specially instances where it actually reflects the interests of this nation or the other.

5. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 1, pp 253, 391-392; vol 21, pp 220, 310.

6. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 1, pp 233, 236.

7. Ibid., pp 440, 392.

8. See *ibid.*, p 402.

9. "From the political viewpoint," K. Marx wrote, "the state and the arrangement of society are not two different things. The state is the arrangement of society" (*ibid.*, p 439).

10. E. Kant even wrote about this: "...Civil liberty... cannot be violated in any way significantly without damage being done to all sectors of the economy, trade particularly, and without the forces of the state in its external affairs being weakened thereby.... When the citizen is prevented from building his prosperity in his chosen way, compatible with the liberty of others, all production is deprived of viability and the forces of the whole are thereby once again diminished" (E. Kant, "Works," vol 6, Moscow, 1966, pp 19-20). For a complete description of the interaction of the state and the civil society see F. Engels' celebrated letter to K. Schmidt of 27 October 1890 (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 37, pp 416-421).

11. The function of the state as an expression of community is dialectically combined with its role as an instrument of class domination. However, in our literature this combination is most often ignored, as a consequence of which the property of community has either disappeared altogether or has been preserved only in respect of the socialist state.

12. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, part 1, p 422.

13. *Ibid.*, vol 21, p 311.

14. *Ibid.*, vol 1, pp 221, 222.

15. For more detail on this see VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 8, 1987, p 79.

16. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 1, p 393.

17. *Ibid.*, vol 2, p 355.

18. For differences in the content and form of the state's domestic and foreign policy activity see E. Pozdnyakov, "Foreign Policy Activity and International Relations," Moscow, 1986, chapter 1.

19. Hegel wrote: "We may speak of the sovereignty of the people only in the sense that in relation to the outside world the people are altogether something independent and constitute their own state" (quoted from K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 1, p 262).

20. This evaluation does not extend, of course, to critical periods in the life of nations accompanied frequently by their division (revolutions, civil wars and so forth).

21. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 1, p 103; vol 16, p 198.

22. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, pp 424-447; vol 21, pp 220, 259, 309-310.

23. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 22, p 48.

24. See Ye. Primakov, "A New Foreign Policy Philosophy" (PRAVDA, 10 July 1987).

25. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 2, p 89.

26. V. Bilak, "Our Common European Home" (PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 8, 1987, p 4).

27. See PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.

28. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 4, p 220; vol 30, pp 43, 44-45.

29. "Where there is no community of interests," F. Engels wrote, "there can be no unity of goals, not to mention unity of action" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 8, p 14).

30. "Europe of the 20th Century: Problems of Peace and Security," Moscow, 1985, pp 207-208.

31. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 1, 5 August 1987, p 6.

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Political Case for Disarmament Must have Technical Backing

18160009c Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 18-30

[Part two of article by A. Arbatov: "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms"]

[Text] In connection with an analysis of the problems of the prevention of a race in space-based arms, preservation of the ABM Treaty and radical cuts in and the elimination of strategic offensive arms (SOA) the first article touched also on the procedural polemic between two schools of Soviet political scientists studying questions of disarmament and international security. It would be wrong to understand the arguments of these two schools, conditionally called "politicians" and "technocrats," as the disagreements of theorists and practitioners or as a debate of representatives of basic and applied research in this field.

The subject of the disagreements between the two concerns rather the kind of theory which is needed here, how to develop it and how closely it should be linked with practice. The "technocrats" mainly advocate the inductive method, that is, movement from the particular to the general, the revelation of regularities and the elaboration of theoretical concepts based on an analysis of practical experience in all its complexity and contradictoriness. They aspire to find the political "philosophers' stone" of the problems of international security by taking as the starting point an investigation of the relationship of military-technical progress and the evolution of strategic concepts; the mutual influence of strategic doctrines and international policy (primarily from the viewpoint of the danger of war); the confrontation of military programs and arms limitation talks; and, finally, closing the circle, the relationship of disarmament measures and an easing of the threat of war in states' political relations.

Representatives of the "political" school cleave for the most part to the deductive method, that is, they move from the general theory of international relations to their military and political aspects and attempt on this basis to draw conclusions with reference to specific questions of security, disarmament and the military situation.

Political Ends and Military Means

This is what E.A. Pozdnyakov, Soviet specialist in the theory of international relations field, writes, for example: "However significant the impact of weapons on policy is at times, they are nonetheless subordinate to it.

Were this not so, it would be necessary to part forever not only with the hope of complete nuclear disarmament but partial arms limitation even. In fact, missiles are not created independently merely as a consequence of the simple 'logic' of the development of military technology, just as they are not deployed independently at various points on the globe. Both are the result of states' policy, which is itself determined to a considerable extent by the political relations which have taken shape between them. This level of arms or the other is the direct consequence of the corresponding policy of states (my emphasis—A.A.) and the political relations between them. In order, consequently, to remove the effect it is necessary to begin with removal of the causes of this effect. The causes, however, are always political and cannot be anything other" (1), he concludes.

The basic propositions of the article quoted would seem perfectly justified, but the adduced statement is highly typical of the "political" school and for this reason merits more detailed analysis. The merit of the adduced syllogism is that it is absolutely incontestable, but only at a very high level of generalization. Its shortcoming, however, is the fact that a multitude of questions immediately arises upon an attempt to suffuse it with even the least specific content, not to mention to draw practical conclusions.

First of all, what is understood by states' policy, the result of which is the creation and deployment of missiles? If what is meant are diplomatic, economic and technical-strategic considerations in the process of the adoption of decisions pertaining to important military programs, everything is clear here. It is they which are the subject of the "technocrats'" research (2). If, however, what is meant are more fundamental aspects of states' political relations, their direct linkage with arms levels gives rise in a number of instances not only to theoretical objections but also leads directly to an impasse from the viewpoint of practical recommendations.

In fact, is there even one political conflict between the USSR and the United States which would justify the stockpiling of approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons and a further buildup of potentials of destruction capable not only of wiping out many times over not only these powers but also all of civilization and, possibly, life on the planet as well? Is there even one convincing explanation of the political factors in accordance with which the Warsaw Pact or NATO would decide to attack one another? But 3 million-strong groupings of the two alliances' armed forces, up to 80,000 tanks and approximately 6,000 tactical strike aircraft confront one another on the continent (3).

Another, practical, aspect of the problem is closely connected with this also. If, as the author writes, this level of arms or the other "is the direct consequence" of states' political relations, arms agreements are really not to be looked for without these relations having been

changed. But inasmuch as it is generally recognized that the arms race is now in itself a most significant source of mutual distrust and contradictions between the states, changing their political relations without curbing the arms race is also barely possible. The result is a closed circle, without extrication from which not only complete but even partial arms limitation is not really to be looked for. Given this formulation of the question, the ground for practical steps is lost, and what is left is merely a subject for interminable talk and mutual recrimination.

There is just one way out of this circle, it would seem. It must be acknowledged that although the first principle of the arms race are in fact political conflicts in states' relations, in the last 40 years the military rivalry between the biggest powers, in the nuclear arms sphere primarily, has far exceeded the political contradictions which originally engendered it and become isolated from them to a large extent. The arms race has acquired powerful inertia, formed its own, exceptionally complex reproduction mechanism and established its own regularities and cycles. What E.A. Pozdnyakov considers the transitory, temporary effect of the "reverse impact" of weapons on policy and an "optical illusion" leading to an exaggeration of the "scale and significance" of weapons (4) is precisely the key and, what is more, long-term problem of the present day.

The military sphere is not something unique here. It is sufficient to glance around to see in practically all spheres of the life of society tremendous problems born of the fact that effects become causes, and tactics, strategy and that means become an end in themselves and generate their own logic of development leaving the primordial ends far behind.

In the military sphere these regularities appear only in particular relief. The dynamics of the arms race are fed by the energy of giant military-industrial bureaucratic establishments, the powerful pulses of the S&T revolution and the constant refinement of strategic thought. Multiply this by the thick veil of secrecy which frequently conceals a lack of supervision and responsibility in the expenditure of huge resources, by jingoistic slogans covering up chauvinism and anarrowness of ideas concerning other peoples and by a fear paralyzing rational thinking in the face of the unlimited power of destruction in the hands of other powers, against which there is no defense, and the driving momentum of this flywheel will appear on a scale closer to reality.

Its quickening revolutions not only separated long since from the original political motivations, they have even outgrown any in the least way rational military considerations (what kind of operations could be mounted in Europe, say, by almost 200 NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions were the two alliances' 7,000-8,000 tactical nuclear weapons, which would render the continent uninhabitable forever, activated?). To all appearances, the levels of military confrontation, military programs and strategic concepts have themselves become a most

important, albeit highly specific, sphere and form of expression of states' political relations. This sphere is to a growing extent becoming isolated from other aspects of international policy, but entails for the latter the danger of the most disastrous and irreparable consequences, with which no single contentious issue of present-day international life is commensurate.

But it is precisely because military-strategic reality is a particular form of expression of political relations between states that it lends itself to political influence, primarily, what is more, in a specific form of relations also: via disarmament negotiations and the corresponding agreements. And for big changes on this path it is not necessary to wait for the removal of the political first causes, the consequence of which the arms race was. The efforts and steps in the sphere of disarmament themselves, enjoying the increasingly broad support of the world community, are changing states' political relations, actively and positively influencing such an important sphere thereof as military-strategic relations.

In this respect the example adduced by E.A. Pozdnyakov involving the INF Treaty testifies, it would seem, not in support of his proposition. The treaty has, of course, abruptly changed the military-strategic relations of the USSR and the United States and the situation in Europe and Asia, and there has undoubtedly been an improvement in the overall world political situation. The treaty could not have failed to have been preceded by pronounced changes in the mood and views both in the Soviet Union and in the United States. But no political first causes of the arms race were preliminarily removed, and the other military programs continue in full swing (if anyone has evidence to the contrary, it would be interesting and gratifying to hear it).

The example of the treaty confirms precisely the other viewpoint. And it is symptomatic in this sense that this largely unprecedented agreement was signed with the R. Reagan administration—that same administration which in preceding years had done much to once again revive the "cold war," which was the first cause of the current (in terms of the composition of the participants and classes of weapons) arms race. At the same time, however, it is obvious that if in the coming years a pause in the disarmament process sets in and the fast pace that has been set is lost, an arms race will once again prevail and "make good what has been lost" even without any additional political arguments.

In order to avert such a development of events it will be necessary to solve a multitude not only of practical but also serious theoretical problems.

Problem of Strategic Stability

One such problem is the relationship of the objective military-technical possibility and the political likelihood of nuclear war. Arms reduction negotiations influence mainly the first, although agreements in this field

undoubtedly improve overall political relations between states, which promotes the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, as a result of the escalation of which nuclear war could be unleashed. The connecting link between the physical possibility and political probability of nuclear war is, it would seem, the degree of stability of the military-strategic situation.

The concept of stability or steadiness means the ease with which this object or the other may be withdrawn from the existing condition and the difficulty with which it may be returned to this condition. As pointed out in a study (5) of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Danger with reference to military-strategic balance—the principal objective factor of the prevention of nuclear war—the concept of stability must, consequently, imply the greatness of the probability and danger of a nuclear conflict being unleashed granted a given correlation of the parties' strategic weapons. More specifically, the most important aspect of stability is evidently the extent to which the constituent components of a given strategic correlation of forces increase or lessen the possibility of the delivery of a first strike in an acute crisis situation, that is, how they influence the material aspect of the danger of a thermonuclear war being unleashed.

It is wrong here, of course, to absolutize the significance of purely military factors. The political prerequisites and aims of states in a conflict have been and remain determining, and their relationship with the purely military situation has always been of a most complex dialectical nature in the plane of the danger of the growth of a crisis into war. But under present conditions the influence of military-strategic factors on the development of possible crisis situations is growing increasingly.

This has been brought about primarily by the unprecedented growth of the power of destruction, speed and range of the parties' arms and the catastrophic consequences of their use—and at the same time by the unprecedented technical and organizational complication of the military mechanisms. They are geared to preplanned and consummate interaction of a tremendous number of components and effectors coordinated in time down to minutes and seconds even and in an area encompassing land and sea and air expanses globally, and recently increasingly space also. This is making the main powers' modern armed forces, particularly their strategic nuclear "units," a powerful factor weighing on the choice of steps in a crisis situation and imposing on politicians to a growing extent a particular logic of operations with a strong admixture of strategic, operational and technical determinants.

The choice of criteria for evaluating the degree of stability of the correlation of forces as a result of this version or the other of a reduction in SOA is dictated decisively by the determination of what strategic ends the opposite side might pursue in the launching of a nuclear first strike.

According to Soviet strategic views, the most likely and priority task of nuclear aggression could be a reduction in the power of retribution, that is, prevention of a retaliatory strike or an appreciable lessening of its losses from such (6).

It should be noted that, while a permissible military goal, reducing damage in a nuclear clash could hardly be taken as a state's political goal in war. After all, the surest method of reducing any power's losses would be prevention of the unleashing of a nuclear conflict altogether. Nonetheless, a nuclear cataclysm could evidently be the continuation of a particular military strategy which has escaped subordination to policy and operates according to its own laws. Powers' political goals could clash and entail a military conflict, with the direct use against one another of conventional armed forces and arms included. It is in this situation, when both the stakes and losses in the course of the clash are already significant, that strategic logic threatens, if the leaders of the belligerents are unable to halt the escalation of combat operations and settle the conflict peacefully, to gain the ascendancy over commonsense.

As the top Soviet scientist V.I. Gantman, a father of our theory of international relations who departed this life prematurely, observed, "having arisen as a political relationship, an international conflict acquires a certain independence and logic of its own development and is itself capable of variously influencing other relationships developing in the context of the given conflict, even the nature of the contradictions at the basis thereof and the methods of their solution" (7). In an instance where a strategic nuclear attack of the other party appears inevitable or very likely and where the estimated difference in damage at the time of the first strike and a second strike is relatively great, there could be an incentive to deliver a preemptive strategic strike in the hope that the retaliatory strike would be of less power than under different conditions.

In such a situation, regardless of the states' original political motives and goals, it is the state of the strategic correlation of forces—the presence of balance or, on the contrary, the superiority of one party—which could be the decisive factor capable of tilting the balance this way or the other. The SOA talks must serve primarily the goals of a lessening of the probability of nuclear catastrophe via the consolidation of stability at declining levels of strategic balance.

Both the theoretical and practical importance of the scientific elaboration of the problems of strategic stability is obvious. And it is just as obvious that there will be no movement here without a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the military balance, strategic doctrines and concepts and the specifics of the arms reduction negotiations.

50-Percent Cuts in SOA

In the course of the top-level meeting in Washington the parties achieved a pronounced convergence of positions for the preparation of joint wording pertaining to key parameters of the first stage of SOA cuts. Specifically, the former principles of a 50-percent reduction in SOA to a level of 6,000 nuclear weapons and 1,600 delivery systems for each party were confirmed. A limit of 154 ICBM's and 1,540 nuclear warheads on them was agreed also. A new point was the establishment of a sublevel of 4,900 ground- and sea-launched ballistic missile warheads. The joint statement also reflected agreement that as a result of the cuts the total throw-weight of the Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's would be reduced by 50 percent and that neither party would exceed this level. The rules for counting warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's were agreed. The decision to concentrate attention on the rules of counting air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and on limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) with nuclear warheads to a separate ceiling over and above the 6,000—1,600 limits. With the experience of the INF Treaty as a basis, measures for monitoring and verifying compliance with the future SOA agreement were developed considerably (8).

At the same time, however, appreciable differences between the two powers remain. The essence of the parties' disagreements on a reduction in SOA has its roots in the considerably differing approaches of the USSR and the United States to the substance of military-strategic balance and strategic stability.

The concept of strategic stability which has been made the basis of U.S. policy postulates that ground-based ICBM's are destabilizing inasmuch as they are best adapted to a first strike against the other party's strategic forces (their analogous component primarily) for the purpose of weakening them and are at the same time vulnerable to such a strike by the enemy. This allegedly creates a dual incentive for their preemptive use. But the missiles of submarines and bombers with ALCM are allegedly intended only for a retaliatory attack (the first are insufficiently accurate and have unreliable communications with the center, and the second require a time of many hours of approach to target). Consequently, the more strictly ICBM's are reduced and limited, the less the likelihood of a first strike and the higher strategic stability.

Taking its understanding of stability as the basis, the United States is endeavoring to obtain terms of the agreement which would alter the structure, qualitative composition and, consequently, operational possibilities of the Soviet Union's strategic forces. Defining ground-based ICBM as the most "destabilizing" type of strategic weapon, the American side has since the Reykjavik meeting been insisting on the incorporation in a treaty of sublevels additionally limiting the number of warheads on individual components of the strategic triad (ICBM's plus SLBM's in toto and ICBM's separately) and even on

certain types of ground-based ballistic missiles. These conditions presuppose an appreciable reconfiguration of the traditional composition of the Soviet strategic forces conditioned by the specific features of the geostrategic location, organizational-technical development and history of the development of the military doctrine and strategy of the Soviet Union.

Besides the quantitative sublevels, strict qualitative limitations should, in accordance with the American proposals, be imposed on heavy ICBM's—traditionally the key component of Soviet SOA—inasmuch as it would be forbidden to manufacture, test or deploy modernized types thereof and modify or refit their launchers. A condition concerning the banning and dismantling of ground-mobile ICBM's was offered also. It was aimed at one stroke against two Soviet programs: it is a question of the RS-22 (SS-24) ICBM system with multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's) and of the RS-12M (SS-25)-type modernized single-warhead ICBM (9). The Soviet Union would thereby be deprived of the possibility of the enhanced survivability of its strategic missile forces (SMF) in the face of the deployment of new American systems (MX, Trident 2, cruise missiles) with high kill capability in respect of hardened permanent facilities of the ICBM launch silo type.

The American condition concerning a ban on mobile ICBM's is officially justified by difficulties of verification, specifically of the prohibition on the capacity for the rapid reloading of ICBM launchers. It is obvious, however, that perfectly dependable safeguards against the possibility of ground-mobile missile launcher reloading could be secured given the all-embracing verification measures, including on-site inspection, being discussed currently by the two powers. It is indicative that this point of the official American position has evoked serious criticism both on the part of the "strategic community" in the United States, including its conservative representatives, and in Congress.

A directly opposite attitude toward verification is demonstrated by the administration when it is a matter of American military programs. The United States is by no means urging restrictions on long-range SLCM's, despite the mutual understanding in principle reached in respect of them in Reykjavik. Yet SLCM's are a clearly expressed destabilizing weapons system. They possess increased accuracy and the capacity for destroying highly protected targets, and it is hard to fix their launch and approach with space- and ground-based early warning facilities, which creates a threat both to the strategic forces of the other party and its control and communications system.

The United States is planning to deploy approximately 4,000 Tomahawk-class SLCM's in 10 various modifications with nuclear and conventional warheads on multi-purpose Los Angeles and Sturgeon-class nuclear submarines (altogether, 93 nuclear submarines by the mid-1990's) and also on large missile-firing ships of the

"New Jersey," "Virginia," "California," "Ticonderoga" and "Berk" class (approximately 100 existing and programmed ships as a whole). It is significant that the verification problem is no trouble for the U.S. Administration in this case, and it is refusing to discuss limitations on SLCM's, aside from one class thereof with a nuclear warhead, although distinguishing individual versions of this system by outward characteristics is practically impossible.

One circumstance of a general nature has to be mentioned. Even without any sublevels and qualitative limitations a 50-percent reduction in SOA to ceilings of 6,000 nuclear weapons and 1,600 delivery systems would affect the strategic forces and programs of the Soviet Union more appreciably. The point being that, first, the United States has a more balanced allocation of delivery systems and nuclear weapons in the three components of the strategic triad. Second, in the arms race the USSR has mainly responded to the actions of the United States with a 5-year gap on average in system-deployment phases. In the Soviet strategic forces there are more single-warhead delivery vehicles than in the American forces. In 1987 single-warhead missiles and bombers without ALCM's constituted for the USSR 49 percent of delivery systems, but for the United States, 41 percent (10). At the same time, however, the Soviet multiple-warhead ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers (with cruise missiles) are approximately 5-7 years "younger" than the American ones, and the most costly operational units (in model-cost terms)—missile-firing nuclear submarines with missiles with MRV's—have a lesser "age" compared with their American counterparts by 15 years on average.

This means that the Soviet Union would have to effect the 50-percent reduction in respect of far less obsolete systems, in respect of submarines particularly. The removal, on the other hand, of the comparatively old single-warhead missiles and aircraft produces a substantial reduction in terms of delivery systems (more than 50 percent), but a very slight reduction in terms of warheads (13 percent). The United States could theoretically thanks to obsolete single-warhead and multiple-warhead delivery systems and old submarines reduce its SOA more painlessly 60 percent in terms of delivery systems and 65 percent in terms of warheads (per the counting rules) (11). This would provide for the 50-percent reduction and additionally create a certain "reserve" for the deployment of new-generation strategic systems.

As already mentioned, a compromise sublevel on the sum total of ICBM and SLBM warheads of 4,900 was fixed at the Washington meeting. Knowing the counting rules (12), it is not difficult to reckon that, given the deployment of, say, up to 3,300 warheads on ICBM's, the Soviet Union could have a maximum of 1,600 warheads on SLBM's, that is, 5 Typhoon-class submarines with SS-N-20 missiles and 9-10 submarines with

SS-N-23 SLBM's (as an alternative, only 8 Typhoon SSBN's or some combination based on 3 submarines of the second class in place of one Typhoon-class missile-firing submarine).

In any version the Soviet Union would have to withdraw from the SOA more than 50 missile-firing submarines, including some relatively new SSBN's which left the building slips in the 1970's and also no less than 500 old single-warhead SS-11 and SS-13 ICBM's (RS-12 in the Soviet classification) and more than 400 SS-17, SS-19 and SS-18 MRV missiles (designated RS-16, RS-18 and RS-20 in the USSR) commissioned since 1975 (13).

As far as the United States' strategic forces are concerned, they would, by virtue of the said objective circumstances, be affected somewhat more "sparingly". Given the withdrawal of 28 obsolete Poseidon and Trident 1 submarines with SLBM's (built in the period 1962-1967), 260 old B-52 bombers (manufactured at the end of the 1950's-start of the 1960's) and 770 Minuteman 2 and Minuteman 3 ICBM's (1965-1975), it would be relatively less difficult for the United States to refit its SOA for the latest systems. As a possible route within the framework of the said sublevels, it would have an opportunity to deploy, for example, 17 Ohio-class submarines with Trident 2 SLBM's, 50-80 B-1B heavy bombers with cruise missiles (14) and 130 breakthrough-type Stealth bombers and also 100 new MX ICBM's, retaining here approximately 180 Minuteman 3 missiles with the new MK-12A warheads (as an alternative, having built 50 MX missiles, it would be possible to retain all 300 Minuteman 3 ICBM's of this modification or have 180 of them and additionally deploy 500 new mobile Midgetman missiles).

"What's the point of all these bewildering calculations?" some supporters of the "political" school ask. "After all, it is the political meaning of the reduction in the arsenals of destruction which is far more important." Yes, this is undoubtedly the case, the treaty would improve Soviet-American relations and the entire political climate in the world. But what does this amount to if the question is posed more specifically? How are the positive changes measured, how are the possible negative phenomena weighed and how are they removed? The main political essence of the treaty is obviously the fact that, thanks to it, there is to be a diminution in the threat of nuclear war. But more tangible and stable changes than the good mood of the world community (which also, of course, performs not the least role) are needed for this. These changes must be expressed in a lessening of the material possibility and, consequently, all other things being equal, the political probability of a nuclear first strike in a hypothetical crisis situation, which could actually trigger a nuclear war. And general discussion is not enough here. It is necessary to count and analyze and formulate justified concepts of what strategic ends the enemy may be pursuing in launching a first strike, which

factors of the military balance contribute to this and which impede it and how their correlation may be changed as a result of this treaty draft or the other.

The sublevels and other limitations proposed by Washington are based, as observed earlier, on a concept of "strategic stability" which has been worked up in detail. This concept has taken shape and been extensively discussed in the United States over two decades in circles of specialists, politicians and representatives of the mass media. Although the concept is not monolithic and has a number of differing versions in the United States, its common propositions substantiate both American policy at the negotiations and its strategic programs as complementary components of the single policy of "safeguarding security".

In practice it has many weak points and has been seriously criticized in Soviet scientific literature (15). But inasmuch as the strengthening of strategic stability occupies such an important place in the negotiations of the USSR and the United States, the Soviet approach to this question is obviously in need of more detailed and comprehensive elucidation in the context of disclosure of the USSR's defensive military doctrine. After all, at the current stage, while nuclear weapons have not yet been eliminated, both the USSR Armed Forces and its policy of reaching radical disarmament accords serve the common goal of preventing nuclear war.

Where it has not been possible as yet to come to an agreement it is necessary to maintain the balance thanks to military programs providing for deterrence by their retaliatory strike potential. It is expedient measuring this deterrence in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency with regard for the forces and programs of the other side. But where the forces of the United States may be limited by way of agreements, the need for certain nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union, renunciation of which could be a part of these agreements, is removed. Attaching priority precisely to this path is prescribed by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, which made paramount political methods of strengthening security. Addressing the UN General Assembly 42d Session, V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy USSR foreign minister, emphasized: "We proceed from the fact that progress toward a nuclear-free world may be made in stages both in terms of the composition of the participants and the inclusion of arms, and at each stage, what is more, and throughout this process security should be strengthened constantly and strategic stability enhanced. Agreement should be reached at the intermediate stages of this progress at least on a reasonable sufficiency of arms, both nuclear and conventional, and on preservation of strategic stability at the lowest possible level of this sufficiency" (16).

A comprehensive elucidation of the Soviet concept of stability would show convincingly how our strategy of the prevention of war and an orientation exclusively

toward a retaliatory strike predetermines the existing and future structure and the basic quantitative and qualitative specifications of the Soviet SOA.

Greater glasnost in these matters cannot weaken security. After all, the main thing in Soviet military doctrine (and, consequently, strategy, operational art and military organizational development) is preventing nuclear war, and not "surprising" the enemy if he, for all that, ventures an attack. Of course, in a number of aspects a degree of military uncertainty reduces the likelihood of aggression. Specific details of operational planning and the functioning of the control, communications and warning system should, of course, be kept secret (and, incidentally, kept secret not only by the Soviet Union but America also) lest the other party attempt to avail itself of such information to acquire the capacity for a "decapitating" or "disarming" strike. But uncertainty proves completely counterproductive when it is used by the other party to develop a campaign about the "Soviet threat," to justify new rounds of the arms race and for attempts to impose unequal terms of agreements on the Soviet Union.

The political approach to safeguarding security presupposes big reductions in arms, both old and new. The "politician" scientists rightly point out that the impending withdrawal of submarines, missiles and aircraft is not to be regretted—it is, after all, the actual disarmament process. But the stability of the strategic balance must not be shaken in the course of this process.

Inasmuch as the sublevels being discussed currently would, as shown above, perceptibly limit the numbers of Soviet ICBM's, SLBM's and the submarines themselves, we cannot, naturally, be indifferent to what new systems the United States will deploy in the 1980's-1990's within the framework of the agreed overall ceilings and sublevels. A reduction in SOA by half should lead to a strengthening of stability and a limitation of the counterforce potential of the United States (primarily its capacity for destroying protected targets and hitting ground-mobile missile deployment areas). The establishment of certain supplementary sublevels or structural quotas for the strategic forces remaining following the cuts could contribute to this.

For example, it is a question of limits on individual arms systems within each component of the strategic triad. The Washington meeting, we recall, agreed a limit of 1,540 warheads for heavy ICBM's within a sublevel of 4,900 warheads on ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The establishment of special limits also within the sea- and air-launched components of SOA in order to limit the deployment of destabilizing systems would, it would seem, contribute to stability in this connection. This applies to the Trident 2-class new SLBM's (together, of course, with their technical counterparts in the USSR). Then instead of on 17, the United States could deploy the Trident 2 missiles on a lesser number of

Ohio-class submarines, and there would, correspondingly, be a reduction in the number of powerful and accurate counterforce weapons undermining stability and increasing the threat of a first strike.

As far as ALCM's are concerned, the sublevel of 4,900 warheads (out of 6,000) on ICBM's and SLBM's presupposes the limitation of ALCM's to 1,100. In insisting on a larger quantity thereof the United States is thereby eroding the significance of the subceiling of 4,900. After all, the other party also could propose a raising thereof within the overall framework in order to augment the number of highly viable retaliatory strike weapons in other components of the strategic triad. Inasmuch as the United States is insisting on limiting ICBM warheads to a sublevel of 3,300 (in October 1987 the USSR proposed a version of such a limit of 3,000-3,300), it would surely be useful converting this subceiling into a limit of the concentration of warheads in any one component of the triad (that is, 50-55 percent), both ground and sea and air.

As pointed out above, the American conditions of a 50-percent reduction presuppose a considerable change in the traditional structure of Soviet SOA. The question arises in this connection: is this structure in some way sacramental brooking no change. Obviously, this is not the case: we have recently been witnessing how many traditions which had seemed permanent have been undergoing revision to the benefit of the cause. Indeed, incidentally, the structure of Soviet SOA has historically changed very noticeably. For example, prior to 1967 the USSR had no SSBN's, which are counted by specialists of both parties in the effective combat strength of the SOA; at the time of the signing of SALT I (1972) the proportion of sea-launched missiles in terms of warheads constituted approximately 20 percent, but in 1986, more than 30 percent (17). The proportion of nuclear weapons of heavy bombers, which now constitutes approximately 5 percent, will increase (in accordance with the sublevel of 4,900 recorded in Washington) to almost 20 percent if the USSR's total number of nuclear weapons following the 50-percent cuts is no less than the agreed 6,000.

Thus it is not a question of the permanency of the structure as such but of the USSR's strategic forces being optimally adapted within the limits of a reduction in SOA by half for performance of their main assignment: prevention of a nuclear attack with impunity, based on their readiness to deliver a retaliatory attack capable of causing the aggressor unacceptable damage (18). The principle of reasonable sufficiency, however, by no means presupposes a restructuring of SOA per the American model, toward which we are being pushed by its terms of reductions. On the contrary, the said principle precludes this rather: after all, the structure and specifications of the United States' forces embody certain strategic concepts which are unacceptable to us ("countervailing disarming strike," "limited and protracted nuclear war" and others). The neutralization of these plans presupposes not the preparation of analogous

plans and arms but preservation of the capacity for performing the above-mentioned assignment in spite of the new strategic weapons of the United States. In addition, there are objective differences in the parties' geostrategic position and their technical development.

Abiding by the principle of safeguarding security politically, even more far-reaching measures in a subsequent reduction in SOA could be proposed. For example, limiting to special individual sublevels the number of warheads on the systems which the parties consider for each other destabilizing and the most dangerous. These subceilings would encompass on the American side the MX, Trident 2 and ALCM systems, on the Soviet side, analogous weapons plus heavy missiles. In this case dangerous new American arms would, together with a reduction in and limitation of a number of Soviet systems, be limited appreciably—with considerable benefit to the stability and security of both parties.

Even more radical steps, particularly in the light of the USSR's intention not to stop at 50-percent cuts, are possible also. There is no point postponing these steps for long, after all, in the next 5-7 years the deployment of new systems even within the lowered quantitative ceilings could cost a tremendous amount of money, and this in itself would make more difficult subsequent, even deeper cuts, not to mention the possible destabilizing effect of a new generation of arms. The Soviet scientist A.A. Kokoshin advanced in this connection an important theoretical proposition which is being fully corroborated by practice: "In contrast to efforts to restore and maintain military-strategic parity," he emphasized, "the strengthening of strategic stability unilaterally is a far more difficult business and at times almost impossible. Whence an important feature of stability—the need for reciprocity to safeguard it" (that is, the corresponding agreements—A.A.) (19).

Proceeding from considerations of the enhanced survivability of SOA, a ban on ground-mobile ICBM's (20) in the course of a reduction in strategic arms, given adequate opportunities for verification, is entirely unwarranted. Of course, SLCM's, as a most destabilizing type of strategic arms, should be limited. If the United States is prepared to discuss a limitation only of SLCM's with nuclear warheads, it must itself also assist in ensuring reliable verification involving the use of new technical facilities and also on-site inspection. It puts the issue precisely thus in respect of ground-mobile ICBM's and other Soviet systems. If verification measures and military programs are in conflict, the second, and not the first, should be sacrificed for the sake of the conclusion of more radical agreements. A political approach to safeguarding security based on a comprehensive analysis of both strategic and technical issues must be displayed here also.

An analysis of the problems of deep cuts in strategic arms makes it possible to draw certain preliminary conclusions of a procedural nature also. The argument between

the "politicians" and "technocrats" (the latter-day "lyric poets" and "physicists") is more often than not devoid of real grounds. It is brought about for the most part not by different approaches to the problem but reflects the endeavor of some people to avoid a systematic study of extremely complex military-strategic subject matter (which does not fit fully within the traditional framework of the humanities) and the readiness of others to undertake this painstaking and endless labor, beginning at times right at the beginning. However, life and work settle these arguments quite definitely. When all ("lyrical," so to speak) words have been spoken and it is necessary to switch to actual deeds, nothing can substitute for the professional and detailed investigation of military-strategic problems.

That the problems of security, and more narrowly even—disarmament subject matter as an aspect thereof—are far from exhausted by study of military-strategic and military-technical questions is another matter. They encompass a wide range of international policy, domestic policy, economic and social and psychological subjects. For example, an evaluation of the prospects of a 50-percent reduction in SOA cannot be reduced merely to the military-strategic, technical and negotiating-legal aspects of the question. An analysis of the domestic political situation of the United States (including the results of the INF Treaty ratification process), the economic situation and the overall development of Soviet-American relations and the two powers' relations with their allies, which are reflected in the Geneva negotiations, is absolutely essential here. All these subjects require special study and have for this reason not been touched on in this article. Here it is up to the specialists in the corresponding fields. But this also is, obviously, something entirely specific and completely different from abstract arguments in support of disarmament.

Generally, we may express the opinion that disarmament problems are a specific, entirely independent, new branch of science. They stand at the intersection of the natural and exact sciences, political and economic studies, military science and art and history and psychology. They are directly coupled with practice in the form of diplomatic negotiations, are nurtured constantly by their experience and deduce therefrom generalizations and regularities which should serve as the basis for specific forecasts and recommendations. This science constantly undergoes strict verification by practice. And, like any true science, it does not tolerate verbiage, slipshod formulas or premature ideas and takes vengeance for arbitrary treatment of itself.

The so-called "technocrats," for their part, must not, of course, become real technocrats in the negative meaning of this word. Weapons systems, strategic concepts, methods of evaluating the military balance, arms reduction levels and sublevels—all this, of course, is not an end in itself but merely the means of realization and form of expression of policy strengthening or, on the contrary,

undermining security. This subordination cannot be lost sight of particularly now, when the new philosophy of security presupposes a fresh view of the world, a view "without spectacles and blinders," and a quest for bold, nontraditional ways of reining in the nuclear danger.

"Politician" scientists appealing against a preoccupation with "pieces of iron" and for people to rise above prosaic details are by no means helping the development of the scientific base in this field, in which, let's face it, for objective and subjective reasons, there is as yet far broader scope for development than in the majority of other fields of the political and economic sciences. Thinking that they are contributing to the political approach, the "lyric poets" are in fact, despite themselves, strengthening the truly technocratic viewpoint. The former's representatives do not, naturally, in scientific debate take any of this "lyric poetry" at all seriously, but frequently fail to greet the viewpoint with a concretized alternative either. Streamlined, glowing maxims not suffused with objective content frequently burst like soap bubbles when confronted with the sharp edges of military-strategic reality and negotiating practice. The political approach may be extolled as much as you like, but this remains merely melodious rhetoric as long as this approach is not expressed via levels of a reduction in arms, conditions of their qualitative limitations and alternatives to the evolution of the military balance and strategic concepts. And then this approach needs to be further substantiated and defended in scientific argument within and with foreign specialists.

It is such responsible judgments which practice now obviously expects of science. As the splendid Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevskiy wrote, "the value of any knowledge is determined by its connection with our needs, aspirations and conduct; otherwise knowledge becomes simple memory ballast good for lessening the day-to-day rolling of, perhaps, an empty ship which is sailing without really valuable cargo" (21).

Footnotes

1. MEMO No 10, 1987, pp 31-32.
2. Very popular among these, incidentally, are so-called "case studies," that is, an examination of the process of the adoption of decisions in respect of major military programs in an aggregate of all the factors influencing it, including interdepartmental struggle.
3. See "Disarmament and Security 1986". Yearbook, vol 1, pp 191, 220.
4. MEMO No 10, 1987, p 31.
5. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms" (Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Danger), Moscow, 1987.

6. D.F. Ustinov, "Warding Off the Threat of Nuclear War" (PRAVDA, 12 July 1982). "For Peace on Earth. Soviet Program for the 1980's in Action". Articles and documents, Moscow, 1983, p 184.

7. "International Conflicts of the Present Day" (Exec. ed. V.I. Gantman), Moscow, 1983, p 18.

8. See PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.

9. "Disarmament and Security 1986". Yearbook, vol 1, p 26.

10. PRAVDA, 8 February 1988.

11. Ibid., 17 March 1987.

12. Ibid., 12 December 1987.

13. Estimated from PRAVDA, 12 December 1987; PRAVDA, 8 February 1988; "Whence the Threat to Peace," Moscow, 1982, pp 7-8.

14. Depending on what counting rules are agreed, that is, how many ALCM's are counted on each heavy bomber, the number of bombers could be even larger.

15. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms," Moscow, 1987; A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasilyev, A.A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA Nos 9, 10, 1987).

16. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 9, 10 December 1987, pp 10-11.

17. Estimated from "Whence the Threat to Peace," Moscow, 1987, p 8; "Disarmament and Security 1986". Yearbook, vol 1, p 39.

18. See D.T. Yazov, "On Guard of Socialism and Peace," Moscow, 1987, p 34.

19. A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasilyev, A.A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability" (article 1) (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 9, 1987, p 10).

20. The mobility of the launch sites makes the targeting thereon of the other side's weapons employing inertial guidance systems and programmed flight control more difficult owing to the uncertainty of location of the target, in this case, the ICBM launcher.

21. V.O. Klyuchevskiy, "Course of Russian History," "Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1987, p 60.

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New Realities Pose New Tasks for Workers Movement

18160009d Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 31-42

[Article by Prof Aleksandr Abramovich Galkin, doctor of historical sciences, assistant dean of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute: "New Political Thinking and Problems of the Workers Movement"]

[Text] Addressing the new political thinking affords extensive scope for debate. This is natural since it is a question not simply of the abandonment of many previous ideas and evaluations but also of the search for answers to questions posed by the changed reality of the end of the 20th century. Under such conditions there should be no areas closed to reflection and a modification of opinions; otherwise the analysis could prove to be out of step with reality, and the findings based thereon to reflect not so much the true as the desired situation. What is set forth below does not, of course, lay claim to an in any way complete illustration of the subject matter broached. The debate on this range of questions is only just beginning.

I

The point of departure which lent the main impetus to the new political thinking was recognition of the possibility of mankind's self-annihilation in a war involving the use of the latest weapons of mass destruction. This demanded a fundamental rethinking of the entire system of ideas concerning the aims, content and forms of foreign policy activity and real national interests, a reassessment of the role of the various factors determining the state's international authority, a search for new approaches to the solution of problems connected with the elaboration of foreign policy strategy and the concept of adequate security and so forth.

At the same time, however, the new political thinking is most directly related to the sum total of problems of various countries' sociopolitical development, including problems of the class struggle and, consequently, the workers movement.

First, recognition of the impossibility, from the rational viewpoint, of war involving the use of weapons of mass annihilation and also the existence of the dangerous trend toward the growth of low-intensity conflicts into increasingly large-scale conflicts inevitably put on the agenda the problem of international stability. But the alignment of forces in the world, in which states belonging to different social systems exist, is frequently associated with the nature of the social system in this country or the other. At the same time, however, the social system is a mobile phenomenon. In addition, the more rapid and profound the changes occurring in the world

(and we are now at precisely such a stage), the higher the probability of internal social movements. Under these conditions the problem of the "compatibility" of stability in interstate relations and its absence in the social sphere arises with all seriousness. It is obvious that the positive solution of this problem will inevitably require a modification of the ideas concerning what is meant by international stability and how to ensure that it is preserved under the conditions of the profound social transformations occurring in various parts of the world.

It may be recalled also that the high-minded conclusion concerning the need to exclude war from the arsenal of foreign policy poses anew questions of the international division of labor, the allocation of natural resources and the solution of other problems common to all mankind of tremendous significance for the economic, social and political situation in individual countries and, consequently, requires a fundamentally new approach to numerous domestic problems.

Second, the need for new political thinking has been brought about by the sum total of large-scale changes which are occurring in human society at the end of the 20th century. These include the danger of ecological catastrophe born of man's inordinately increased pressure on nature, primarily the conflict, which has assumed extreme forms, between the earth's limited natural resources and the outdated, wasteful model of industrial production, which still operates; growing material and social differentiation polarizing even more the developed and developing parts of the human community; the new realities of the technological revolution, which is largely changing the social articulation of society, the nature of labor and the correlation between work and free time and painfully breaking up the stereotypes of the consciousness and behavior of mass human communities.

Issue being taken with the "unduly broad" interpretation of the "new political thinking" concept, reference is frequently made to the fact that this could lead to its erosion and loss of categorical certainty. It is maintained that in this case the "new political thinking" would become simply a synonym for the current stage of the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Such an assertion does not seem convincing. Of course, the two concepts overlap one another to a certain extent. However, there are appreciable differences between them. On the one hand the new political thinking is considerably broader than the current stage of the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory. After all, for this thinking to be an effective factor of social development it must become—in its most important parameters—an organic component not only of the Marxist world outlook but of the principal ideological (or quasi-ideological) systems which are opposed to Marxism. On the other hand, the new political thinking is in some respects narrower than the current stage of the

creative development of Marxism-Leninism for it encompasses only the parts of Marxist teaching which face directly onto the totality of problems of social development.

II

Let us attempt to examine in the light of what has been said certain serious questions which have recently come to confront various currents in the workers movement.

The first of them, which we have already mentioned, ensues from the dialectically contradictory relationship between the objective need for the preservation of stability on the international scene and the highly mobile social situation in various regions of the world. It is frequently a question of two polar-opposite pseudo-prescriptions of a solution of this contradiction posed by life itself. In accordance with one of them, the conservative prescription, the forcible imposition on the peoples of the social status quo is proposed as the method of solving the problem. The supporters of this approach believe that the preservation of stability in the world presupposes the assumption by members of the international community of the commitment "to prevent" revolution and also the creation of mechanisms (like the Holy Alliance of the last century) with which it might be possible to cut short all attempts to transform outdated social living conditions into different ones more in keeping with the level of development of the productive forces which has been attained and the progress of society. The fallacy of such a prescription for ensuring international stability is not only the fact that the basis thereof is a reluctance to come to terms with the generally recognized right of the peoples to determine their fate themselves. As all accumulated historical experience attests, it is impracticable. Interference in other states' internal affairs to preserve the social status quo inevitably entails the same disturbance of international stability which it was theoretically contemplated preventing.

The other approach, which might be described as leftist, is based on a disregard for external factors when tackling internal social problems. The fact that this disdainful attitude may not only open the way to foreign interference but also become the detonator of an international conflict with unpredictable consequences is not considered. On the contrary, in a number of cases such a development of events is perceived as desirable (in accordance with the notorious "the worse, the better" principle).

An orientation toward the actual solution of the contradiction between the need for the stability of international relations and the steady trend toward social change free of the above-mentioned extremes presupposes, it would seem, an aspiration to fundamental changes of a dual kind.

The first concern the structure of the system of international relations. It should possess a mechanism which provides for its adaptation to inevitable social change. Part of such a mechanism could be legally formalized international agreements furnished with control mechanisms providing for a categorical ban on all forms of foreign interference in the internal affairs of other states, the artificial destabilization of the situation in them, the instigation of belligerents, financial and military assistance to them and the creation of armed forces intended for participation in a domestic struggle taking place in another country. In accordance with such agreements, the changes which have occurred in this state or the other as a result of the struggle of internal forces, including changes in its foreign policy orientation, must be recognized unconditionally and allowed for by all other countries, regardless of whether they like them or not. Possible contradictions or differences in the interpretation of events brought about by internal development in some country must be examined and settled in the international institutions designed to resolve foreign policy conflicts.

It is obvious that were this set of measures to be sufficiently effective, the destabilizing impact of the socioeconomic and political changes occurring in individual countries on the international situation could be appreciably lessened.

Changes of the second type are associated with the nature of the internal social and political transformations and the forms in which they are realized. Their range is great—from more or less radical reforms within the framework of existing legality through a decisive confrontation of class forces, including armed struggle. Of course, the choice of methods of social transformations is a matter for the peoples concerned themselves. And it is determined by the totality of objective and subjective factors operating in a given specific situation. Nonetheless, the regularity, which has been clearly ascertained, in accordance with which a most destabilizing influence on the international situation stimulating the intervention of outside forces is exerted by social transformations carried out in an extreme, forcible form, cannot be ignored. They contribute to the disorientation of the foreign community, give rightwing, expansionist forces additional arguments in support of intervention and legitimize, as it were, their interference in the corresponding country's internal affairs. For this reason it is extremely important when deciding the question of the preferred methods and forms of social transformations that, all other things being equal, preference be given peaceful, democratic means of their realization. The more insistent mankind's need to prevent an all-annihilating military conflict here, the more important it is to consider the external factor when choosing the methods and means of social transformations.

None of this is the fruit of abstract theoretical reflection. It is sufficient to ponder what the increasingly clearly expressed aspiration to national reconciliation in the

main zones of regional conflicts represents in practice. It reflects a recognition of the fact that internal struggle in its extreme form—in the form of civil war—involving outside forces in the conflict, creates a stalemate situation. And the sole way out is to transfer the struggle to a different plane, to the sphere of political confrontation. Of course, this is not always possible. But it is the purpose of the new political thinking to impart to the trend toward the political solution of social conflicts additional strength and incentives.

III

An assessment of the situation which has taken shape in the world in the spirit of the new political thinking inevitably leads to the conclusion concerning the high probability of the long development side by side of the sum total of states differing from one another both in terms of type of social organization and in terms of a number of other essential parameters. Under these conditions it is essential to have an objective idea of the focus and strength of the main trends determining this development and its prospects. It is all the more important for the workers movement in nonsocialist countries, where it has to match against these trends both its political goals and the methods of struggle for current, interim and ultimate goals.

How do these trends appear in various regions of the world? Let us turn to the situation in the zone of developed capitalism. The capitalist economic system is currently confronted with the need to adapt to the new conditions being created by the technological revolution. This complex process will probably be prolonged in time and be accompanied by many economic and social costs, whose possible scale is not accurately assessable. Nor can the likelihood of serious sociopolitical upheavals be precluded either. As yet, however, it has to be affirmed that adaptation to the conditions of the technological revolution in its initial phase has provided capitalism with additional potential, which it is using in the interests of stabilization. This means that the workers movement will in the foreseeable future, while preserving its socialist principles, have to conduct the economic and political struggle on the ground of existing reality, that is, capitalism.

Accumulated empirical material makes it possible to distinguish two appreciably different models of the development of present-day capitalism. One is the conservative-technocratic model. The basis of this is an endeavor to ensure capitalism's transfer to a new technological and engineering base at the expense of a socially infringed section of the working population. Whence the main distinguishing features of this model: elitism, the counterposing of economic to social imperatives, defense of social inequality, the trend toward the maximum possible limitation of democratic expression and a lack of faith in rational principles of the organization of social relations. The most vulnerable part of this model is the underestimation of the possibilities of

society's social and political resistance to the inhumane methods of the accelerated transfer of the economy to the new technological basis.

The second model could be called liberal (or democratic)-reformist. Its distinguishing feature is an orientation toward the technological retooling of capitalism given the preservation and expansion of the working people's economic and social gains. Realization of this model does not preclude negative phenomena caused by the break with settled structures. However, it is contemplated considerably alleviating the seriousness of these phenomena by way of an improvement in the social shock absorbers which have been created in the years of capitalism's existence. The model does not contemplate the elimination of the existing social inequality but nor is it oriented toward an intensification therein. It is contemplated not dismantling the democratic institutions of bourgeois society but, on the contrary, perfecting them in order to stimulate the population's participation in the process of modernization of the economy. The model's main weakness is that it takes insufficiently into account the regularities of the functioning of capital and its orientation toward economic results without regard for considerations of morality and social and political rationality.

Of course, in pure form the said models exist only in theory. Attempts at their practical realization immediately conflict with the actual social situation. As a result both the first and the second models have already undergone appreciable changes. In the one case it has been necessary to soften the strict conservative-technocratic policy, turning to the use of methods typical of the liberal-reformist persuasion. In the second, liberal-reformist policy has assumed a number of features corresponding to a large extent to conservative-technocratic ideas concerning the preferable forms of socioeconomic and political action. A consequence of this has been the emergence of a number of versions of policy containing a varying set of components of the opposite models—with the predominance of conservative-technocratic tendencies at one pole and liberal-democratic at the other.

The attitude toward these versions on the part of various political parties largely depends on the place this party or the other occupies in the traditional party-political structure. The center and center-right bourgeois parties have been the proponents of a moderate version of the conservative-technocratic course. The supporters of its most hard-line version have been concentrated on the right flank. Center-left and moderately left forces champion the liberal-reformist version of development with more or less appreciable conservative-technocratic interspersions.

It is not to be doubted that it is by no means a matter of indifference for the workers movement, including its revolutionary wing, which version of socioeconomic and political development will ultimately gain the ascendancy and be made the basis of the policy which is

pursued. The choice facing it is quite unambiguous: the main efforts should be geared to preventing realization of the conservative-technocratic model in its extreme forms and seeking a strengthening therein of liberal-reformist elements in order ultimately to ensure the pursuit of a policy most fully reflecting the principles of the liberal-democratic version.

The question of whether a preference shown the liberal-reformist model will lead to a weakening of the socialist orientation of the workers movement and substitution for one specific principle of another, opposite, principle is perfectly legitimate in this connection. Such doubts have arisen repeatedly in the history of the workers movement. When it was confronted by the task of democratization of the political system of bourgeois society (in the course of the struggle for universal suffrage, for example), when it was faced with the need to unite with bourgeois-democratic forces in the face of the fascist threat and now, when it is having to play a most important part in ensuring the survival of mankind. Experience shows, however, that the accomplishment of the current tasks which have been set in motion by social development not only does not impede progress toward the ultimate goal but, on the contrary, clears away the obstructions on the path leading to it. This applies fully to the problem in question also.

Upon a close examination of the liberal-reformist model there inevitably arises the question of its compatibility with the regularities of the functioning of capital. The consistent implementation of the social imperatives contained in this model is fraught with the risk of a serious infringement of capital's freedom of action, which at once gives rise to its resistance, the "softest" form of which is, as experience has shown, a suspension of private investments, the mass withdrawal of deposits and a drain of financial resources. In other words, given the implementation of liberal-democratic policy, it is necessary to bear in mind the possibility of a situation arising which could lead either to a retreat to more moderate positions (as was the case in the period in office of the government of the left in France) or to movement beyond the limits of the liberal-reformist model and the adoption of measures partially of a socialist nature. In any event, it is obvious that the flexibility of the models of the development of present-day capitalism is determined by the possibility of their evolution not only toward the right but also, given the appropriate circumstances, leftward.

What has been said above is exceptionally important for determining the main parameters of the content of the democratic alternative, to whose formulation overriding significance is now attached for all currents of the workers movement. Important elements of this alternative are contained in the theoretical studies and policy documents of many workers parties, both communist and social democratic. Nonetheless, there is as yet no really comprehensive such program which has been drawn up in detail and is persuasively realistic. And this,

as has been recognized everywhere, is an important factor which has brought about a weakening of the workers movement and the entire left camp in the zone of developed capitalism.

What are the reasons for the fact that the elaboration of a democratic alternative has dragged on? A certain part has been played here by subjective factors. However, the objective complexity of the situation has evidently been of decisive significance. It has proven extremely propitious for the conservative forces. The previous version of liberal-reformist policy, which had been predominant in the 1960's-start of the 1970's, had compromised itself. For this reason its opponents were able to confine themselves to simple rejection, advancing as a counterweight to it old, but more strictly formulated, slogans. The forces of the left, on the other hand, found themselves in a more difficult situation. They had to interpret the changed situation from scratch, evaluate the reasons for the failure of the previous reformist model and formulate a new one not repeating the previous model but at the same time preserving the positive values which it had contained.

The workers movement has come in for particular difficulties. One of its most important tasks is defense of the interests of the part of society which has been hurt economically and discriminated against socially. Inasmuch as the transition to the new production base dictated by the requirements of the technological revolution and effected by conservative factions of the ruling class has assumed the form of "social revanche" for the concessions of the past and resulted in economic and social losses for mass groups of the most wounded part of society, this movement has naturally taken up defensive positions. Its resistance, manifested in various forms, has not averted the negative consequences of the profound technological transformations but has mitigated them considerably. At the same time, however, the orientation toward defensive actions pushed into the background, as it were, the far more important problem associated with the need to be in the vanguard of the objectively urgent technological and engineering transformations, make full use of the objective opportunities which they afford and seek to ensure that these opportunities become to an equal extent the property of the whole of society and all its members.

Now, as far as we can judge, the lag is being overcome. There is every reason to say that certain general contours of a democratic alternative which could ultimately be the common platform of the workers movement in the zone of developed capitalism and more broadly, of all forces of the left, have come to light.

We shall try to reveal these contours. In the economic sphere the main goal of the program of a democratic alternative is to limit to the greatest extent possible the chaotic nature of the technological restructuring which is a consequence of the competitive struggle on the world market. After all, only in this case might it be possible to

avert the disastrous consequences for world-economic relations, international currency relations and the whole sphere of employment with which this chaos is fraught.

Insufficiently intensive investment activity has become a serious impediment in the way of the universal introduction of the latest production engineering systems. Its stimulation thanks to private sources is encountering tough inhibitors. Whence the vital need for the creation and appreciable expansion of social funds for the realization of investments in the technologically most advanced sectors and industries.

What has been said applies to the same extent to the problem of the training of manpower. The new technology is making qualitatively different demands of it. The shortage of manpower of the new type is even now an impediment in the way of production retooling. The accomplishment of this task with the aid of private appropriations is practically impossible. Whence the need for the decisive stimulation of public efforts in respect of the training of manpower corresponding to the requirements of the technological revolution.

Programs aimed at a qualitative reinforcement of the system of the social defense of the main categories of working people constitute an important part of the democratic alternative. This is needed by both principal components of the given system: both the social infrastructure made up of various types of benefits, health insurance funds and so forth and the sum total of guarantees of employment for the able-bodied. The strengthening of these guarantees is particularly important for the technological revolution is entailing the supplanting of manpower both in material and nonmaterial production. Inasmuch as this process is irreversible, employment guarantees inevitably presuppose the development of a broad front of work of national significance financed from social funds.

The question which is usually asked in this question is that of where the resources necessary to pay for such large-scale measures will come from. In order to answer it is necessary to bear in mind the following: the transition to the new technological base is economically justified—otherwise capital would not be endeavoring to accomplish it. But this being the case, the additional profit obtained as the result of this transition should be at the disposal not only of a specific capitalist but of a society capable of using it for long-term ends. This can be achieved by way of a redistribution of social income with the aid of the tax system. There is also such an as yet unused reserve as the tremendous military spending, which has now become completely pointless.

The relative and absolute growth in the categories of working people belonging to the new type of manpower—incomparably better educated than before—is making satisfaction of the intellectual requirements of constantly increasing numbers of the population particularly urgent. There is a growing need for a new mass

culture, but not in the sense of the "second rate," as this term is frequently understood, it being counterposed to "elite culture," but in the sense of high culture accessible to broad strata of the population. Naturally, the programs of a democratic alternative are now assigning these problems an increasingly noticeable place. The spiritual-cultural component of these programs forms the divide which separates (or, at least, should separate) them from utilitarian conservative-technocratic notions of the paths of social development.

In the political sphere the core of the alternative is the endeavor not simply to avert the threat of the gradual dismantling of democratic institutions (which is extremely important in itself) but also to bring the political system more into line than hitherto with the increased intellectual level and social assertiveness of the masses.

The increased interest of social forces in various aspects of the problem of self-management can hardly, therefore, be considered fortuitous. The new generations of people, of whom increased assertiveness and independence in the labor process are required, will not accept the role of passive object of managerial and political decisions adopted within the framework of representative democracy and reducing the role of the citizens to episodic expression with the subsequent delegation of authority. And although various social self-management projects, including direct democracy, have yet to win general support, they should evidently be considered an inalienable component of the democratic alternative whose role will grow everywhere.

IV

The situation in the part of the nonsocialist world which is not a part of the zone of developed capitalism is taking shape differently. Describing it, we formerly made extensive use of the term "third world" countries; we then began calling them "developing countries". The change of wording has not, however, altered the essence of the approach. What is not a part of the socialist system on the one hand and the zone of developed capitalism on the other has been seen, as before, as something uniform.

In reality this approach has long been hopelessly out of date. Groups of states have taken shape in the "development zone" which differ from one another not only in level of maturity of social relations but also most important characteristics of economic and social system. Concentrated at one pole of this zone are states which have reached a middle and, in individual spheres, a high level of the development of capitalism. They differ from the "old" developed capitalist countries in a number of particular features of social and political organization brought about by the deforming impact of the world capitalist centers, the low level of class confrontation and the specifics of the preserved traditionalist structures and political culture.

The task confronting the workers and, more broadly, the general democratic movement in these countries is, seeking in the course of daily struggle a gradual improvement in the conditions of the sale of manpower, to channel their main efforts into the fundamental democratization of the political structures. Reaching the level attained in this sphere in the "old" highly developed capitalist countries would under current conditions not only signify an appreciable step forward but would also clear a field for the further struggle of the working class.

At the other pole are the countries of a socialist orientation. Granted all the differences between them, they are united by an aspiration to overcome backwardness on the paths of noncapitalist development. The question is the extent to which this aspiration (which is perfectly natural from the viewpoint of social and humane considerations) may be secured economically. Jumping naturally conditioned stages in social development as an exception is, of course, possible. However, either propitious conditions or concentrated economic support from outside are required for this. For this reason the sphere of the spread of the socialist orientation will, in all likelihood, be limited. The main task of the revolutionary forces in this group of countries remains the creation of the conditions capable of preventing a slide backward and ensuring the economic and social progress which would demonstrate the advantages of the chosen path.

The bulk of countries of the zone in question is still experiencing the complex process of socioeconomic differentiation. The majority of them has embarked on the path of "market capitalism," but has not made in any way significant progress on it. A consequence of this has been the extreme exacerbation of the economic and social situation, which, in turn, has given rise to high political instability. Whence the increased probability of various upheavals connected with an abrupt change in orientation, the advancement of slogans not reflecting the essence of actual socioeconomic development and attempts to take advantage of the contradictions between the different world social systems.

The general development trends in the majority of countries of this zone are negative. Differentiation between them and the industrially developed states is intensifying, being expressed, specifically, in the unprecedented growth of the foreign debt, which, for its part, is contributing to a deepening of the differentiation. Some of these countries are already floundering in the depths of disasters: starvation reigns, and the poverty of the population goes beyond conceivable limits. Others are rapidly moving in the same direction.

At the socio-psychological level the situation is expressed either in growing passiveness mixed in with a sense of hopelessness or in the buildup of the potential for social discontent. Given the low level of consciousness of the population of this part of the world, this social discontent is frequently realized in the form of religious fanaticism, national and racial intolerance and xenophobia. It

would seem obvious that, given a further intensification of this trend, socioeconomic and political instability brought about by the accumulation of mass discontent could go beyond national and even regional bounds and assume a global nature.

Averting such an outcome is possible only by the efforts of the whole world community. The first step on this path could be the writing off, recorded in treaty form, of the accumulated debt or, at least, a suspension of the payments in respect thereof for a lengthy period. The next could be the urgent financing of large-scale programs of food, medical and other analogous aid. It would then be appropriate to embark on the creation of what is now called, not that specifically, a "new economic order," that is, the conditions enabling the majority of countries of the "development zone" to gradually overcome both the industrial and sociopolitical lag, employing predominantly methods which V.I. Lenin once described as state-capitalist.

Such development is resisted, as experience has shown, by the most influential factions of the ruling class of the most developed and influential capitalist countries. And, on the contrary, impetus in this direction has emanated from the left. So it will be henceforward, evidently, also. We can probably speak of the need for the elaboration of a program of an international democratic alternative which sets the task of averting the threat looming over mankind in view of its disintegration into comparatively prosperous and extremely impoverished parts.

V

How does the alignment of social and political forces in the world look if viewed from the standpoints of the new political thinking? What place is occupied therein by the workers movement and what is the particular feature of the tasks confronting it conditioned by the current situation? An exhaustive answer to these questions has still to be formulated in the course of all-around search. Nonetheless, certain considerations may be expressed even now.

In the examination of the alignment of social and political forces we have for a long time approached it as something unambiguous. In reality it could at every specific moment be different—depending on the nature of the tasks to be tackled. Whence the need for a differentiated approach at the time of an analysis of the alignment of social and political forces, particularly now, when there is an acute need for the parallel solution of a number of questions which not only differ from one another but which are in some respects dialectically mutually opposite.

When it is a question of the vital need for the deliverance of mankind from the threat of self-extermination, there is one alignment of forces: on the one hand the workers movement, the social currents close to it and the political spectrum of the left in conjunction with the center and

moderate conservative forces of the bourgeois camp, on the other, the most militant factions of the bourgeoisie (mainly connected with military production) and political forces of the extreme right. When addressing problems of preventing ecological catastrophe, the composition of the contending forces could be somewhat different. After all, a practical (not in words, in deeds) solution of ecological problems affects the interests of quite broad strata of industrial capital. Furthermore, such a factor as the fears of significant numbers of the working population that undue emphasis on a solution of these problems could jeopardize the existence of many traditional sectors of industrial production and, consequently, jobs operates additionally in this case.

The alignment of social and political forces looks completely different when it is a question of choice of model of development of capitalism. In this case the demarcation preserves a predominantly class nature: at one pole, parties representing the working class and the groups of working people close to it, at the other, the political forces reflecting the interests of conservative circles of the bourgeoisie. The fact that at the electoral level this confrontation is now expressed not as precisely as before does not change the heart of the matter. At pivotal stages, at the time of an abrupt reorganization of the social structure, the process of the social self-identification of the masses usually lags behind the actual course of things.

It is sometimes maintained that the varying nature of the tasks dealt with above, specifically, makes practically impossible the cohesion of the forces called on to secure their accomplishment. This assertion is legitimate only if these tasks are counterposed to one another or (which is almost the same thing) one is substituted for another. If, however, the questions are tackled at different levels and are not seen as being mutually exclusive, the problem connected with differences in the alignment of social and political forces in each specific instance is soluble. It consists of the precise determination of the boundary of joint interests and the actual limits of unity of action.

It is significant, however, that, given a neutralization of the social and political forces tackling tasks of various levels, a quite clear and stable configuration arises: the democratic, left forces in conjunction with some centrists conduct a struggle against the right and far right bloc, the boundaries of which vary depending on the specific features of the country and the object of the struggle. In other words, whatever the task the democratic forces and, consequently, their nucleus—the workers movement—have to tackle, their main adversary remains in principle one and the same. The struggle against this adversary relegates (or, in any event, should relegate) to the background all contradictions dividing the democratic forces.

This applies primarily to relations between various currents in the workers movement. The problem of their unity of action was in principle resolved positively by

Marxist-Leninist scholarship long since. To the arguments in support of this unity several new ones may be added also. In the course of historical development life itself has done away with many of the disagreements which at one time separated different streams of the organized working class. Inasmuch as at this stage the struggle for the interests of wage workers being conducted in the soil of capitalism is on the agenda in the zone of developed capitalism, the specific demands put forward by both the communists and social democrats are not all that different from each other. The restructuring being carried out in the USSR and a number of other socialist countries has contributed to the erosion of the anticommunist prejudices which deformed the positions of a number of social democratic parties. A process of the surmounting of the persistent hostility toward social democrats rooted in some communist parties is under way.

Of course, the ideological differences between the revolutionary and reformist currents in the workers movement remain. However, given the shift of emphasis, it is not what disunites but what unites which is gradually moving to the forefront: the coincidence of practical tasks, the common threat on the part of forces of the right and the common system of values inherited from outstanding men of the Enlightenment, utopian socialists and the great thinkers who were at the sources of the workers movement.

In practice the situation has evolved such that the rapprochement of the two streams of the workers movement began with the improvement in relations between the social democrats and ruling communist parties. How far matters have advanced in this field may be judged from the results of an unofficial meeting on 4-5 November 1987 in Moscow at the time of the festivities connected with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The presence at the meeting of high-ranking delegations of a multitude of social democratic and socialist parties may be seen as a considerable change. This conclusion is supported if only by smaller-scale, but portentous events: the meeting with delegations of social democratic and socialist parties in the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute on 6 November 1987, contacts between the SED and the SPD culminating in the fall of 1987 in the signing of a document which examines problems of general security and the struggle of ideologies and the high level of cooperation between the Bulgarian Communist Party and PASOK.

True, in the capitalist countries themselves the rapprochement of various currents in the workers movement is not as yet in any way pronounced. It is clearly being impeded by many circumstances brought about by the particular features of the domestic situation (the struggle for influence on the common social base and other attendant circumstances). Nonetheless, many obstacles have been cleared away here also.

Of course, the problems of unity of the democratic forces go beyond the framework of relations between the communists and social democrats, the more so in that both are currently encountering new difficulties. New social forces are led into the public, including political, arena by new democratic movements and parties, which will have to perform an important role in the life of their countries and, primarily, in rebuffing the offensive of the right. Particular attention has been paid in this case to the problem of unity of the workers movement because it is in this sphere that appreciable changes have come to light recently.

What has been said emphasizes once again the particular relevance of the theoretical search which is being conducted currently by the communist parties in nonsocialist countries and all Marxist forces. The task of this search is to comprehend the essence of the situation which has arisen, evaluate the focus and depth of the processes which are occurring, formulate the orientation appropriate to them and find ways of solving the new problems which confront the working class and all working people.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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U.S. Spending Has Greater Psychological Than Military Impact

18160009e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 43-56

[Article by Aleksey Alekseyevich Vasilyev, candidate of technical sciences, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences Historical Commission, and Mikhail Ivanovich Gerashev, candidate of historical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Historical Commission: "Certain Results of the R. Reagan Administration's Military-Political Course"]

[Text] *Operating under the slogan of the achievement of military superiority, throughout the 1980s the R. Reagan administration has made purposive efforts for a rapid quantitative buildup and qualitative upgrading of the American armed forces. At the same time, despite the growth of U.S. military power which has occurred in this time, the administration is today coming in for quite keen criticism pointing to essential flaws in its military-political course. What is the normality and stability of the trends which led the U.S. leadership to broaden the Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament, sign the INF Treaty and agree in principle to a 50-percent reduction in SOA, given compliance with the ABM Treaty? An answer to these questions is impossible without a comprehensive analysis of the results of Washington's policy in the military-political sphere.*

The end of the 1970s was a difficult stage for American foreign policy. The chain of telling setbacks and the inconsistency and contradictoriness of the policy of the Democratic administration brought with them calls for an urgent reassessment of the basic postulates of the United States' foreign policy and its adaptation to the changing international situation. The prescription for such a reconsideration proposed in the course of the 1980 election campaign by the representatives of the right wing of the Republican Party and their candidate, R. Reagan, was based on a most simplistic, bipolar vision of the modern world and provided for a maximum enhancement of the value of the military factor in U.S. foreign policy. It was essentially a question not of adjustments to the United States' line of behavior on the international scene in accordance with the foreign policy situation which had taken shape but of the power transformation of existing realities and their adaptation to the ideas of the United States' global domination. In the opinion of Reagan and those closest to him, all the United States' foreign and military-political problems which had arisen at the end of the 1970s were the direct consequence of the insufficient backing for American policy of real military power.

The natural consequence of such assessments was the Reagan administration's sharp criticism of the military-political course of its predecessors and also the proclamation of a commitment "to restore the United States' military superiority" lost as a result "of the systematic neglect of national security interests in the 1970s." At the same time, it would seem, the critical rhetoric bore the marked imprint of deliberate exaggerations and biased evaluations of the actual state of the American armed forces.

In terms of the majority of basic indicators it was hard to call the 1970's as a whole, as also the J. Carter presidency in particular, a decade of the "neglect of the United States' national security interests". Despite a certain reduction in the growth rate of the military budget in the 1970s brought about by the end to the war in Vietnam, as a result of the ballistic missiles being fitted with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) the number of nuclear weapons of the United States' strategic forces more than doubled in this period (from 4,000 in 1970 to 9,000 in 1980). A set of modernization programs, which affected all components of the U.S. nuclear triad, was begun in the 1970s. In the conventional arms sphere the reduction in the rate of purchases of new military hardware which was observed was objectively caused by the round of accelerated modernization which had taken place at the start of the decade associated with the Vietnam war. But even the certain dropoff which followed it in the mid-1970s was brief, and as of 1976 even expenditure on weapons purchase items in the U.S. military budget had begun to grow quite rapidly in real terms. Programs for the creation of a new tank, armored personnel carrier, helicopter and two new fighters—the F-15 and F-16—entered the series production phase in this period. The U.S. Army was increased from

13 to 16 divisions (which partly gave rise to the problem of a personnel shortage), and the program of a buildup of the numbers of tactical aircraft from 22 to 26 air wings was begun also.

Only the navy actually reduced its strength in the 1970s as a consequence of the withdrawal of ships which had reached the end of their service life. But contracts were then drawn up for the construction of new warships, which were to enter active service under the subsequent administration.

None of these real indicators was taken into consideration by critics of the Carter administration. Their sharp rhetoric was based not so much on an objective analysis of the state of the American armed forces; it reflected more a desire to profit from the psychological sense, supported by representatives of far right circles, of "American weakness" characteristic of the mass mood in the United States at the end of the 1970s. It was for this reason that the main motive for the criticism came to be the most general indicator—the military budget—which was declared "chronically insufficient in the 1970s". Such an approach to military-political problems through the prism of the military budget proved effective from the viewpoint of its impact on the electorate. Speculating on this issue, the Republicans succeeded in putting together a relatively broad consensus concerning the need for an increase in military spending. By the end of 1980, according to the results of an opinion poll, more than 60 percent of Americans supported increased appropriations for military needs, and only 7 percent advocated a reduction therein.

The political pressure was so significant that it could not be ignored by the outgoing Democratic administration either. On leaving the Pentagon Defense Secretary H. Brown maintained in his final report to Congress that total Soviet spending from 1968 through 1979 had been \$270 billion more than American spending and that "the balance of spending today will show up as the military balance of tomorrow" (1). The latest "gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union—in the military spending sphere this time—was thereby given a base.

The presidential election victory confronted the Reagan administration with the need to clothe its slogans in specific military-political measures. It transpired here that the "luggage" with which the new leadership had entered the White House contained practically no fundamentally new ideas. The plans for practical steps to change the existing military balance in favor of the United States which had been prepared by the administration's advisers, among which the most prominent place was occupied by the program for a buildup of strategic forces (the so-called "quick fix list"), confronted the new leadership basically with tasks of expanding, accelerating and, in some cases, modernizing military programs which had already been drawn up.

In addition, following the new administration's presentation of specific detailed plans in the military sphere, primarily the program for modernization of the United States's strategic forces of 2 October 1981, it became obvious that even these proposals of experts of a conservative-right persuasion had undergone very considerable cuts. As a whole, the program was far closer to the plans of the Carter administration than to the "quick fixes" and was even inferior to the Democrats' plan in terms of certain other parameters.

There was a marked lowering also of the Reagan administration's ambitions in the sphere of development of the general forces. The first report of Republican Defense Secretary C. Weinberger for the 1983 fiscal year even contained a warning that the pace of modernization of the general forces would be less than the administration would wish and advanced as the main goal the achievement of greater efficiency of the manufacture of military equipment and a strengthening of the corresponding industrial base (2).

It is necessary to bear in mind in evaluating this transformation the exceptionally propitious domestic political situation in which the administration found itself following the 1980 election victory. The Democrats were demoralized as a result of the defeat, and the administration was faced with practically no organized and influential opposition which might have counterposed to its military policy some telling arguments. Under these conditions it could perfectly well have anticipated approval of the most radical ideas in the field of military development. But the administration had no such ideas.

As a result the most visible component of Reagan's military program remained a sharp increase in the military budget. It is sufficient to say that without a detailed study of the military budget request which had been made by its predecessor the Republican administration was in less than 2 weeks after having taken office requesting an additional \$26 billion for the 1982 fiscal year (3). The average annual growth of the military budget in the first 4 years (fiscal years 1982-1985) in comparable prices amounted to 8 percent (2.9 percent in fiscal years 1978-1980). The proportion of military spending in the GNP grew from 5.5 percent in the 1981 fiscal year to 6.6 percent in the 1985 fiscal year, and in the federal budget, from 23.2 to 26.5 percent respectively (4).

This growth was accompanied by internal structural reorganization of the military budget. The administration took the route of preferential development of the "investment" items (R&D and arms purchases), which accounted for more than 60 percent of the entire increase in the military budget in the period from fiscal years 1981 through 1987. The "support" items, usually connected with maintaining the combat readiness of the armed forces (pay and the maintenance and operation of materiel), accounted in this same period for 29 percent

of the additional appropriations (5). In absolute terms expenditure in the said period on the investment items grew 75 percent and amounted to 43 percent of the U.S. military budget.

Thus having been able to achieve a reallocation of resources from civil to military needs unprecedented for peacetime, the Reagan administration simultaneously shifted the internal priorities of the military budget in favor of the preferential financing of programs of an increase in the quantity and quality of arms. This policy could not, undoubtedly, have failed to have led to a growth of U.S. military power. The main question was whether this growth was in keeping with the financial investments in the military sphere.

Development of Strategic Nuclear Forces

We would note at once that in no sphere has the Reagan administration changed the balance in its favor. Having declared that the vulnerability of America's strategic forces and at the same time the danger of an attack on the part of the USSR would be at their maximum by 1985, the United States has spent on the development of its strategic forces more than 25 percent of the entire increase in military appropriations in the 1980s. At the same time there has in this period been a decline in the number of strategic delivery systems (see Table 1), and the United States' advantage in terms of the numbers of nuclear warheads of the strategic forces has diminished thus:

Table 1. U.S. Strategic Forces in 1980 and 1987

Component of strategic forces	1980	1987	% change
Bombers (B-52's, B-1B's)	316	292	-8
ICBM's	1,052	1,000	-5
SLBM's	576	528	-8
Total delivery systems	1,944	1,820	-6

Source: "American Defense Annual 1987-1988". Edited by J. Kruzel, p 54.

Of the five main components of modernization of the strategic triad, three—MX, Trident and Stealth—were a continuation of plans adopted in the 1970s, the fourth—the B-1B—revived a program which had been canceled by Carter and the fifth—the Midgetman mobile ICBM—emerged to a considerable extent as a consequence of the domestic political struggle and was an administration concession in exchange for congressional support for the MX program. Of course, it would be wrong, taking merely quantitative indicators as a basis, to speak of a weakening of the U.S. strategic forces. It was only old arms which were written off. Given the simultaneous increase in efforts to create new generations thereof, this meant a shift of emphasis to qualitative parameters of the arms race.

Even in the abridged form compared with the pre-election plans the program for the modernization of the strategic forces has not developed as successfully as the administration hoped. Problems which have arisen in the course of the development and deployment of a whole number of most important strategic programs (the B-1B, MX, Stealth, C³I) have now become public property.

The Reagan administration's incapacity for making appreciable amendments to the plans for the development of the strategic nuclear forces was caused to a considerable extent by its lack of fundamental new principles in this field. It ultimately took the route pioneered by its predecessors. By 1982 even it had practically abandoned attempts to elaborate its own strategic concept and subscribed to the policy proposed by the Carter leadership. It was a question of preservation of the concept set forth in the well-known PD-59. In 1982 C. Weinberger confirmed (with negligible amendments) adherence to the concept formulated by the preceding administration (6).

Thus the activity of the new leadership made no fundamental changes to the arterial directions of military thought and the development trends of the strategic triad established in the 1970s. It played on the fact that it was in its term in office that the majority of the main military programs either entered the production and deployment phase or were very close to this. As a result the key long-term trend of the development of the United States' strategic forces established in its basic parameters baack in the 1970s has become more visible. It is a question primarily of the preferential increase in the capacity for destroying centers of political and military leadership and ICBM launcher silos constituting the basis of the USSR's strategic forces. The administration's hope of molding in a certain part of public opinion both in the United States itself and among its allies the idea that time, technology and the asymmetry in the structure of the sides' strategic forces were working to the United States' advantage was evidently based on this circumstance also.

General Forces

The administration has increased the number of combat-ready army divisions from 16 to 18, implemented the decision to increase the number of tactical air wings to 26 and come very close to the goal of creating a navy of 600 warships and 14 carrier groups. It has also succeeded in resolving the armed forces' personnel problems and achieving a pronounced growth in the proportion therein of personnel of the appropriate standard of education.

When evaluating these results, other circumstances should be taken into consideration also. The two additional light army divisions were brought up to strength thanks to personnel of existing army subunits. The increase in tactical aviation strength, just as the growth in the number of warships, was provided for by decisions

of the preceding administration. As far as the vaunted successes in the solution of the armed forces' recruitment problem are concerned, the decisive role here has been performed by the sharp (up to 55 percent on average compared with 1980) (7) increase in the various forms of servicemen's pay. The opinion has been expressed here that the task could have been tackled more economically thanks to a selective increase in the income of individual categories of military personnel.

One further result of the Reagan administration's policy in the sphere of development of the general forces has been the increase in purchases of military equipment compared with the end of the 1970s period. All told, the number of units of military hardware (aircraft, tanks, missiles and so forth) purchased in the period 1982 through 1985 exceeded the 1978-1981 level 26 percent, but at the same time was considerably inferior to the 1974-1977 period, when the armed forces obtained 54 percent more units of military hardware (8).

The quantitative increase in military equipment purchases in the period of the Reagan administration has been far from unambiguous. When the Carter administration left the White House, it was pursued by accusations that the acquisition of 227 fighters a year was the "danger line" below which came "neglect of national security interests". However, in the period 1982-1985 the Pentagon acquired an average of 172 fighters a year (22 percent fewer) (9).

The growth in arms purchases in the 1980's has been accompanied by an even bigger growth in the cost thereof. Upon a comparison of the statistics of the period of the most rapid growth of the military budget (fiscal years 1982-1985) with the 4 years of the Carter administration it can be seen that the appropriations for military aircraft grew 75.4 percent, but the number of machines ordered, 8.8 percent. In purchases of all classes of missiles these figures appear as an increase in appropriations of 91.2 percent and a growth of purchases of 6.4 percent. The growth of appropriations for purchases of tanks and helicopters in the 1980s has amounted to almost 150 percent, whereas the pool of machines has increased 30 and 40 percent respectively (10).

Administration spokesmen explain this trend by the increased complexity and for this reason the allegedly greater combat efficiency of the arms purchased in the 1980s. This argument, for which there is undoubtedly some justification, only partly explains the rise in costs. Some 277 F-15 and 605 F-16 aircraft, the unit costs of which in 1987 prices amounted to \$26.8 million and \$15.1 million per aircraft respectively, were purchased, for example, in the period 1978-1981. In the period 1982-1985 purchases of these aircraft declined to 153 and 534, but the cost of each aircraft had risen to \$42.5 million and \$17.5 million. In this same period there was an increase in the cost of Trident submarines of 24 percent, of the Los Angeles-class attack submarines (SSN-668) of 10 percent and also of a whole number of

other programs (11). As a result a considerable amount of the additional appropriations allocated by the Pentagon for the modernization of military hardware was swallowed up by the increased cost thereof.

Even if we examine cases where this increase really went to pay for the increased technical intricacy of weapons systems, even then the picture would seem far from unambiguous. There are assessments indicating that the great technical complexity of certain new types of arms is having a negative effect on their combat readiness. These assessments proceed, for example, from the following data. The new American M-1 tank requires per hour of operation an average of 2 hours 42 minutes' servicing, whereas for its predecessor this indicator constituted only 24 minutes. Maintenance costs are growing accordingly. For the M-1 tank they are approximately 35-40 percent higher than for the M-60 (12).

The increased complexity of the systems being adopted in the United States is compelling another look at the above-mentioned restructuring of the proportions of the military budget which has been carried out by the administration. The widening of the "scissors" between appropriations for purchases of arms on the one hand and their operation and maintenance on the other is leading to the actual combat potential of the American armed forces growing to a lesser extent than might have been expected if solely the dynamics of the "investment" items of the military budget are taken as the basis. Thus the proportion of completely combat ready weapons systems has increased far from always proportionate to the increase in the number of units of military hardware in the arsenal of the U.S. armed forces. This particularly is attracting the attention of American critics of the administration inasmuch as it proclaimed the combat readiness of the armed forces one of its main goals.

As far as the American armed forces' supply of reserves for combat operations, which is considered a most important indicator of combat readiness, is concerned, the actual picture here, despite the increase in appropriations, is far from the point at which this question could be considered solved. Thus the U.S. Air Force is provided with the corresponding backup supplies to the extent of 30 percent, and for the navy this indicator constitutes 22 percent. American specialists estimate that, given the continuation of the rate of growth of appropriations for these needs characteristic of the period up to 1985, 100-percent provision with reserves may be achieved no earlier than 5-6 years hence, given outlays of the order of \$70 billion (13).

All these problems have been reflected in such a general indicator of combat readiness as the intensity of personnel training programs, where the additional appropriations have in practice led to no pronounced growth (see Table 2).

Table 2. Participation of the U.S. Armed Forces in Military Exercises

Participation of the personnel in exercises (man-years, thousands)	1980	1982	1984
Army	78	76	70
Navy	58	64	64
Marines	19	19	21
Air force	42	44	41
Flying time per month per aircraft crew, hours			
Army	18.8	17.2	16.4
Navy and marines	24.2	23.7	23.7
Air force	20.2	21.4	21.5
Number of days at sea per quarter of ships of the navy			
	86	87	88
Appropriations for military exercises (\$, billions, 1985)	11.1	12.6	13.8

Source: "Defense Spending: What Has Been Accomplished". Congressional Budget Office, April 1985, p 13.

A most important place upon an analysis of the current state of the American general forces is occupied by a comparison of their actual possibilities with the stated principles of use. The "horizontal escalation" concept proclaimed by the Reagan administration (which has come to be called the "3 and one-half wars" doctrine among American specialists) attracts attention. The demands made on the armed forces by this concept elicited a negative response from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which declared that the goals of "horizontal escalation" were unattainable even in the event of the successful completion of all plans for the development of the armed forces. As a result the concept proved still-born, and subsequently the development of the American armed forces has come to be based mainly on the waging of two full-scale wars (in Europe and the Near East).

Here also, experts believe, the main problem remains the acute shortage of facilities for the rapid transfer of forces to the areas of combat operations. According to current estimates, conducting them simultaneously in the two said regions would require the delivery there within 30 days of approximately 800,000 tons of military freight, bearing in mind that current possibilities do not exceed 200,000 tons (14). This discrepancy will seemingly continue for quite some time inasmuch as the American leadership has put the emphasis in the solution of this problem on faster, but at the same time more costly and insufficiently efficient (from the viewpoint of carrying capacity) means of air transport, primarily on purchases of the new C-5B transport aircraft (15).

One further particular feature of the programs of the development of the armed forces which have been implemented in the 1980s needs to be noted also. The buildup

of military power has not been based on a uniform concerted strategy linking the armed forces' assignments with the means of tackling them. Having jacked up the military budget, the administration has simultaneously accorded the arms of the services practically complete freedom to use the allocated appropriations at their discretion. As a result each corresponding department has been guided by its own priorities in military organizational development based not on common assignments but on "navy, air force, army or marine corps strategy".

But neither on this organizational basis has it been possible to create serious and substantiated concepts. In particular, despite the clamorous publicity campaign, the concept elaborated in the army of an assault on the rear lines enshrined in the doctrine of an air and ground operation was, following detailed discussion, deemed not to be supported by the requisite technical and military-economic resources. This explains why, except for certain individual programs, it has as a concept disintegrated, like a central military program created in support of it—the Assault Breaker reconnaissance-assault complex program. At the same time, however, the potential impact of the concept on the military-political situation in the future, when the corresponding technical possibilities have matured, cannot be discounted.

As far as U.S. naval strategy is concerned, there has been active discussion here in recent years of the Lehman-Watkins concept providing as a principal goal for the delivery of strikes against the territory of the USSR. It is now being sharply criticized in the United States itself. As many authoritative specialists believe, this strategy sharply increases the vulnerability of big and costly ships, which would be forced to operate in the zone of the most concentrated Soviet defenses. However, this concept has in the period of the Reagan administration become a principal argument in support of purchases of costlier and more efficient warships. As a result, as many critics observe, the priorities in naval development chosen by the navy leadership will on the one hand hardly assure performance of assignments in the channel of the Lehman-Watkins concept and, on the other, will actually lead to reduced possibilities of the efficient performance of other important naval functions such as the defense of sea lanes, troop transportation and so forth.

The decentralization of the decision-making process in the Pentagon has had one further consequence also. Under the conditions of the increased independence of the arms of the services the concepts which they have been elaborating have acquired a clearly expressed "purchasing character," that is, have been oriented primarily not toward the creation and preservation of a balanced structure of the armed forces but their rapid saturation with the latest military hardware. Such a practice "worked" under the conditions of the rapid growth of the military budget. But as soon as the growth slowed, all the costs of such an approach made themselves known in the form of manifest imbalances in the armed forces. A

consequence has been the discrepancy between purchases of new equipment and its provision with spares and maintenance facilities. Another example is the situation which has taken shape currently in the navy, where as a result of the emphasis on an increase in the strength of the carrier groups the department's budget has proven insufficient for completely equipping the existing carriers. As a result of the imbalances which have arisen the number of fully combat-ready army subunits has today declined 25 percent compared with 1980, and of the air force, 15 percent, according to one Pentagon report (16).

Summing up the development of the American general armed forces in the 1980s, it may be said that here, as in the strategic sphere also, the Reagan administration has been unable to accomplish the promised surge from "weakness to strength". Despite a certain growth in military potential, it has not been of a fundamental nature and has not matched the increase in the military budget in the 1980s.

The SDI Program

An analysis of the results of the military-political course of the Reagan administration would be incomplete without an evaluation of the "strategic defense initiative" program which it has put forward. Just like the administration's entire military program, the formation of its plans in the sphere of the creation of space-based ABM defenses was accompanied by stepped-up rhetoric, the advancement of knowingly unattainable goals (of the absolutely efficient defenses type) and promises of a "fundamental revolution" in the military sphere. Subsequently, as the SDI program was put into practice, the rhetoric and arrogance and the tasks which were advanced subsided.

Realization of the SDI has come up against the extensive opposition of scientists, politicians and public figures noting both the technical groundlessness of the idea of an efficient ABM system and the bankruptcy of the military-political bases of the program (17). The administration's attempt to enhance the prestige of the program by way of a number of "tests" demonstrating the "successes" in the development of the SDI ended in failure. The analysis of these tests conducted by congressional specialists enabled Sen W. Proxmire to describe them as a series of "deft stunts".

The plan put forward in December 1986 for the "accelerated deployment" of an ABM system based on traditional components (including space-based ABM interceptors), that is, on an outline which has been actively criticized by the supporters of SDI even, may be considered an indirect recognition of the technical and political weakness of the program.

The said weaknesses of the program combined with the tremendous outlays on the development of the system are giving rise to ever increasing congressional opposition. The progressive cutbacks in appropriations for the

SDI program testify to this. In the 1985 fiscal year the Defense Department experienced a shortfall of \$300 million (18 percent), in the 1986 fiscal year, \$1 billion (27 percent), and in the 1987 fiscal year, \$1.8 billion (34 percent) in respect of the requested appropriations, and in the 1988 fiscal year, \$1.8 billion (32 percent).

The result of the effect of all these factors has been the pronounced retreat of the U.S. military-political leadership from the goals announced by the President in 1983 in the direction of versions of "limited" ABM defenses as far as target defense, although there has been practically no mention of this in public statements.

At the same time the administration's persistence and its stubborn reluctance to agree to any measures limiting the SDI program are also determined to a considerable extent by the fact that even if the building of an integral efficient ABM system proves impossible, the results of broad-based efforts could be of use in practically all spheres of military development. Such efforts expand the possibilities of the creation of ASAT systems capable of destroying artificial Earth satellites in low, middle and high orbit. The appearance of increasingly small and efficient sensors, computers and their software, work on which is being performed within the SDI framework, could bring closer a qualitative leap forward in conventional arms and the tactics of their operational use and battle management, communications and reconnaissance systems. Work on the SDI program is, besides, strengthening the basis for the creation of third-generation nuclear weapons, which could be seen as a means of inflicting a disarming strike.

Basic Components of Military Policy

If we summarize the material results of the United States' military measures in the 1980s, there arises the natural question of the factors which have prevented the administration realizing its declared aims of military superiority and made for quite low returns from the unprecedented financial investments in the military sphere. The adduced instances of the inefficient expenditure of military appropriations cannot fully explain this situation, which, it would seem, has been a consequence of two most important factors—economic and S&T—determining the objective limits of a rapid increase in military power.

Life has confirmed that the stability of the nuclear balance possesses a substantial dynamic range. This has rendered hopeless all attempts to achieve military superiority on the traditional paths of the nuclear arms race. While proclaiming reliance on a spurt ahead toward military superiority, the administration has in practice lacked both the actual possibilities for achieving it and the S&T prerequisites making it possible to extricate from the state of overall approximate equilibrium the entire structure of the military balance, which is complex and which possesses great force of inertia.

The administration has found itself confined to a strict (albeit in this period significantly expanded) budget framework, which has prevented it creating and realizing the necessary material-technical conditions. The policy of increased military spending and simultaneously tax cuts brought about the rapid growth of the federal budget deficit and ultimately led to more assertive congressional intervention in budget policy.

Although the Reagan leadership had certain opportunities for achieving one-sided advantages in respect of individual components of the military balance, this would have required the articulation of the spheres of military organizational development most advantageous to the United States with the corresponding concentration of resources on a limited number of assignments. The administration did not agree to such an adjustment: the political-ideological aspects which ensued from the fact of the budget increase remained for it, evidently, no less (if not more) important than the actual results of the declared measures. This approach has undoubtedly borne fruit. The perception of American strength has changed appreciably both within the country and overseas in the past 7 years. The perception of weakness which was manifestly present in the sentiments of the American public in the 1970s has receded into the past.

If the material and political-psychological results of the Reagan administration's activity are ranked together, the obvious preponderance of the latter is evidently no accident. Clearly expressed elements if not of outright bluff, in any event, of the calculation of a psychological offensive along a broad front may be discerned in the ideas proclaimed by Reagan.

The following main instruments of the present administration's military-political course may be distinguished from this viewpoint:

the artificial spurring in the country of an atmosphere of "special circumstances" contributing to the consolidation of the nation around a "decisive and dynamic" leadership. The very tone of the criticism leveled at preceding administrations, the manifestly unobjective assessments of the military balance, the campaign surrounding the "window of vulnerability" and the growing "Soviet threat" in this connection and so forth worked to accomplish this task. All these means of pressure on the mentality of the ordinary American performed their function at a certain stage, and their continued use became unprofitable to the administration. As if at the waving of a magic wand, the interpretation of the balance of forces changed abruptly, and official estimates of the "Soviet threat" were toned down appreciably. Unconnected with the actual state of affairs, which, as the above analysis shows, had not changed in principle since the end of the 1970s, such a change of official phraseology was designed to highlight the administration's "services" in having "appreciably rectified the situation";

the emphatically militant statements concerning the possibility of victory in a nuclear war, official proclamation of the concept of military superiority—all this was designed to demonstrate a decisive style of leadership and its confidence in its powers. But here also the administration has been forced in recent years to switch to a more restrained and even peaceable rhetoric inasmuch as the hard-line wording, regardless of whether it had performed its psychological functions, had begun to operate counter to the leadership's interests, having given rise to a mass antinuclear and peace movements and growing concern at U.S. policy among the allies. A return was also required at a particular moment from reliance on unilateral actions and negotiations exclusively "from a position of strength" to a more moderate line of behavior, which was to have demonstrated the essential "rectification" of the military-political situation allegedly as a result of the decisive measures adopted by the leadership. In addition, the very policy of the administration was being pushed by the country's influential moderate forces toward a reconsideration of the situation, stimulating a growth of interest in the idea of arms limitation. Under these conditions negotiating with the USSR was not only a forced but also necessary measure. However, this did not prevent the use of all concessions and compromises on the part of the negotiating partner (natural for the diplomatic process) for the purpose of propagandizing the soundness of its power policy;

the sharp expansion of investments in the military sphere as support for political declarations. Given this approach, decisive significance is attached to the mere fact of the accelerated growth of the military budget, whereas in the short term its actual allocation and the efficient use of the allocated appropriations are of secondary significance. The artificially jacked-up military budget has been only partly supported by actual programs for the development of the armed forces, to which, in particular, the rapid growth of appropriations which have been unspent and unsupported by commissions and which have accumulated in the 1980s in Pentagon accounts testifies. Under the conditions of the absence of both the logistical prerequisites and radical conceptual principles permitting the achievement of the declared goals, the emphasis on the military budget was for the leadership a forced measure, and the budget itself has secured not so much a real increase in military power as the political and psychological perception of such growth.

A no less important consideration behind the increase in military appropriations may be considered the endeavor to pull the USSR into an arms race beyond its means, primarily in areas of the development of the latest technology. Here the administration saw possibilities of returns from investments in the military sphere connected, first, with the U.S. lead in certain key technical fields and, second, with the certain imperfection of the mechanism for assimilating the latest technology in the USSR. It was contemplated reorienting rivalry toward

these areas and imposing on the Soviet Union its own conditions of the arms race. Whence such programs as, for example, "smart weapons" and the SDI, which widen sharply the spectrum of the sectors of industry involved in the sphere of the arms race. According to calculations of the U.S. Administration, the USSR's embarkation upon the path of a "technology race" (and specialists working for the administration saw for the former no other choice, considering past experience and the fact that new technology promises fundamentally new military possibilities) would push it toward inevitable bankruptcy. That such calculations occupied a pronounced place in Washington's plans is indicated by the attention which it is paying to measures to restrict exports to the USSR of all latest technology. In addition, the gamble on "exotic" technology has also performed important psychological functions. Specifically, it has been observed (J. Foster, former director of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency, for example, wrote about this) that "exotic weapons" have a far stronger impact on the mind than the actual weapons which are already in existence and that the idea of the creation of some laser gun or neutron, acoustic and radiological weapons (particularly if what is being discussed is utterly incomprehensible) operates considerably more powerfully on the person who is far removed from technology (the leader of a state included) than any projects for the enhanced combat efficiency of weapons systems, even those which are exceptionally devastating, which are already in service.

And, finally, one further important instrument of the administration's military-political course has been the cautious and measured use of military power where undesirable consequences for the United States have been precluded and at the same time an opportunity to demonstrate the resolve to defend U.S. "national interests" by all accessible means has appeared. Such examples were the invasion of Grenada, the bombing of Libya and numerous showings of the American flag, that is, situations in which the leadership had every reason to expect quick success and did not fear negative repercussions in the form of an escalation of the conflict and the involvement therein of significant American forces. At the same time, despite the militant rhetoric, the Reagan administration has not dared to openly invade Nicaragua, all the costs of which it has not been able to confidently predict. Washington also hastened to remove the marines from Beirut following an incident there. A paradoxical situation wherein it is frequently the State Department which advocates the use of American armed forces overseas and where the Pentagon is opposed to this has taken shape.

Summing up, it may be said that whereas at the initial stage in the policy of the Reagan administration there were hopes of the possibility of a rapid spurt toward military superiority, subsequently, as the groundlessness of such hopes became increasingly apparent, the center of gravity began to shift gradually toward exploitation of the political and psychological effect of the policy being

pursued. This shift was natural inasmuch as this remained practically the sole sphere in which the administration could expect to acquire domestic and foreign policy dividends.

The administration seemingly understood that the function of nuclear weapons (and in the case of the Soviet-American confrontation, weapons in general) is to intimidate and not to be fired. Whence the endeavor to restore the perception of superiority even without a particular examination of what this means in practice. Whence a new phenomenon—the emphasizing of the “weakness” of the USSR. Whereas the administration assumed office with repeated statements concerning the “buildup of Soviet power,” an opposite note has been heard increasingly often recently. Use is being made here also of the positive trends in the development of Soviet society initiated by the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th party congress. Distorting the essence thereof, the administration is attempting to place the reason for the “weakness of the Soviets” primarily in the economic and S&T spheres.

The opinion prevalent in the West that the perception of “American strength” has been reflected in the policy of the Soviet leadership also operates in the same direction as well. The “USSR’s inclination to compromise” on a number of key problems of arms limitation which has appeared recently and its clearly expressed concern at the work on the SDI program and the painful response to leaks concerning “Pentagon directives” are also seen as confirmation of this. Active use is being made of such arguments in corroboration of the soundness of the policy being pursued by the Republican administration and determine to a large extent the likelihood of its continuity.

At the same time, however, the effect in the West and in the United States caused by the Soviet leadership’s statements concerning an asymmetrical response to the SDI, which has become a most telling argument in the hands of its opponents, calls attention to itself. The impact of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, particularly its repeated extension, despite the Americans’ continuation of nuclear testing, also proved significant and largely unexpected for the administration. The principle of reasonable sufficiency, which has been put forward as the basis of the USSR’s military policy, is gaining momentum also.

The USSR’s new approaches to the problem of military rivalry with the United States are taking the ground away from the hopes of certain U.S. circles for the economic exhaustion of our country. This gamble emanated largely from the predictability of the Soviet side’s potential retaliatory measures and was built on the fact that it would continue “to play by the American rules”. A clearly expressed emphasis on the response of the other side may be detected in the works of many military theorists, specifically in a work by H. Brown written

following his resignation as defense secretary. Specifically, he believes, the fact that the Soviet Union has spent more resources on the creation of a system of ABM defenses against American strategic aviation fully compensates all U.S. expenditure on its offensive weapons (16).

It has to be said that this idea was expanded and its emphasis changed somewhat under Reagan. For the success of the technology race imposed by the United States the USSR’s more symmetrical retaliatory actions were essential for the administration. This can be seen from an analysis of the main directions in which the administration threw down a challenge to it. Having obtained a symmetrical response, the administration would consider its steps justified, despite their great cost.

The refusal to follow the paths imposed by the United States which has been declared by the Soviet leadership and its active and consistent pursuit of a policy based on the principles of equal and general security are undermining the very foundations of the United States’ military-political course and showing the ineffectiveness of political and psychological pressure on the Soviet Union and the futility of attempts to drag it into a ruinous arms race.

Footnotes

1. “Report of Secretary of Defense H. Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982, Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs. January 19, 1981,” Washington, 1981, p 16.
2. See “Report of Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense Programs. February 8, 1982,” Washington, 1982, pp 1-31.
3. A. Maroni, R. Foelber, “The Defense Spending Debate: Comparing Recent Defense Appropriation with 1981 Projections,” Congressional Research Service, May 29, 1984, p 13.
4. “Department of Defense. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1986,” Washington, 1985, pp 120, 121.
5. “American Defense Annual 1987-1988”. Edited by J. Kruzell, Lexington, p 52.
6. See “U.S. Strategic Doctrine. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, December 14, 1982,” Washington, 1983, p 100.
7. See “American Defense Annual 1987-1988,” p 59.
8. Estimated from “Defense Spending: What Has Been Accomplished”. Congressional Budget Office, April 1985, p 13.

9. R. Stubbing, "The Defense Game," New York, 1986, p 48.
 10. W. Kaufman, "A Reasonable Defense," Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1986, p 43.
 11. R. Stubbing, Op. cit., p 47.
 12. THE DEFENSE MONITOR. Center for Defense Information, vol XIII, No 4, Washington, p 5.
 13. "Defense Spending...", p 22.
 14. W. Kaufman, "The Defense Budget: Setting National Priorities. The 1984 Budget," Washington, Brookings Institution, 1983, p 66.
 15. Fifty C-5B aircraft are capable in 30 days of delivering approximately 300,000 tons of military freight. Fourteen such aircraft had been received into service as of 1987.
 16. THE DEFENSE MONITOR, p 4.
 17. A most substantial work devoted to the problem of the technical feasibility of the SDI was a report released at the start of 1987 of the American Physics Society, which analyzed the possibilities of directed-energy weapons. The report's main conclusion was that it would take at least 10-15 years of persistent efforts just to ascertain the possibility in principle of the creation of a system of the destruction of ballistic missiles on this basis.
 18. See H. Brown, "Thinking About National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World," Boulder (Col.), 1983, p 63.
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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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New Soviet Committee for Far East, Pacific Development

18160009f Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 57-58

[Text] A constituent conference of representatives of research, industrial and social organizations, ministries and departments and soviet and party organizations, which elected the Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (SNKATES), was held on 25 March in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO. The plans for the creation of this body were mentioned by M.S. Gorbachev in his interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, which was directly linked with the Soviet Union's concern for the enrichment and

realization of the idea of regional economic cooperation in the interests of the progress of all countries of the Asia-Pacific region and stability and peace.

The increasingly dynamic nature of the processes of development of the Asia-Pacific region and the objective interests of our country, for which the development of Siberia and the Far East is becoming extraordinarily important, determine the national committee's goals and tasks. It is to promote the development of the USSR's trade and economic and S&T relations with countries of the Asia-Pacific region and contribute to the creation in the Far East of a highly developed national economic complex.

The greetings of N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the participants in the constituent conference observe: "The development of the country's entire national economy, particularly its eastern regions, should be the firm foundation of the USSR's active and truly extensive participation in the regional division of labor. The Soviet Far East has a big future, and the national committee's task is to contribute by active work to its conversion into a highly developed region of the country. It is necessary to abandon old outlines and stereotypes more boldly here, seek new forms of cooperation and creatively borrow the positive experience of other countries of the region."

The message of greetings was read out by V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission. He also emphasized in his speech that the national committee is to participate in shaping the concept of the USSR's foreign economic relations with countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the elaboration of the main directions of economic cooperation with countries of the region and the development of close relations with the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, the national committees of the members of this regional organization and other international institutions.

Academician Ye.M. Primakov said in his speech: "In his Vladivostok speech M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, linked the task of the conversion of the Soviet maritime region and the Far East into a highly developed national economic complex with the organic involvement of this region in the system of the all-union and international division of labor. It was emphasized here that the region's economy should have its own resources and science-production base, the optimum economic structure and a developed social sphere. This formulation of the question would seem the sole correct one.

"Whence a most important specific task confronting the Soviet national committee. Using program studies which are already available, it is necessary to think through in detail possible prospects and alternatives of the 'inscription' of the Far East areas of the USSR in the system of

the international division of labor and regional economic relations. And not only think through but also contribute most actively to the practical introduction of specific proposals. It could be a question here, seemingly, of the USSR's Pacific areas not only as an integral part of the entire national economic complex but also of their relatively autonomous participation in the international division of labor. The best conditions for this could be created as a result of the opening of areas of the Far East for broad international cooperation."

The Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is a somewhat unusual organization inasmuch as it is of a public and state nature. It has been formed in accordance with the "three-tier representation" principle (business, academic and government circles), just like the national committees of the countries which make up the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference. The Soviet national committee includes representatives not only of public and research but also soviet, state and industrial bodies and foreign economic departments. This structure will contribute to the most efficient accomplishment of the tasks confronting the new organization. Specifically, the Soviet national committee will promote international seminars, conferences and other activities in the sphere of economic cooperation in the Pacific region with the participation of the USSR and other socialist countries and take part in the organization of business contacts and scientific and organizational ties.

The SNKATES constituent conference studied organizational matters: a presidium was elected, rules were adopted and the constituent organizations, among which were the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR Foreign Ministry and a number of others, were determined.

Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, was elected chairman of the Soviet national committee; Academician V.I. Il'ichev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Branch, V.L. Malkevich, chairman of the USSR Chamber of Trade and Industry, I.A. Rogachev, deputy USSR foreign minister, and I.Ye. Khotsialov, head of a department of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission, deputy chairmen. The presidium will organize the work of the SNKATES in the intervals between its sessions, which is it planned to be conducted twice a year, direct the executive secretariat and decide current organizational matters.

The temporary address of the executive secretariat for correspondence is 117418, Moscow, Profsoyuznaya ul., 23, SSSR AN IMEMO, Pacific Studies Department.

Yu. Akhremenko, executive secretary of the SNKATES.

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Attraction of Foreign Capital for Far East Development Sought

18160009g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 59-70

[Article by Vladimir Ivanovich Ivanov, candidate of economic sciences and head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, and Pavel Aleksandrovich Minakir, doctor of economic sciences and deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Branch Khabarovsk Economic Research Institute: "The Role of Foreign Economic Ties in the Development of the USSR's Pacific Areas"]

[Text] *In accordance with decisions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, the maritime region and the Far East are to become a highly developed national economic complex organically incorporated in the system of the all-union and international division of labor. It will need its own large-scale resource base, the optimum structure of the economy and a developed social sphere.*

The recently adopted Long-Term State Program of the Comprehensive Development of the Productive Forces of the Far East Economic Region is geared to the realization of these decisions. Obviously, these are not only of domestic economic but also great international-political significance. Our country's positions in the Asia-Pacific zone, in a developing and rapidly growing center of the world economy, will ultimately depend on their fulfillment. The problem of the use of foreign economic relations for the solution of both structural and long-term and also urgent social questions, an expansion of exports and an improvement in the structure thereof becomes very important in the light of this.

Setting forth their viewpoint of the prospects of development of the Pacific areas of the USSR, the authors of the article pay special attention to the role of foreign economic ties as an important reserve of the scheduled economic transformations.

The very name—Far East—reflects the long predominance of the Eurocentrist view of the surrounding world. Essentially this major economic area is only just being assimilated and settled, its potential developed and rich natural resources being put to use. In the future its resource and general economic possibilities could be a huge reserve for the entire Soviet economy. At the same time the realization of this potential is of more than just economic significance. The dynamic and comprehensive development of the Pacific areas of the USSR is to secure for our whole country, two-thirds of whose territory is in Asia, vital, natural interaction with the Asia-Pacific region, whither the center of world economics and politics will most likely move in the coming century.

The understanding of this obvious fact is having difficulty paving a way for itself, still encountering sluggishness of views. Vladivostok remains a "closed city," and not only for foreigners. The very approach to the concept of security for these "peripheral" eastern areas, which are largely isolated from the main industrial and economic centers of the country, remains narrow as yet and continues to bear the imprint of dramatic events of history and the acute and painful problems of contemporary international relations. It is appropriate here to recall the territorial disputes with Japan, the Russo-Japanese war and the protracted struggle for the establishment of Soviet power complicated by the imperialist intervention. The events on the eve of WWII, including the "trial of strength" imposed on the USSR at Lake Hasan and in the Halhyn Gol River region, testified to the reality of the threat of a second front against our country at least up to the turning point in the Great Patriotic War.

The postwar events in the countries closest to the USSR and the large-scale revolutionary changes strengthened the positions of socialism on the Asian continent. But owing to the high level of military tension and political rivalry, East and Southeast Asia remained zones of confrontation, instability and crises. It is sufficient to mention the wars in Korea and Indochina, the United States' endeavor to encircle the Soviet Union from the East with military bases and alliances, the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations, the unsettled state of relations with Japan, its territorial claims and the seriousness of the military confrontation in various parts of Asia.

At the same time there has been a qualitative change in the postwar period in the place in the world of East Asia and of the entire Pacific region as a result of turbulent economic development processes. Even by today's criteria a most important center of economic activity has taken shape exceptionally rapidly and "the capacity of present-day capitalism for ascending to new levels of the socialization of production, extending the limits of the growth of the productive forces and adapting to the global challenges of the era" (1) has been manifested more distinctly than anywhere here.

The correlation of economic potentials of states of the Western Pacific is not as yet taking shape to the benefit of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the gap in the rate of development of the USSR's eastern areas and a number of neighboring countries and in the extent of their integration in regional economic relations is increasing. Trade relations are practically the sole channel of the USSR's interaction with the region. The level of orientation of the USSR's foreign trade toward the Pacific region (including China and other socialist countries) is negligible—approximately 8 percent of total foreign trade turnover (9 percent in terms of exports, almost 8 percent in terms of imports), whereas for the majority of countries of the region these indicators amount to 50-80 percent (2).

The socialist states (the PRC, DPRK, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) are the Soviet Union's principal foreign trade partners: our total exports fluctuate within the R4-5 billion range, and imports amount to R2 billion. Exports to the developed capitalist countries of the region (excluding the United States and Canada) are at the level of approximately R1 billion, and imports, approximately R2.8 billion. The imbalance in trade is even more substantial with the ASEAN countries: in 1986 exports constituted R55 million, but imports, R265 million (3). The USSR does not maintain trade contacts with South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Xianggang), the most dynamic participants, together with Japan, in regional relations. There has been virtually no increase in Soviet exports to the developed capitalist and developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region, and imports have declined even, in the 1980's.

Intensive business ties are an essential factor of political relations and the growth of international trust, although it is obvious also that extensive and productive economic cooperation is difficult without a normalization of interstate relations. The USSR's limited trade and economic involvement in regional processes frequently fosters a distrust of our foreign economic initiatives, whence once again the limited possibilities of the development of commercial and other business contacts. This "closed circle" is making markedly more difficult the task of the stimulation of Soviet foreign policy and mutually profitable economic cooperation in the Pacific direction.

Foreign economic relations—a natural continuation and organic part of the economy—frequently take shape under the impact not only of economic but also political requirements. However, a priority attitude toward their Pacific direction is essential not only to unravel political knots but primarily in order to make fuller use of external possibilities for economic and social development needs. In this sense the Pacific areas of the USSR are designed to be both objects of the expansion of foreign economic relations with the region and the link connecting the country's entire national economy with the most dynamic zone of the world economy.

Impetus to the reconsideration of our priorities in the region and the status of the Soviet Union as a Pacific power was M.S. Gorbachev's trip to the Far East in July 1986 and his speech in Vladivostok. However, it has been commented upon relatively one-sidedly even by the Soviet press. The main attention has been paid to the foreign policy part of the speech, whereas its sections devoted to the restructuring and economic development of this vast area have remained on the sidelines.

If we attempt to briefly summarize what was said in Vladivostok with reference to both domestic and international affairs, clearly moving to the forefront is the task of "abbreviating the time taken to solve problems," sharply increasing the Far East's contribution to the country's economic potential, paying priority attention

to the development of the eastern areas and looking closely at the prospects of the economy of the Far East, considering its particular significance—natural resources, social and economic possibilities and great international future. As observed in the Vladivostok speech, "the Far East has traditionally been called the country's outpost on the Pacific. This is undoubtedly right. But such a view can no longer be deemed sufficient today. The maritime region and the Far East need to be converted into a highly developed national economic complex."

As is known, the Long-Term State Program of the Comprehensive Development of the Productive Forces of the Far East Economic Region has been adopted. It virtually reproduces as the first task the corresponding part of M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in which he, speaking of the need for a concept of the area's long-term development within the framework of a uniform state regional policy, formulated as the goal of the comprehensive program the creation in the Far East of a highly efficient national economic complex with its own large-scale resource and scientific and production base, optimum structure of the economy and developed social sphere organically incorporated in the system of the all-union and international division of labor. Thus the problem of imparting to the Far East economy the parameters of "dual integration," which it currently obviously lacks, was set.

The position of the Far East in both the intra-union and international division of labor is determined primarily by raw material resources and the extractive sectors, which account for up to 30 percent of the region's total industrial production, and the degree of processing of the raw material remains very low as yet, what is more. In the 1960s and 1970s the relative inexpensiveness of the recovered raw material caused a lag of manufacturing industry and brought areas which had already been developed to the verge of resource exhaustion. The commissioning of new capacity in the 1980s, however, has required large-scale material and financial outlays, which have also been channeled into maintaining the level of raw material production, in the main.

The orientation of the Far East economic region toward the maximum, unthinking use of the fish, mineral and forestry resources for a long time preserved the illusion of the possibility of the effective solution of the currency problem thanks to the concentrated growth of the raw material sectors. Account was not taken in due measure here of the regularities of the development of the economy of the Far East region itself and world-economic relations. As a result the industry of the region has found itself divorced from the needs of the region: a considerable amount of the engineering product goes to the European part of the country, and a contraflow of equipment for local needs is received thence. The infrastructure, including its social components, followed the specific requirements of the raw material sectors and has

been determined not by the needs of the region's comprehensive development and its settlement but by the tasks of the speediest development of raw material stocks and the maximization of the export "gross".

The general economic potential of the Far East determining the intensity and quality of both domestic and foreign economic ties has as a result found itself insufficiently developed and deformed in terms of basic proportions. These disproportions have, as V. Chichkanov observes, "been caused largely by subjective factors and engendered primarily by the lack of coordination of sectoral decisions and the all-state goals of the region's comprehensive development" (4).

The sectoral approach to the assimilation of the Far East has led, specifically, to the rate of its economic development slowing and share of all-union production declining and precisely the priority sectors—forestry, fish and extractive—finding themselves in a state of the greatest stagnation. A lag has shown up in the development of nonferrous metallurgy, where the narrow departmental approach is leading to the point where only 5-6 of the most valuable components contained in certain types of raw material are being recovered out of the 20-30. It is estimated that merely the treatment of the nonferrous metal ore heaps which have formed could triple the volume of the commodity product. "Unprofitability" from the viewpoint of narrowly understood sectoral interests and the development of manufacturing industries is at the basis of the export of huge amounts of raw material outside of the region, which has put the Far East in the position of "raw material appendage".

The raw material specialization of production has become a considerable inhibitor not only of the internal development but of the business contacts of the Far East with adjacent countries. It is impeding an increase in the efficiency of foreign economic relations. Thus the actual stagnation throughout the last 10-15 years in Soviet exports to Japan at the level of approximately R1 billion a year has been connected not least with their exclusively raw material composition: timber (round, predominantly, four-fifths of which is procured in the Far East), hard coal, fish and fish products and also rare and nonferrous metals. Altogether the Far East's share of the USSR's exports to Japan amounts, it is estimated, to 70-80 percent.

As a result of the practical application of the "export specialization" concept (based on gross indicators), which has essentially become an integral part of the sectoral approach to the region's development and the assimilation and use of its resources, an impasse situation has in fact arisen not only in the foreign economic activity but in the economic development of the Far East as a whole. In the 1980s the extractive sectors have sharply reduced the rate of expansion of production, but there have been no other sectors capable of assuming the role of generators of economic growth in the Far East.

Under these conditions the need for converting the Far East economic complex into a system with "dual integration" components becomes increasingly obvious: it is important that it become an organic part of the national economy and also be organically inscribed in the system of the international division of labor. Only in this case, apparently, will the opportunities appear, first, for converting the Far East into an area not inferior in its development to all-union socioeconomic standards and, second, creating here a foreign economic and S&T "contact zone". The concept of the Far East's export, more precisely, export-raw material, specialization, which is still applied in practice and which has led to an increase in the volume of exports of raw material solely thanks to an expansion of the scale of its recovery, may be overcome on this basis.

It was perfectly natural, seemingly, to have expected of the foreign economic section of the Long-Term State Program specific proposals pertaining to the organic incorporation of the Far East in the system of the all-union and international division of labor. However, the very title of the corresponding section—"Strengthening the Export Focus of the National Economic Complexes of the Far East and Trans-Baykal"—clearly testifies to a tilt in the direction of the old approaches.

It is planned accomplishing a threefold increase in exports primarily thanks to supplies of energy carriers, an expansion of cooperation with Japan in the development of the region's forest resources, including the production of products with more extensive processing, and also an increase in exports of engineering products to the socialist and other countries. It is forecast that by the year 2000 the amount of lumber exported in relation to exports of round timber will not exceed 10 percent. Industrial shavings also will be exported in the same ratio to untreated wood. It is planned here exporting to Japan coking coal at the present level (5.5 million tons a year) and also sharply increasing exports to countries of the region of natural gas, oil and gas condensate, and it may be assumed that untreated raw material will by the year 2000 remain the main item of Far East exports and will determine their structure and the nature of the USSR's participation in the regional division of labor.

To speak of domestic economic parameters, the production of lumber, for example, in relation to timber procurement will be practically unchanged and will remain throughout the period at the 16-18-percent level, although the volume of the production of pulp will double, and of industrial shavings, will increase fourfold. The program does not provide for the production of lumber in Maritime Kray, Amur, Kamchatka and Sakhalin oblasts and the Yakut ASSR, although timber shipments are planned at the existing or a somewhat higher level.

While using these facts and figures solely as an example it should be noted that the problem is not only the fact that the correlation of lumber and round timber in

exports will not change in the period from 1990 through the year 2000 and that this will lead to big "shortfalls" in foreign currency and to additional material, human and ecological costs on our part. There could perfectly easily be a situation wherein selling round timber at a profit, in Japan, for example, is impossible, but, for our part, the corresponding resources have already been invested, that is, the program requirements have been formally fulfilled.

Even today our Japanese partners are making highly selective demands on imported timber commodities. High-grade coniferous saw logs constitute over 80 percent of the products they purchase. The growing demand on Japan's part for such products as cardboard, paper, plywood, wood particle board and lumber is being met under the conditions of tough competition on the part of both local and foreign, including North American, producers. This presupposes the highest standards of quality of the exported product and their conformity to the demands made in Japan, which are frequently highly specific. These inhibitors could be neutralized with the organization of joint ventures with the participation of Japanese capital and the use of Japanese technology, but, as far as we know, such projects are not being discussed as yet.

Nor is consideration of the foreign economic component, which reflects the growing complexity of relations with overseas partners and implies the establishment of closer mutual relations in the phase of production, including its financial, technical and commercial support, to be found upon an analysis of certain other sections of the program, where its presence would be highly desirable. This observation could be applied primarily to the sections connected with the solution of social questions. Speaking in Vladivostok, M.S. Gorbachev observed: "If the addressing of social issues is vitally necessary for the whole country, it is doubly and triply important for the Far East."

The problem of the development of the Far East has long been tackled in circumvention, as it were, of man inasmuch as it has been manifestly unprofitable for ministries to invest resources in a socioeconomic infrastructure, the more so in that the cost of construction here is two-three times higher than in the central areas. Frequently the absence of normal living and working conditions has been "compensated" by extra cash payments and, from time to time, commodities in short supply. Nonetheless, the amounts of savings bank deposits in the area are 14-35 percent less than in the RSFSR on average, and monetary income, even with regard for the territorial allowances, is 20 percent lower than that of inhabitants of the center. The level of consumption of services and material benefits is lower, and the choice of food products is worse. For every 1,000 persons arriving to take up residence in Khabarovsk Kray, for example, there are 800 who leave. Five years after having moved only 3 out of 10 incoming families remain on farms of

Amur Oblast. The outflow of skilled personnel trained in the region and the chaotic migration of the population are leading to losses running into billions.

The acute shortage and turnover of personnel is hitting painfully at the most vulnerable components—the agrarian sector of the economy (more than half the food consumed is brought to the Far East from the western parts of the country) and the construction complex, including housing construction (in some cases people spend 10-15 years on the apartment waiting list). In accordance with the relocation benefits, each family with no less than two persons in work has the right to accommodation, an individual cottage, for example. However, the extent of the relocation has conflicted with the possibilities of housing construction, which, in turn, are holding back the attraction to the Far East of manpower, and this is limiting the possibilities of new construction. There are an average of only seven men per construction site, and in order to keep within the standard timeframe it is necessary today to “freeze” one out of every two sites. Yet it is essential to build more in the region in order for the process of its assimilation and development to be more dynamic.

It would seem that both housing construction and solution of the food problem could be spheres of intensive foreign economic cooperation. The creation of a system of enterprises producing batched-supply structures and panels and modules for the construction of single- and two-story contemporary-design wood residences could be suggested as one direction. The construction of new and the modernization of operating enterprises for comprehensive wood processing with the participation of overseas firms and the creation of line facilities for the manufacture of construction products and also finishing materials, floor coverings and furniture would contribute to the accelerated surmounting of the difficulties involving accommodation. Opportunities for exports of a wide range of wood-processing products could emerge simultaneously.

Further, the Far East accounts for 40 percent of the fish caught in the USSR and the canned fish products. However, there is an acute lack here of processing capacity, warehouses and production premises, cold stores, equipment and, finally, packaging, with which the Far East enterprises supply fish-processing industry to the extent of only one-third. The rest of the packaging is purchased... in the Baltic area.

Granted the significant increase in the catch in recent decades, a steady trend toward a deterioration in its qualitative composition has come to light: Alaska pollock and iwashi account for up to 75 percent of the total product. The low level of technology employed in the processing of this raw material has led to a general decline in the quality of the fish product, increased the narrowing of the selection and caused a certain stagnation in export earnings. The degree of processing of the fish product shipped for export is low. In particular,

tremendous potential for the preparation of fillets and stuffing, for which there is demand in neighboring countries, is not being realized in the processing of the Alaska pollock. The attraction of foreign capital, technology and experience would not only accelerate the unraveling of these knots and increase the saturation of the domestic, primarily Far East, market with fish products and convenience foods but could also contribute to an expansion of exports and an improvement in their structure. And it would be advisable, what is more, to provide for the use of the production and marketing possibilities of overseas firms in the earliest possible phases of the development of the corresponding sectors, the more so in that Japanese business circles are displaying considerable interest in such projects.

The retooling of fishing and the construction of new fish-processing enterprises could be a sphere of joint enterprise. According to certain estimates, the lack of fish-processing capacity in coming years will reach the critical stage, and the situation concerning ship repairs will remain difficult. Thus in the last 5-year plan large-capacity ships of a fishing kolkhoz of Khabarovsk Kray spent more than 500 ship-days over and above the necessary time waiting in port for the hulls to be scraped prior to a refit, that is, two ships virtually stood idle throughout the 5-year plan.

The enlistment in this sphere of foreign companies and resources on a compensation basis could raise appreciably the efficiency of the use of equipment and increase the degree of processing and the quality of the product and export income in trade not only with Japan but also the United States, Canada, the PRC, DPRK and South Korea. The modernization of shore-based facilities with the participation of overseas firms, the refitting of small-capacity boats for coastal fishing and the provision of mariculture enterprises with the necessary equipment could also in time afford qualitatively new opportunities for an outlet onto overseas markets.

A weak part of the program, whose realization also envisages no in any way extensive use as yet of outside possibilities (such as, for example, manpower imports), is the creation of a modern construction complex. Approximately R200 billion of capital investments, including R80 billion of construction and installation work and the construction of 101 million square meters of housing, are to be assimilated by the year 2000 within the confines of the Far East economic region. The successful fulfillment of such a major investment program will require the organization of a new, modern construction materials industry, a change in the technology of construction industry and its comprehensive industrialization.

It is understandable that, as distinct from fish or wood-processing industry, recouping currency outlays in the creation of a construction complex is practically impossible. But without having developed a modern construction industry and without having untied the knots in

connection with provision of the region with workers and engineering personnel, the fundamental restructuring and modernization of industry will not be achieved. The lag in the development of the construction complex could result in the flaccid, incomplete implementation of the whole program and threaten big currency losses in other areas, and for a long period of time, what is more. Thus, for example, of the 200,000 persons working in the "Dalryba" Association, 45,000 are waiting for housing. Although the fishermen produce 37 percent of the maritime region's gross product and provide for a substantial proportion of export proceeds, their housing quota in the plans of the Glavvladivostokstroy is confined to 3-4 percent. Sizable currency losses in the form of unrealized income from foreign tourism, the manufacture of industrial products and so forth are potentially connected with the lack of development of the construction complex.

The program provides for extensive economic cooperation with the socialist countries of Asia, specifically, the creation of joint ventures for the production of agricultural products and consumer goods from Soviet raw material, which are then to be imported into the USSR. Economic cooperation based on the use of the supplier's raw material could also be supplemented by the relocation of some Far East light industry enterprises to Vietnam and the DPRK with their surplus labor resources. This is all the more advisable in that the population of the Far East is supplied with consumer goods largely from the European part of the USSR. Local enterprises of the sector, on the other hand, work under the conditions of the acute shortage and turnover of manpower and frequently on imported material. Medium-sized and small firms of a number of other countries of the region capable of providing for the technological updating of the products (5), which could then be exported and, in particular, defray the considerable deficit in the socialist states of the region's trade with the USSR, could be enlisted in such cooperation projects.

The use of foreign economic possibilities and currency resources in spheres not contemplating direct currency returns should evidently be accompanied by the creation of a kind of Far East regional system of foreign currency expenditure priorities, the regulation of import purchases and the creation of mechanisms which would preclude the miscalculations made in the past. Thus, for example, imports of costly Japanese equipment used in forest exploitation have grown from year to year, and no attempts have been made, evidently, to attract the necessary technology and equipment for the manufacture of such equipment ourselves. It would be possible with regard for this experience to avoid, for example, at time of the creation of wood-processing joint ventures such a "compensation" model and direct foreign economic ties toward the production of the necessary equipment by enterprises of the Far East.

Similarly it would be advisable, for example, to orient ourselves not toward imports of refrigerating and fish-processing equipment but toward the creation of the

necessary conditions for its production. This could afford Far East industry new export prospects and help it acquire its own character both in the national economy and in relations with the region, primarily with the socialist and developing countries.

With regard for the remoteness of the region from the main auto-manufacturing centers of the country and also the proximity of the markets of China, the DPRK and Vietnam the Far East engineering complex could also include cooperation projects with overseas auto-manufacturing companies, which would lend impetus to the development of all mechanical engineering, expand export opportunities and increase the saturation of the home market. The project of a joint auto works, Soviet-Japanese, for example, could be seen in the context of a special economic cooperation zone as a version of non-traditional approaches to the assimilation of progressive forms of economic ties to foreign countries.

There have been practically no improvements in the Far East economic region in the field of the organization of joint ventures with overseas firms. The proposal of a group of Japanese insurance companies concerning the creation of a special joint enterprise zone on an area of Soviet territory close to the PRC and DPRK border cannot fail to evoke interest under these conditions. The lessee of this area for a term of 50-60 years could be a Soviet-Japanese consortium, which would begin the construction of a modern commercial port, an international airport, a heat and electric power plant, roads and other facilities of the infrastructure. The Japanese side's contribution to realization of the project could be \$5-6 billion. A fixed amount of profit would be paid out of the income obtained for the leasing to companies and organizations of developed plots made ready for economic assimilation.

Realization of such a project could lend powerful impetus not only to Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations but also the whole set of the USSR's foreign economic ties in the Asia-Pacific direction. Nor can it be ruled out that China also, which lacks large ports on the coast of the Sea of Japan, would be interested in realization of the project. The DPRK could be enlisted in participation in the construction of facilities of the special zone as well.

The authors do not intend direct analogies with the "export production zones" or "special economic zones" which exist in certain developing countries of the region and also in China. In the vast majority of cases their formation was connected with possibilities of taking advantage of cheap manpower, an advantageous geographical location or special preferential tax or investment conditions and also with the host countries' interest in building up exports. Ultimately all will be determined by specific national priorities and possibilities of attracting foreign partners. At the same time,

however, although as a whole China's experience in this field may not be a model to copy, it is in many respects of considerable practical interest, nonetheless.

In the special economic zones Chinese legislation grants foreign investors terms comparable to those which exist in Southeast Asian countries. To attract foreign investments in industry preferential tax and customs conditions extend to 14 "open" coastal cities and Hainan Island (6). Within China's special economic zones all foreign trade transactions are duty-free. Producer goods are not subject to duty in the "open" cities, and in some of them the economic conditions for joint enterprise activity are more auspicious than in the special economic zones. In a number of instances in the latter half of 1986 the Chinese side lowered the rental payments and the wage rates of local personnel appreciably and abolished the tax on exported profits. In the special economic zones the rate of income tax is half that stipulated by the 1979 act governing joint business activity.

More than one-fourth of all foreign investments, the total of which amounted in 1987 to approximately \$7 billion, is concentrated in the zones. Three "open" cities (Guangzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin), which have become the forward edge of work on mastering overseas experience, account for approximately the same amount. In 1986 aggregate exports of the products produced on their territory amounted to \$1 billion, and the export product's share of total production is growing constantly. Various forms of cooperation with foreign companies are being officially accepted, and enterprises with foreign participation are becoming a kind of reference point for Chinese industry and services and contributing to the introduction of new approaches to the organization of production, the attraction of foreign capital and the organization of long-term ties to foreign partners.

In studying the prospects of the development of the foreign economic ties of the Far East economic complex even more radical versions of administrative-territorial methods of attracting foreign investments, technology and experience could be proposed, we believe. Inasmuch as individual economic zones obviously cannot contribute to the solution of the whole set of problems, the Soviet Far East could as a whole be regarded as a natural zone of economic cooperation with foreign countries geared to the creation of a diversified economic structure and an improvement in the quality of the social sphere.

Service trade is becoming an increasingly important sphere of economic exchange in which the Far East could participate more actively. The accelerated development of the USSR's Far East areas and their more extensive enlistment in foreign economic ties require the development of the merchant fleet, an increase in the capacity of the ports and their modernization and expansion. As yet, however, the possibilities of maritime transport lag behind the growing requirements of foreign trade and

the transport services market. A substantial amount even of Soviet export cargo is transported on foreign ships, which is attended by foreign currency losses.

Compared with other countries of the Pacific the coastal infrastructure on the Soviet Pacific coastline, port facilities particularly, is insufficiently developed. The main ports are Nakhodka, Vladivostok, Vostochnyy and Vanino, but of these, only two are open to foreign ships. Interested overseas firms could be enlisted in the upgrading and expansion of port facilities and the coastal infrastructure, including the construction of container terminals, warehouse premises, automated handling complexes and processing enterprises.

All this, in particular, would help the more intensive use of the trans-Siberian container bridge, which serves virtually only the port of Vostochnyy. The problem of the containerization not only of export-import cargo but also intra-union shipments, in which the Far East is involved, and the "raising" of the possibilities of ground transport to the modern level of the organization of container, packet and lighter transportation require solution. It is significant in this connection that it is contemplated intensively developing the production infrastructure, including power engineering, transport, communications and the construction of hydropower plants and ports, in the Seventh Five-Year Plan of the development of the PRC's national economy with the aid of the attraction of foreign investments (7).

Inasmuch as a change in the direction of an increase in the relative significance of services is occurring in the structure of consumer demand of the developed countries of the region, it would be wrong to concentrate exclusively on the "industrial" approach to the economic development of the Far East. It is well known that there are many possibilities here for tourism and the attraction, thanks to this, of considerable foreign currency resources from Japan and other countries of the region. The experience of China, in particular, where more than one-half of total foreign capital investments is channeled into the nonmaterial production sphere—the construction of tourist complexes and hotels, restaurants and municipal and consumer service enterprises—testifies to the expediency of the enlistment of foreign firms in the development of this sector. As a result there is a steady increase in the PRC's currency receipts from foreign tourism—they were in excess of \$1.8 billion in 1987.

The specific features of the region, particularly the fact that there is practically nowhere within the region for the Far Easterners to spend their vacation, might also be taken into consideration in the development of the tourist industry in the Far East. It is estimated that its population spends 8-10 times more than residents of the European parts on travel to summer recreation spots. To solve this problem and create a universal system of

services for tourists, both Soviet and foreign, it will evidently be necessary to abandon narrow departmental approaches and seek nontraditional solutions.

In particular, it would hardly be expedient under the conditions of the lack of construction capacity and an infrastructure to create separate tourism and recreation structures serving, as is still customary, Soviet and foreign tourists. Under the conditions, however, of the transition to currency self-support and the obvious "unprofitability" for Intourist of Soviet tourists' payment for services in rubles a number of "compensatory" mechanisms could be provided for.

One such is the sale to foreigners for foreign currency of licenses for fishing, hunting and so forth. In Canada and the United States the commercial organization of angling (for salmon primarily) has led to the appearance of a highly profitable variety of international tourism. Thus in Canada the total salmon catch is put at \$145 million, and the value of the sale of licenses for salmon fishing by amateur sportsmen, at \$120 million. Whereas the commercial value of salmon has in the last 25 years remained practically unchanged at \$6-7, its catch by amateur fishermen on license, which, naturally, includes a charge for all the services rendered them, rose from \$158 in 1956 to \$333 in 1980.

Decisive significance for the creation of a dependable export base is attached to the availability of manpower with the necessary skills and the readiness of managerial personnel to work under the rapidly changing conditions of the international market. Let us turn once again to China's experience. The shortage of skilled personnel was one of the principal problems which brought about its cooperation with foreign firms. It was solved thanks to the extensive use not only of internal but also outside possibilities and overseas university and research centers. Commercial channels for obtaining the appropriate professional or educational training were switched in also.

A most important condition of realization of the Long-Term State Program of the Comprehensive Development of the Productive Forces of the Far East Economic Region is an adequate and efficient fine-tuning mechanism for it. It should obviously have room for a unit for controlling foreign economic ties. The program in itself reflects the new approach to planning and presupposes a combination of the sectoral and the territorial approaches. At the same time its work assignments are scattered around departments. As before, the departmental approach shows through in the section devoted to foreign economic ties also.

It may be assumed, therefore, that if for realization of the program itself some supradepartmental coordinating body is needed, for the realization in full of the foreign economic goals as formulated by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok such a body is doubly essential inasmuch as even under the conditions of the reconstruction of the

system of the organization of foreign economic relations export-import transactions are communicated at ministry, department, enterprise and association level (8), which under the conditions of the Far East could contribute to an intensification of the departmental approach. At the same time the elaboration and adoption of the program pertaining to the Far East testify to the need for the purposive "raising" of the region to a particular level and to a recognition that the potential for its "self-development" has not yet taken shape. It is all the more important that fulfillment of the program led to qualitative improvements and a change precisely in the situation which has come about largely as a result of the unchecked activity of the departments.

Continuation of the present organizational approaches to realization of the program could only intensify the orientation of leading sectors of the Far East toward obtaining income from raw material exports. The traditional foreign trade forms of relations will obviously be used here. The customary "foreign trade" approach to the USSR's participation in the international division of labor in the Asia-Pacific region is hopelessly out of date. The gap in export potentials with neighboring countries is considerable not only in terms of quantitative parameters but, particularly, in terms of qualitative and organizational characteristics also. For this reason emphasis on a buildup of the Soviet exports by traditional methods could evidently hardly change very much, and the "export base," whose foundation is raw material specialization, cannot correspond either to the economic processes occurring in the region or the focus of the changes in the structure of the Soviet economy.

Whence the urgency of a cardinal restructuring of the entire Far East regional economic complex, its rapprochement in terms of qualitative parameters with the economy of progressive states of the Asia-Pacific region and the use of all opportunities for the formation of qualitatively new "points of growth," which would be stimulators of the balanced and dynamic development of the Far East and ensure an expansion of its foreign economic ties.

In order to make the Far East a full-fledged economic partner of the leading Asia-Pacific countries a well-considered strategy geared to a gradual "entry" into the structure of the international division of labor, the determination of both sectoral and geographical priorities and the use of a broad set of methods and forms of foreign economic relations is essential. The elaboration of such a strategy is connected both with the search for a model of the long-term specialization of the Far East region and methods of using outside factors in the structural reorganization and with the use of cooperation with foreign countries for solving priority problems, social and infrastructural primarily.

The purposeful and broad use of external possibilities in the said directions could not only supplement the measures outlined by the program but play the main part in

important areas thereof in the realization of what is contemplated. It has to be considered in the solution of urgent long-term and immediate problems of the development of the economy of the USSR's Pacific regions that "the development of civilization is assuming an increasingly energetic nature in the East, in Asia and in the Pacific zone. Our economy also is shifting to Siberia and the Far East. Thus we have an objective interest in the enrichment of Asia-Pacific cooperation" (9).

Footnotes

1. KOMMUNIST NO 2, 1988, p 5.
2. "Pacific Economic Community Statistics 1986," Tokyo, 1986, p 43.
3. "The USSR's Foreign Trade in 1986. Statistical Digest," Moscow, 1987, p 11.
4. V. Chichkanov, "Problems and Prospects of the Development of the Far East's Productive Forces" (KOMMUNIST No 16, 1985, p 100).
5. Problems of the Far East's ties to Asian socialist countries are analyzed in detail in an article by M.Ye. Trigubenko and N.A. Shlyk entitled "An Intensification of the Direct Cooperation of the USSR's Far East Regions With Asian Socialist Countries" (PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA No 4, 1987).
6. For more detail see A. Salitskiy, "The PRC: Search for the Optimum Foreign Economic Strategy" (MEMO No 9, 1987).
7. "Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China". UN Centre of Transnational Corporation, New York, 1988, p 23.
8. V. Kamentsev, "Problems of Foreign Economic Activity" (KOMMUNIST No 15, 1987, p 26).
9. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World," Moscow, 1987, p 187.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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French Impressions of Perestroika

18160009z Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA
No 5, May 88 pp 87-95

[Article by Igor Alekseyevich Yegorov, candidate of economic sciences: "The French and Perestroika"]

[Text] Our new correspondent Igor Alekseyevich Yegorov, candidate of economic sciences, has begun work in France. We call your attention to his first material.

The initial impressions from the country always differ outwardly and are contradictory. Therefore, a pivotal point is necessary somehow to organize them and try more or less to pass them on to the reader convincingly. For a Soviet journalist who has recently arrived in France, the topic of perestroika can serve as such a pivot.

I

The reaction abroad to perestroika in the USSR reflects both the international aspects of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and the state of public opinion and struggle of ideas in one country or another. At the same time, this reaction is, in our opinion, part of the weighty proof of the growing mutual influence of states and peoples, the integrity of the modern world. Taken in a world context, the ideas of perestroika act as an active factor in forming a new type of international relations, as a call for awareness of universal problems and a joint quest for ways to solve them.

Let us say right away: The topic of perestroika and its universal importance is still just becoming a subject of scientific analysis. Many of its aspects cannot yet be clear today for a number of objective and subjective reasons and will be realized only as it develops. Social sciences, both ours and abroad, are searching for approaches to shaping a more integral knowledge. Advancing new tasks and placing emphasis on universal values, principles of glasnost and openness, creative debate and rejection of claims of having a monopoly on truth, perestroika is thereby stimulating both a new social practice and its scientific understanding, and not just in the USSR but also beyond its borders.

Slowly but surely, an understanding of the scale of changes taking place in the Soviet Union is also penetrating into the thick of French public consciousness. The Russian words "perestroika" and "glasnost" are being used not only by journalists. Virtually all prominent political figures now use these words before mass audiences, expressing them, as a rule, in a favorably and cautious manner. And this is understandable: noblesse oblige. The opinions of scientists, experts, persons engages in cultural activities, figures in business circles,

and those customarily called common French are considerably more diverse. However, there is one indisputable fact—the sharply increased interest in the USSR and its internal and international affairs.

This is evidenced by the growing stream of publications about the USSR; the organization of discussions and conferences in scientific, political and social circles; the intent attention on the personality of M. Gorbachev (remember, the local mass media prefer the “personality” way of shedding light on events and facts), both from Soviet people coming to France and from French people visiting the Soviet Union.¹

The “image” of the USSR is also changing for the better, according to public opinion polls. But before talking about the reaction to perestroika, let us try to assess indirectly the amount and quality of information on the USSR. Bibliographical reference books may offer some assistance. The most complete information is contained in “European Bibliography on the USSR and Eastern Europe,” which takes into account practically all serious

publications in the field of social sciences, culture, literature, art and linguistics (except daily newspapers) in seven European countries—Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, the FRG and Switzerland.

According to the latest issue, there were 3,696 works published in these countries in 1982 (not counting reviews) devoted to the USSR and general questions on the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, one-fourth published in French (851).² In order to get a rough idea of the flow of information in France about the USSR taking into account the daily press, radio and television, the latter figure should be increased by factor of 3-4. This would make it a minimum of 3,000 publications and reports on the USSR by the early 1980's. On the whole, there is an enormous flow of information, with more than one-third devoted to culture, literature and art.

Unfortunately, such detailed data for recent years are not yet available. Therefore, we will use far from complete bibliographical materials prepared in 1986 and 1987 (as of June) at the Higher School of Social Sciences of France and present them in tabular form.

Table 1. Subject Structure of French Publications About the USSR, Including General Questions for the USSR and Countries of Eastern Europe³

	1982		1985-1986		1986-1987	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total publications	851	100	312	100	574	100
Including:						
Books	241	28.3	82	26.3	153	26.7
Articles and such	610	71.7	230	73.7	421	73.3
History	135	15.9	68	21.8	82	14.3
Economics	98	11.5	43	13.8	74	12.9
Domestic policy	92	10.8	30	9.6	62	10.8
International relations	127	14.9	45	14.4	84	14.6
Social issues	22	2.6	21	6.7	41	7.2
Culture, literature, art, linguistics	322	37.8	88	28.2	205	35.7
Others (geography, memoirs, law, nationalities question, etc.)	55	6.5	17	5.5	26	4.5
Number of periodicals counted	505	-	68	-	93	-
Average number of publications per periodical, including yearbooks	1.2	-	3.4	-	4.5	-

As can be seen from Table 1, the difference between the number of publications in individual years is explained primarily by the fact that more than 400 periodicals, mainly yearbooks, were not counted in 1986 and 1987. At the same time, the subject structure of the publications remains sufficiently stable. If one takes into account only the works pertaining to the sphere of social sciences, most of the publications are devoted to history, international relations and economics, then internal political problems and, finally, social issues.

It is much more complicated to assess the level of information. We will limit ourselves to one objective indicator—the percentage of publications of Soviet authors in the total number of works on social sciences. According to bibliographical materials, in 1986 and

1987 these publications were only 3-1 and 0.5 percent of the total number of works published, compared to 15 percent for all books by non-French authors translated and published on a given topic. The daily press, radio and television only partially make up for this gap, which explains, as we have been repeated convinced, the dissatisfaction of the French with information on current events in the Soviet Union.

Perhaps what is published in the USSR does not correspond to local standards? The answers from French experts studying the problems of the Soviet Union convince us otherwise. Many Soviet publications have become so informative and diverse that they complain about not having enough time to become familiar with them. A number of French publications have begun

reprinting materials from Soviet sources. Thus, E. Coulesa, a staff member at the French Institute of International Relations who prepared for the magazine *POLITIQUE ETRANGERE* a selection of letters from Soviet readers addressed to *PRAVDA* and *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, notes that the letters "attest not only to the readers' interest in the perestroika program but also to the astonishing political maturity of representatives of Soviet civilian society, the existence of which some people not long ago firmly refuted."⁴

The book by M. Gorbachev has evoked tremendous interest on the part of French political figures, press, radio and television.⁵ French readers looked through with great attention the book by A. Aganbegyan⁶ and a number of other Soviet experts. For them this is in-depth, serious and capacious "first-hand" information on perestroika in its various aspects. Of course, far from all reviews on the books were favorable or even objective. Here, just as it often is in the USSR, many of the writing and speaking fraternity adhere to two lines of logic as a minimum: by one they judge us, and by the other they judge themselves.

However, such a phenomenon is quite natural in the initial stage of international dialogue begun in connection with perestroika. What is more, in arousing interest, the new approaches to internal and international affairs, a new and considerably broader system of theoretical ideas, and the very practice of perestroika in the Soviet Union require a considerable time to comprehend.

Naturally, this comprehension goes through sharp clashes of various points of view reflecting virtually the sum total of views of French society, thereby becoming a part of internal socio-political debate. That is why published works about the USSR more often contain assessments and judgments of their authors than concrete information on specific questions. Hence the following paradox: On the one side is the enormous flow of literature about the USSR (especially for experts fluent in several languages)⁷, and on the other is the sense of a shortage of information for the reader receiving it, in addition, in a heavily prepared form.⁸

To make the picture complete, it is also necessary to talk about the great diversity of regularly published materials (more than 270 national periodicals, including more than general 80 newspapers and magazines, 40 on economics and finance, and so forth) which at times give not only a different but even an opposite interpretation of the same facts or events.

The left-wing press, especially the communist press (*L'HUMANITE*, *L'ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE*, *RECHERCHE INTERNATIONALE*, and others), regularly reports on major events in our country. "Are we fully enough aware of the meaning and importance of the radical change which is taking place in the history of socialism primarily in connection with Soviet

perestroika?" writes F. Cohen, for example. "The new concept of socialism, which today is finding flesh, has overall importance for communist theory and practice."⁹

It is the French Communist Party (PCF) press which writes most fully about the international aspects of perestroika and emphasizes the tremendous importance of Soviet initiatives in the area of international security and disarmament and strengthening trust and cooperation between states and peoples.

The reforms in the USSR are arousing the fixed attention of French experts as well. Noting a certain skepticism on their part, the first secretary of the French Socialist Party, L. Jospin, at the same time emphasized: "...If perestroika continues, the USSR's image in France will change, and anti-Sovietism will abate... All among the experts feel sympathy for this movement." At the same time, a certain part of the French left-wing, as the national secretary of the United Socialist Party, J.-C. Le Scorne, believes, for example, has not been able to assess perestroika and only most recently (roughly beginning in the fall of 1987) has begun to realize the importance of the changes taking place in the USSR.

In the right-wing camp, perestroika is encountering a rather guarded and skeptical attitude, particularly regarding new thinking in the area of inter-state relations and rejection of the confrontational approach to solving international, regional and local problems. The right-wing press up to now has been trying to impress upon public opinion that the Soviet initiatives do not give rise to trust, for they are predominantly tactical and forced in nature.

As regards the internal aspects of perestroika—in-depth reforms in the economic mechanism and democratization—they try to portray them as a certain retreat from socialist principles and drawing closer to the market capitalist "ideal." Here one can clearly see the desire of the right-wing forces to derive political benefit for themselves by interpreting the changes taking place in the USSR from their own neo-conservative positions.

Perhaps, if one attempts to express in a most condensed manner the essence of the French reaction to perestroika, it comes down to the statement of a whole series of questions. Does perestroika actually signify a "revolution within a revolution," that is, a profound transformation of Soviet society and its political and economic system, or is this in all the sum total of temporary and limited measures to eliminate negative tendencies in the economy and the social sphere? What are the real content of the process of democratization and its forms? How does it ensure human rights and individual freedoms? What forces specifically are hampering perestroika? In general, is it possible for the Soviet economy to shift to a path of intensive development and accelerated mastering of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution?

Perhaps the most important question is: What does perestroika promise the French, Western Europe, and the West as a whole—a more powerful potential enemy or an ally in the struggle with common troubles, a partner in developing universal civilization? Is this non-confrontational type of inter-state relations, heretofore unknown in history, which would preclude not only war but also even the very principle of using military force to settle disputes and conflicts between states, possible in principle?

There are dozens and hundreds of questions. Only the Soviet people can answer some; the answers to others can only be found together. The tremendous effect of glasnost on the French public is related to the fact that it not only is removing many information "taboos," but is also making the process of searching for the necessary solutions, answers to questions large and small, open and accessible to all. In a certain sense, glasnost is making participants in perestroika out of everyone abroad who is speaking out one way or the other on the problems being raised by it.

II

So, what do the French think about the Soviet Union and perestroika? Perhaps public opinion polls provide a sufficiently unbiased answer to this. According to data from the Center for the Study of French Political Affairs (SEVIPOF), more than 340 polls concerning the "image" of the Soviet Union and European socialist countries were conducted between 1965 and 1987. The latest data indicate a "warming" of French public opinion with respect to the USSR.

According to IFOP evidence, 72 percent of the French polled in October 1987 favorably assess the process of perestroika going on in the USSR, believing that it is beneficial to human rights (72 percent) and promotes detente (69 percent) and disarmament (61 percent). The figures are quite revealing, considering that French public opinion is extremely heterogeneous and is the object of persistent anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda (to be covered later). In particular, the results of a poll conducted by SOFRES in October 1987 can serve as an example of the "spread" of opinions.

If we try to sum up briefly the public opinion and the numerous statements by the French press concerning reforms in the USSR, despite the tremendous differences in approaches and assessments, they come down to several basic tenets. First of all, virtually everyone believes that perestroika is responding to a need that could no longer be put off, although the reasons for it, naturally, are interpreted differently. According to a poll conducted in June 1986, French opinion on the socio-economic development of the USSR during recent years was basically negative—69 percent of those polled, compared to 12 percent who believed the results of development rather positive. One year later, this ratio had

changed somewhat (59 and 18 percent).¹⁰ It is significant that favorable assessments of the accessibility of public health services and educations were predominant even in 1986.

As a rule, French experts cite as the reasons for perestroika in the USSR the abrupt slowdown of economic growth, technological and scientific and technical lagging, inefficient use of material and labor resources, structural disproportions, a serious shortage of consumer goods and especially food, the acuteness of social problems, and much else that generally coincides with the conclusions of Soviet economists. At the same time, many scientists strive to assess the processes ongoing in the USSR from broader positions. Thus, Professor of History M. Reberneau writes: "Gorbachevism (this is what perestroika is often called here—Author) comes not from Gorbachev alone. It reflects an increase in the average cultural level of the Soviet society as a whole. It is this very society...that has made it a nationwide requirement."¹¹

Table 2. Attitude of People Polled on Certain Political Trends¹²
(percentage of total)

	Positive	Negative	No Opinion
Socialism ¹³	53	30	17
De Gaullism	47	30	23
Left-Wing	45	38	17
Centrism	40	30	30
Right-Wing	33	47	20
Social Democrats	29	30	41
Christian Democrats	27	38	35
Communism	13	71	16
Extreme Right-Wing	5	78	17

French experts are relatively unanimous in assessing the extreme complexity of accomplishing the tasks set by perestroika. Critically assessing the state of the Soviet economy, many scientists conclude that there is no other way. "The stake of the next few years is clear," writes economist J. Sapir. "Either this country will acquire a new dynamism, but within the framework of a sufficiently excellent model of development...or it will find itself faced with upheavals as a result of stagnation due to exhaustion of the traditional model... In many respects, the country is faced with a dilemma similar to the one which the Western countries faced during the crisis of 1929."¹⁴

Believing that the supporters of perestroika have undertaken to carry out a colossal task, economist B. Chavans at the same time justly reproaches Soviet science for not resolving the problems related to carrying out reforms. "Any economic reform," he writes, "is accompanied by various processes of acquiring knowledge. The first concerns lessons drawn from the country's previous experience, particularly from previous attempts at reform... The second is the perception and interpretation of the reforms being carried out in other socialist countries...

The third is acquiring knowledge in the process itself of reforming. An opinion is being formed that the level achieved by the supporters of perestroika is still not very high... It is surprising, but in the USSR the reasons why previous attempts were not carried through to the end have not been studied thoroughly and in detail."¹⁵

The opinions cited above are merely a weak reflection of the discussions and debates which are taking place in France on the most varied aspects of perestroika, including political structures and the process of democratization, international ties, the alignment of forces with respect to reforms, and the problems of CEMA member-countries.¹⁶ Naturally, there are still many skeptical assessments, particularly among those who express France's point of view on international questions. Thus, the director of the French Institute of International Relations, T. de Monbrial, urges assessing glasnost and perestroika with care.

Nevertheless, despite the skepticism and distrust, the ideas of perestroika and renovation of the Soviet society are encountering a growing response among the French. Analyzing the results of one of the polls (June 1987), French analyst A. Duhamel noted: "M. Gorbachev's influence in France for the first time is becoming perceptible... Of course, anti-communism remains stable, but the Soviet leader's manner and methods and mobile diplomacy enable him to score points even in France, where skepticism is an extremely widespread phenomenon."¹⁷ Indeed, in June 1987, 43 percent of those polled believed the changes in the USSR were profound compared to 35 percent, when only 3 months earlier this ratio was reversed—35 percent versus 42 percent.

III

Perhaps the effect of perestroika and the USSR peace initiatives is most perceptible in questions of disarmament, war and peace (see Table 3). In only 3 months (April-June 1987) the ratio of opinions on the question of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe changed significantly: 35 percent in favor (45 percent against) in April, but by the end of June it was already 53 percent in favor (28 percent against).

Table 3. Evolution of Assessments of East-West Correlation of Forces¹⁸
(percentage of total)

	Nov 1981	Nov 1983	Nov 1985	Oct 1987
Approximate equality	24	27	29	40
Warsaw Pact advantage	47	45	36	20
NATO advantage	14	16	21	18
No opinion	15	12	14	22

In October 1987, the compilers of the questionnaires asked those being polled a somewhat different question: "Do you believe that the simultaneous elimination of

Soviet and American missiles poses a threat to France?" At first glance, this is a strange question. However, it is all simple to explain. Many statesmen and political figures, politologists and Sovietologists, and the mass media persistently tried to convince and continue to try to convince the French that an agreement between the USSR and the United States is a blow against French and West European security. They believe that until the Western Europeans (prompted by France, naturally) significantly modernize their military power, they will remain unprotected in the face of possible aggression from the East. However, despite this, 41 percent of those polled responded negatively to this question, 37 percent positively, and 22 percent had no opinion.¹⁹

Using the USSR-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe as a pretext, the French "political class," as they say here, strives to step up the process of military integration in Western Europe as much as possible. This question goes beyond the limits of this article. Nevertheless, it cannot help but influence public opinion.

In this regard, let us direct our attention just to the assertions which, to put it mildly, do not correspond to reality (we are by no means underestimating the actual complexity of the entire complex of problems facing Europe). First of all, this is the thesis on the sharp disbalance of forces in favor of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries which is continually being spread by the majority of mass media. Here is one example. Speaking on television on 3 January 1988 (program TF-1), Socialist C. Hernu, former minister of defense, not only urged extreme vigilance with respect to Soviet disarmament initiatives, but also claimed that the correlation of military forces in Europe between the East and West was 3:1 in favor of the East.

However, there are also different opinions. Thus, based on various sources, including a report of the Western European Union dated November 1987, K. Julienne, director of MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, writes: "The Soviet threat is real enough and should not be taken lightly. But the subject of the USSR's 'overwhelming superiority' is a myth. The Western headquarters have never had any delusions on this account, nor has the Soviet headquarters... Only the common people are frightened by this. Beginning in the late 1940's, not a single chance has been missed to horrify them. This game continues tirelessly."²⁰

This opinion is also held by Vice Admiral A. Sanginetti, former chairman of the Commission on Defense Issues of the National Assembly of France, which, as he himself asserts, cannot be suspected of sympathy for the East. "The question arises," he writes in MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, "as to why the legend about the East's enormous superiority in conventional armed forces and arms is being cultivated so zealously in Europe and particularly in France? Of course, maintaining fear is a recognized means of preserving the solidarity of the alliance. But there is little of this if you do not count the

special—financial and group—interests of the two influential pressure groups which never benefit from detente: the industrialists, whose most developed sectors (machine building, aircraft building, electronics, information science, chemistry, and nuclear industry) are linked to arms, and the military.”

To judge from his article, A. Sanginetti is primarily concerned with problems of the “effectiveness” of French policy, not with questions of preserving peace: “...Good policy cannot be built on bad data. Besides wasting money, which is always harmful, systematic overestimation of the capabilities of the USSR politically serves its prestige in the Third World... However, in all probability, it is precisely there and not in Europe that the future will be decided.”²¹

The latest line of shaping public opinion is to present the agreement on medium-range missiles not as the result of joint efforts of two great powers, but as a one-sided win by Moscow, as the “Kremlin’s new trap,” and so forth.

Partly, this is done to beat down the rise in pacifist sentiments and to stop the shift in public opinion in favor of the USSR and its new leadership (see Table 4). Another, more important task of this sort of propaganda is to justify the need for a further buildup of arms, including nuclear, despite the serious socio-economic difficulties. And this is yielding certain results. Many of those polled think that the development and modernization of French nuclear forces make it possible to strengthen peace in Europe and that the presence of nuclear weapons serves as a guarantee of peace. However, the majority favors total elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe (61 versus 15 percent) and believes that a nuclear conflict will lead to the destruction of European civilization (85 versus 7 percent) and complete renunciation of nuclear testing by the USSR, the United States and France will make it possible to scale down the arms race (66 versus 16 percent).

Table 4. Results of Poll Concerning USSR Foreign Policy²²
(percentage of total)

Question	Answer		
	Yes	No	No opinion or believe there is no change
Have relations between France and the USSR improved in recent years?	52	3	45
Do you think that France should increase its ties with the USSR, taking into account the policy being conducted by Gorbachev since 1985?	66	15	19
Do you believe that Gorbachev’s policy since 1985 has a favorable influence on relations between Western countries and the USSR?	60	5	35

The shift in public opinion in favor of strengthening peace, detente and disarmament is stimulated by the growing awareness of the foolhardiness of military competition between the East and West, and also by the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the open nature of its foreign policy. This seriously concerns the ruling circles of France, since it places in doubt the current policy in the military area. In which direction will this contradiction be resolved? Partly—as was and is being done—by provoking distrust of the USSR and its people, attributing to the Soviet Union an aspiration “since earliest times” to dominate Europe, and so forth, since it is necessary to have an image of a strong and crafty enemy.

A second and also “tried and tested” way is to ignore the shifts in public opinion, placing hopes on the fact that under conditions of the current political institutions the public only periodically plays an important role—at

election time—without having an opportunity to directly affect the decisionmaking process.

There is, however, also a different way—intensifying the dialogue between the East and West and searching for mutually acceptable solutions.

IV

As sociologist J. Rabiet notes, some deeply ingrained opinions and lines are supported by the mass media. In his opinion, the most significant is the example of negative attitude—this is the attitude toward “Russians, the people who are the object of the greatest distrust on the part of all age groups of the population.”²³ This is well illustrated by the data of two polls. There were conducted in October 1987 in “Big Moscow” and in France under an agreement between the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the French organization IPSOS.

Table 5. Opinions on Character Traits of French and Soviet People²⁴
(percentage of total)

	Muscovite opinions about the French	French opinions about Soviet people
Positive character traits (intellect, kindness, frankness, joviality, warmth, courage, etc.)	70	30
Negative character traits (weakness, reticence, cruelty, submissiveness, etc.)	2	37
Neither positive nor negative	6	4
"Like we are"	4	1
No opinion	19	28

Some of the poll results shown in Table 5 are so obvious that no comments are necessary.

Brief results of the Moscow poll were published in the magazine LE POINT.²⁵ They were prefaced with an preface by E. Carrere d'Ancos entitled "Contradictions of a Conformist Society." From it one cannot learn either about the good attitude of Soviet people toward the French (this question was omitted entirely by the magazine), about the peculiarities of Soviet society, or even about the acuteness of the problems which perestroika is called upon to solve—nothing that could help the French reader to understand the fairly high degree of unanimity in the answers to a number of questions important to the Soviet people (nuclear disarmament, ending the arms race and, finally, the reforms being carried out under perestroika).

As a result, very important information is "stolen" from the reader, information about the peaceful disposition of the Soviet people, their kind attitude toward other

people, and the tremendous desire to resolve their difficult internal problems. The Soviet people are portrayed as "dummies" deprived of their own opinion and freedom of thought.

Purely factual errors are also encountered in the text. For example, it is asserted that Muscovites believe that Franco-Soviet relations are worsening. But the opposite conclusion follows from the answers. First of all, 73 percent of the Muscovites (60 percent of the French) believe that today's changes in the Soviet Union are helping to improve relations between the USSR and the West; secondly, 31 percent versus 29 percent believe that relations between our countries have improved during the past year; thirdly, 51 percent express dissatisfaction with the state of Franco-Soviet relations, that is, an absolute majority advocate expanding mutual ties. What is more, on such cardinal problems of today as problems of war and peace, the threat and consequences of a nuclear conflict, and the need for disarmament, the opinions of Muscovites and the French essentially coincide (naturally, there is not a word about this).

Table 6. French and Muscovites on Nuclear Weapons²⁶
(percentage of total)

	Opinion of Muscovites			Opinion of French		
	Yes	No	No Opinion	Yes	No	No Opinion
Do you believe that French nuclear weapons pose a threat to the USSR?	44	47	9	31	58	11
Do you believe that Soviet nuclear weapons pose a threat to France?	17	79	4	72	19	9

E. Carrere d'Ancos tries to underscore the distrustfulness of the Soviet people, claiming that "even France commands only their limited trust," considering its nuclear weapons. But can nuclear weapons at all command trust and be seen as the main condition of maintaining peace, which French propaganda continually reiterates?

Such a detailed analysis of one of the mass anti-Soviet "works" appears necessary in order to show by concrete example how white is transformed into black, amicability into hostility, and normal people with their troubles and joys into puppets.

We are not against normal, justified criticism in any form. We are against the deliberate and systematic distortion of facts concerning the Soviet people and their complex and difficult history and against instilling in the French a feeling of distrust and hostility with respect to the Soviet people as well as any other people.

As a matter of fact, anti-Sovietism and anti-communism are part of a broader ideological complex which is based on a dogmatic (and one-sided) interpretation of the facts of history and the processes of social development as a whole, including its world and universal aspects. In this sense, the advocates of a "tough" policy with respect to the Soviet Union, including the anti-Soviets on the one hand and the dogmatists of socialism and Marxism on the other, paradoxical as it may seem, are not only kindred, but are also ideologically nurturing one another, adhering to opposite but mirror-symmetrical dogmas. That is why the ongoing perestroika in the USSR, primarily a rejection of many stereotypes and dogmatic ideas, significantly weakens the theoretical positions of its opponents.

Footnotes

1. In this regard, one cannot help but mention the "France-USSR" trip organized by the society to the

Soviet Union by a group of 365 people, including representatives of various social circles and political convictions. Upon returning, the participants in the group widely shared their impressions, including via the press, radio and television, about the talk with M. Gorbachev and the numerous meetings with Soviet people.

2. See: "Bibliographie europeenne des travaux sur l'URSS et l'Europe de l'Est," Paris, Vol 8, 1982.

3. Calculated from: "Bibliographie europeenne des travaux sur l'URSS et l'Europe de l'Est," Paris, Vol 8, 1982; "Bibliographie europeenne des travaux sur l'URSS et l'Europe de l'Est. Materiaux pour la contribution française," June 1986, June 1987.

4. See: POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 3, 1987, p 607.

5. M. Gorbachev, "Perestroika. Vues neuves sur notre pays et le monde." Paris, 1987.

6. A. Aganbeguian, "Perestroika. Le double defi sovietique." Paris, 1987.

7. In this regard, we must note the large work of the Center for Documentation and Study of the USSR, China and Eastern Europe. In particular, the center has 22,000 works of Soviet authors, processes more than 270 periodicals and 300 annual publications from the countries studied, and also Western sources on the economy of socialist states. The monthly BULLETIN OF COUNTRIES OF THE EAST and the annual USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE contain, as a rule, serious informational and analytical materials on the economy which may also be of interest to Soviet experts.

8. According to results of the poll of the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), 61 percent of the French consider the mass information on what is taking place in the USSR to be insufficient (L'HUMANITE, 31 Oct 87).

9. L'HUMANITE, 20 Nov 87.

10. "Opinion publique 1987," SOFRES, Paris, 1987, p 167; "Les Francais, le desarmement et l'image de l'Union Sovietique," Chronique A. Duhamel/SOFRES, Jul 1987, p 15.

11. LE MATIN, 2 Oct 87.

12. Source: LE POINT, 9 Nov 87, p 81.

13. Having in mind the trend presented primarily by the French Socialist Party.

14. See: L'URSS en transition—1975-1995," Paris, 26-27 Nov 87, p 21.

15. Ibid., pp 4, 5.

16. See: M. Lavigne. "La difficile adaption de la 'perestroika' aux economies de l'Europe de l'Est" (MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE), Jan 88, pp 14-15.

17. "Les Francais, le desarmement et l'image de l'Union Sovietique," p 2.

18. Compiled from: "Opinion publique 1987," SOFRES, Paris, 1987, p 172; "L'image de l'Union Sovietique," IPSOS, Paris, 26 Oct 87, p 50.

19. "L'image de l'Union Sovietique," IPSOS, Paris, 26 Oct 87, p 57.

20. MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan 88, p 1.

21. Ibid., Oct 87, pp 14, 15.

22. Compiled from: "L'image de l'Union Sovietique," Paris, 26 Oct 87, pp 31, 33, 49.

23. "Les jeunes europeens." Etude exploration des jeunes de 15 a 24 ans dans les pays de la Communaute europeenne. Commission des communautes europeennes. Bruxelles, Dec 1982, p 58.

24. Calculated according to: "L'opinion publique a Moscou en octobre 1987." Sondage IPSOS, Paris, 26 Oct 87, pp 25, 26; "L'image de l'Union Sovietique," p 21.

25. See: LE POINT, 2 Nov 87, pp 89-91.

26. Sources: "L'opinion publique a Moscou," pp 29, 31; "L'image de l'Union Sovietique," pp 35, 37.

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Soviet-Norwegian 'Partnership Zone' Proposed
18160009h Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 96-102

[S.V. Chugrov conducts interview in Norway: "The Fjords Must Be Safe"]

[Text] During a business trip to Norway S.V. Chugrov, deputy chief editor of MEMO, requested of representatives of academic and public and political circles of the country an assessment of the Soviet proposals for a strengthening of security and the development of cooperation in North Europe and the Arctic through the prism of the current situation. The journal's questions were answered by (Chell) Kjellsbekk, director of Norway's Foreign Policy Institute, Kare Andre Nilsen, chairman of the Norwegian Communist Party, and Theo Koritzinsky, parliamentary speaker on international issues of Norway's Socialist Left Party.

1. What changes have there been recently, in your view, in Norwegian public opinion's perception of the program for a lessening of the military confrontation and the development of peaceful cooperation in the northern region put forward in Murmansk on 1 October 1987?

(Ch.) Kjellsbekk. It is my belief that the Soviet proposals expressed by General Secretary Gorbachev in Murmansk are, as before, evoking close interest here. But the main thing is that we in Norway clearly feel that this general political program is gaining new impetus and becoming more specific. For example, much was clarified for us by Mr Ryzhkov's visit to the North European countries—the first visit at such a level for 17 years. The negotiations in Oslo produced concrete results. Important agreements were signed: on prompt notification of a nuclear accident and on an exchange of information concerning nuclear installations; on cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection; on cooperation in the search for missing persons and the rescue of persons in distress in the Barents Sea. We have to be gratified by the agreements on S&T cooperation in the Arctic and in the North and on cooperation between the USSR's Vneshekonombank and Norway's Export Credit Institution. Yes, these documents are very useful for building confidence between us. But Norway expected more appreciable practical results from the visit. Many people were left with an after-taste of disappointment: there was no movement on the main issue, in my opinion—on the demarcation of expanses in the Barents Sea. Of course, the proposal concerning the creation of a special Soviet-Norwegian partnership zone in the Arctic was unexpected and interesting. But it is as yet difficult to imagine the specific contours of such cooperation in "common waters".

K.A. Nilsen. Comrade Gorbachev formulated the basic provisions of the program for security and cooperation in the Arctic on 1 October last year. As far as I recall, on 2 October even Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland responded positively to these proposals, but voiced the opinion here that the entire set of questions should be discussed by NATO's northern countries initially with their allies, and then its discussion between the two blocs could be put on the agenda.

The Norwegian side attempted to return to a specific discussion of the Soviet proposals subsequently also. But if we view the state of affairs realistically, it is obvious that there is no movement on the question currently. The most useful thing that can be done now is, I believe, removing the vagueness in positions and drawing up as far as possible a precise plan for realization of the ideas which do not need prolonged and difficult coordination. The public placed unduly big hopes in political circles, believing that the question had switched entirely to the plane of political discussion. Obviously, we communists must also make a self-critical evaluation of our position. Essentially the peace movement and the communists have virtually shirked their duty. We cannot succumb to

complacency and let matters take their own course. Public opinion needs to be mobilized. Otherwise the problems will become bogged down in bureaucratic and political manipulations.

T. Koritzinsky. I perceive the Soviet Union's Murmansk initiatives not as a tribute to the political moment but as a comprehensive long-term program for strengthening security and cooperation. I would like to mention that Mr Ryzhkov's visit contributed to a large extent to the growth of its popularity in Norway. We were clearly persuaded that an individual's personality influences the perception of political positions. A most pleasing impression was made by your premier's reserve and politeness, the balanced nature of his assessments and competence on a broad range of issues. These attributes were displayed particularly strikingly during his interview on board ship off Norway's western coast. This was not a conventional interview but reflections on the philosophical essence of man's activity and his inscription in the natural environment. The candid, particularly personal nature of these meditations impressed everyone. They undoubtedly illuminated for us new facets of Soviet policy.

Nonetheless (I wish to speak honestly and frankly), despite the most positive perception of Mr Ryzhkov's visit, I would not venture to maintain that his proposal concerning the disputed sea area was perceived positively. The question of delimiting sea zones is, understandably, reflected most directly in political relations. A clear boundary is for us the basis of a strengthening of cooperation, and not the other way about. And I hope that this position will be taken into consideration by the Soviet side. No one questions the idea of an extension of cooperation itself. It could contribute to the solution of many strictly Norwegian problems also. I shall name just one—development and housing construction in Norway's northern areas.

The proposal concerning an exchange of observers at the time of naval maneuvers made by Mr. Ryzhkov in Stockholm merits great attention, in my view. I considered it my duty to call attention to this proposal in parliament. Defense Minister J.J. Holst treated this initiative with interest in principle, but observed that it had to be discussed with the NATO allies. As a whole, it would seem to me, the proposal concerning observers has been perceived positively both in North Europe and by other West European states. But, to judge by everything, Washington is opposed. Imagine this situation. Moscow invites Western observers, but NATO refuses to accept observers from the Soviet Union. This would be noticed by many people, I believe, and would make a favorable impression on all in Europe who are as yet hesitating in choosing their position.

I believe that in addition to the military-political proposals new initiatives are needed in the sphere of contacts between citizens of our countries. For example, a broadening of the opportunities for the youth of the

northern countries to tour the Soviet Union. My son went to Hungary by Interrail and as a result shed certain prejudices. New forms of cultural contacts are needed. I am convinced that the development of humanitarian relations would facilitate considerably the solution of military-political problems.

The policy of perestroika and glasnost is making a big impression in the West. In our country even the right is no longer attempting to maintain that the Soviet leadership's new course amounts to cosmetic or purely propaganda measures. Soviet representatives are behaving entirely differently from before. We see from the television screen even that Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Dobrynin are practical, candid, smiling people who answer plainly the questions which have been raised. It might a certain time ago have seemed improbable that, according to opinion polls, the population of Western countries is equally trustful of its own and the Soviet leadership. And more trustful, at times, of yours.

2. What, in your opinion, are the most serious obstacles in the way of a strengthening of security in the region?

(Ch.) Kjellsbekk. I believe this to be primarily the danger of the growth of the two superpowers' naval activity in northern seas. Judge for yourselves. With the elimination of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles the role of the sea-based component of the nuclear forces grows appreciably. Some experts are inclined to see this as a stabilizing factor inasmuch as sea-launched missiles are considered less destabilizing.

However, this development of the situation is no gift for Norway. It becomes more vulnerable. The superpowers' interest in the Arctic is growing: for Moscow there is an increase in the strategic role of the Kola peninsula, and for Washington, of northern Norway. All this hardly strengthens stability in the region. The American command obviously intends moving its submarines further north to more actively counter the submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet. There naturally arises in this connection the danger of an accidental confrontation and the risk of the unsanctioned commencement of military operations off our shores. The question of limiting naval activity in North Europe is now more acute than ever, therefore, from my viewpoint.

As you know, the Soviet Union has proposed specific measures for limiting the confrontation on the seas. However, the American side, to judge by everything, is not ready for such a change. The present defense minister, Holst, who was director of the institute before me, is displaying great interest in the problem of strengthening stability in the adjacent seas. But a multitude of questions arises, primarily associated with the verification of a potential agreement. How to monitor sea-based missiles? A problem of extraordinary complexity! But it needs to be tackled, however, and without it being put on the back burner, what is more.

K.A. Nilsen. It is my belief that the most serious and difficult obstacle in the way of a strengthening of security in North Europe should be considered Washington's negative response to the possibility of an improvement in the political climate here. The separation of the democratic and peace forces is playing into the hands of the United States. We believe that the most important task now is overcoming the fragmentation and rallying these forces.

A year ago, at the congress of Norway's communists in April, a new party leadership was elected, which set as its task the creation in the future of an alliance of forces of the left. We called it the "red and green alliance". Why? The movement in defense of the environment is gaining momentum in Norway currently. I believe that the formation of a "green" party is possible this summer even. This is an ill-assorted movement as yet. Social pessimism, disenchantment with the values of the society of the S&T era and a waiting for Judgment Day are characteristic of some of its representatives. But healthy forces of the alternative movement are operating from clear-cut positions of struggle against nuclear catastrophe. The communists have much in common with them. On 12 January we approved a course of action with the task of working in contact with the Greens and implementing joint actions. This was a first step toward union. Before November we hope to have drawn up a specific program of cooperation with the alternative movements.

An alliance with the Greens could be a turning point in our policy of alliances and enable the communists to emerge from the isolation in which we have found ourselves in recent years. We hope that the socialist left and the social democrats will support the idea of unity on the left flank. I know that the task is a bold one, but I am sure that we have grounds for optimism. We hope that in 5-6 years the forces of the left will be in a position to pick up up to 20 percent of the vote. It is my belief (and I fully share here the opinion of the West German scholar Peter Glotz) that the communists and social democrats, the two traditional schools of the democratic movement, can and must make common cause. And primarily, it seems to me, on the basis of the common goal of struggle against the threat of nuclear war and for firm security both in the North and throughout the common European home.

A weak aspect of our party—and we are well aware of this—is the absence of a theoretical foundation for the formation of an alliance of forces of the left. It is necessary at times to make our way gropingly: unfortunately, we lack sufficient forces of our own for a theoretical analysis of the problems confronting us.

T. Koritzinsky. We cannot fail to be disturbed by the concentration of the superpowers' arms in the North. The Norwegian Defense Ministry's studies pertaining to confidence-building measures in the naval sphere are being discussed currently (these are preliminary discussions, and we expect the final results of the studies in the

coming months). I have been told that similar research efforts are being conducted by the American Rand Corporation also. But the opinion is quite prevalent here that the Pentagon is in principle very skeptically disposed toward confidence-building measures at sea. Among West Europeans, however, a positive attitude toward this proposal is, on the contrary, strengthening, as you know.

We know of and appreciate the steps taken by the Soviet Union (unilateral measures included) which are aimed at strengthening peace and stability. I would like to emphasize, however, that to overcome the lingering coolness on the part of public opinion in North Europe it would be extremely desirable for Moscow to agree to eliminate the tactical nuclear missiles which are deployed in Leningrad Oblast and on the Kola peninsula and which are capable of hitting only the northern countries. It is my profound belief that any unilateral measures and new proposals would be perceived most positively here.

And, finally, one further problem, but of a different order—the amorphousness and disconnected nature of the local peace movement. Norway lacks a united strong organization. The most influential one is No to Nuclear Weapons! But it lacks a consistent strategy and a clear action program.

Of course, the antiwar organizations do a considerable amount of useful work—organize demonstrations, publish books and pamphlets and develop international contacts. They do all this. But the slogans are sometimes eclipsed by actual deeds. Just look for comparison at the solidarity movement: there are more actual international aid projects there (my daughter, for example, as part of an international team, built a school house in Nicaragua). But following the signing of the INF Treaty the peace movement, I fear, runs the risk of becoming more passive inasmuch as the opinion that problems of disarmament and security depend, for all that, merely on the superpowers is becoming widespread among its participants.

3. This is not the first year that the North European countries have been discussing the problem of the creation here of a zone free of nuclear weapons. The debate sometimes abates, sometimes flares up with new strength. How clearly can a solution of this question be discerned at this time?

(Ch.) Kjellsbekk. Norway's position is that a nuclear-free zone can be created in the North. But is this conceivable without consideration of the all-European context? It was for the absence of a broad view of problems of security in North Europe that S. Morgachev reproached our scholar A.U. Brundtland in the article "The 'Northern Balance'" in issue No 1 of your journal for this year. I would reply that in the work of our institute the "northern balance" concept is beginning to give way to the "northern stability" concept. This is not a play on words, as may appear at first sight. The essence of the

new comprehension of the problem is that an understanding of the impossibility of an isolated conflict in the North has strengthened. We are now clearly aware that the "northern balance" is merely part of the all-European balance of forces.

Let us take a look at certain specific difficulties impeding the creation of a nuclear-free zone here. Norway is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty, but does not permit the allies to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. Nonetheless, Norwegian airfields may in a crisis situation, with the consent of the Norwegian authorities, be made available to squadrons carrying nuclear arms. What would happen with this point? This is the first thing. Further, allied warships call at our fjords. And, in accordance with evolved tradition, they do not give notice of the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board. Let us assume that this obstacle can be overcome. But what is the point of a nuclear-free zone if the international waters close to Norway's sea boundaries are teeming, as with herring, with nuclear weapon-firing surface ships and submarines?

In order to come close to the creation of a nuclear-free zone it is essential to solve a number of problems. Proclaiming it is not enough. It is necessary first of all, I believe, to come to some arrangement concerning verification and inspections. And, furthermore, Norway is, I emphasize, interested in inspection. Second, it is essential to solve the problem of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the Kola peninsula and in Leningrad Oblast.

And, finally, a point which would seem to me the most important: the question of a nuclear-free zone in the North is primarily of political and not military significance. It is my profound belief that the zone will become a reality only if the Warsaw Pact organization and NATO, primarily the USSR and the United States, are at one in their intention to observe and guarantee it. I have already proposed in a government commission that this question be studied and that it be brought up for discussion in NATO. And I see as the purpose of this proposal the stimulation of efforts pertaining to a strengthening of security. Not only our own, not only of the North. But of all of Europe.

K.A. Nilsen. In order to perceive the entire complexity of the question of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe it is sufficient to cast a cursory retrospective glance at its history. When, in 1963, the Finnish president came out with the idea of the creation of the zone, Norway's leaders turned down the idea as unacceptable. And both bourgeois and social democratic governments subsequently adhered to this position, what is more. In the 1960's-1970's the U.K. Kekkonen plan was supported in Norway only by the communists, the socialist left and a small number of peace organizations. This idea had not at that time "grown legs," as they say here.

But the mood of the masses changed abruptly following the NATO Brussels decision adopted in December 1979—on the deployment in West Europe of new American missiles. At the start of the 1980s the parliaments of Sweden and Denmark passed resolutions making it incumbent upon their governments to act in the interests of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region. The tone of North European newspapers and influential politicians changed, and the peace movement assumed greater proportions. All this was typical of Norway also. Officials in Washington had reason to argue thus: "Truly, if the Norwegians are not stopped, the fjords will soon be nuclear-free."

Indeed, in North Europe a petition in support of the idea of a nuclear-free zone was signed by 2.4 million persons, of whom 540,000 were Norwegians. Very many.... That is, the mood of the masses supports the creation of such a zone, if only tomorrow.

A certain amount of work was done, I believe, to prevent this question being put on the agenda. Including that of the recent Norwegian-Soviet negotiations in Oslo. Washington's disapproval evidently assumed perfectly tangible forms of pressure by various channels. Nonetheless, we are not disposed to lose heart and consider the present situation "a difficult birth".

T. Koritzinsky. Work geared to the creation of a nuclear-free zone is going forward, things are not at a standstill. Efforts are being concentrated in two channels, in the main.

The first is an intergovernmental working group of representatives of the five northern countries. It has been given a mandate for drawing up the conditions of the creation of a nuclear-free zone. The work of this group, which is composed of executives of foreign ministry departments, is not limited by a temporal framework. But it will soon, I believe, be completing its work and submitting a report, which will become the basis for discussion between politicians. The opinions of Norwegian parties on the question of participation in the working group were divided: the socialist left and the social democrats supported participation, as did the two center parties, but unenthusiastically; the Høyre Party and the far right were opposed.

The second channel of preparation for the creation of a nuclear-free zone is the commission of members of parliament of the northern countries which has been at work for 2 years now under the chairmanship of former Danish Prime Minister Jorgensen. It enjoys broad support in North Europe. Of Norway's political forces, only the Høyre and the right do not take part in its activity, while the center parties are represented by observers. The majority of parties of Sweden, Denmark and Iceland and all political parties of Finland's parliament are on

the commission. This fall delegations of this commission will head for Washington and Moscow to discuss possibilities of the creation of a nuclear-free zone guaranteed by the two great powers.

The United States is displaying no readiness to provide such guarantees. The Soviet Union has declared that it is ready to do so. But lest this commitment be not absolutely beyond doubt it is essential to normalize the situation in the Baltic. It is necessary for violations of Sweden's territorial waters to end. This is a very important psychological point: with particular intent or quite unintentionally Soviet submarines surface in parliamentary debate on virtually any pretext (1).

4. How is Soviet-Norwegian cooperation progressing in the sphere of the creation of joint ventures?

(Ch.) Kjellsbekk. After the Soviet Union opened wide its doors to the Western business world, inviting the creation of joint ventures, an explosion of interest in Norway followed immediately. A Norwegian firm conducting oil exploration in the Barents Sea began intensive negotiations in Moscow. But this work soon came to a halt. Why?

Differences in economic interests and the uncertainty of market conditions took their toll. The firm had contemplated handing over some of the oil to the USSR and reserving some for Norway. Such terms were, alas, unsuitable. Our Soviet contractors should, I believe, either make markets available for the sale of the products or, if they wish to obtain foreign currency, set up joint ventures primarily with partners which already have guaranteed markets. There are obstacles also, unfortunately, in the Soviet side's sluggishness and in palpable difficulties in contacts with your bureaucracy.

It would perhaps be useful in the mutual interest to send your specialists to the Norwegian firms which aspire to develop contacts. It will be necessary in the future, I believe, to solve the problem of the ruble's convertibility.

The difficulties are, I am sure, not of a political but organizational nature. Joint ventures have sound prospects as a whole. First, we know the Soviet Union as a dependable partner not subject to a variety of destabilizing fluctuations. Second, there is growing interest in Norway, as in the West in general, in capital investing. In order to stride ahead the Soviet Union needs to open its doors wider.

K.A. Nilsen. In January of last year leading Norwegian companies reacted spiritedly to the reports of the reorganization in the USSR of the structure of foreign economic relations, primarily to the plans for the creation of joint ventures. Approximately 40 representatives of business circles traveled to Moscow at that time for the "For the Survival of Mankind" forum.

But business circles' interest in the prospects of cooperation which had been afforded was followed by an immediate response from Washington. It amounted to a clamor concerning "violations of CoCom rules" by the Japanese Toshiba Machine and Norway's Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk (2). The tightening of CoCom rules struck a painful blow at Norwegian business. To be blunt, those who had responded to the Soviet proposals concerning cooperation simply took it on the chin. An atmosphere of hidden, latent discontent has now come about, it seems to me, in the country's business circles. In official discussions many businessmen express the opinion concerning the need for precise compliance with the CoCom rules. But in a less official atmosphere they are inclined to agree with H.-D. Genscher, who proposed a sharp reduction in the list of restrictions.

Under pressure from Washington and under the influence of political motivations some people have given up the prospects of cooperation as a bad job. But not all. Some businessmen are calling attention to the reaction of other West European countries advocating an expansion of economic contacts with the socialist countries. Incidentally, the Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk's order was snapped up by the British. Of course, this went down badly in Norway, which has a deficit trade balance.

T. Koritzinsky. The question of the prospects of Soviet-Norwegian ventures remains open and is being attentively discussed both in business circles and by members of parliament. The greatest interest in the projects is being displayed in Finnmark (the northern province of Norway bordering the USSR—S.Ch.). There are in our country political forces who are disposed to see in increased cooperation a growth of dependence on the Soviet Union and a threat to Norway's security even. Some people are directly linking the future of Soviet-Norwegian cooperation, of joint ventures included, with questions of the delimitation of boundaries in the Barents Sea. It is perfectly clear what aims these forces are pursuing, and their influence should not be exaggerated.

In my view, cooperation in the North, joint ventures included, would contribute to a winding down of the confrontational trends in this region. The difficulties and delays in the creation of such ventures are more of an organizational nature.

As follows from the interviews obtained in the Norwegian capital, the problem of security and strengthening cooperation in North Europe requires nonclashed approaches. Such approaches have been revealed in the past 6 months, in the context primarily of the program advanced on 1 October 1987 in Murmansk.

Security and the development of peaceful cooperation in the region can be secured only as the tight knot in which the military-political, economic and other interests of various states and groupings is untangled. (Ch.) Kjellsbekk and T. Koritzinsky express particular concern at the

growth of naval activity in the northern seas. It has to be mentioned in this context that the Pentagon would like to "compensate" for the reduction in its West European nuclear arsenal (in connection with the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles) by way of the deployment on ships of SLCM's. The danger of such a development of events, of course, is recognized full well even in Norway. "We see a trend toward the transfer of cruise missiles to underwater ships and submarines," V. Eide, commander in chief of Norway's armed forces, pointed out. "The significance of sea-launched nuclear weapons will grow even if the number of missiles remains at the previous level. This will lead to the seas around Norway assuming great strategic importance."

What is the Soviet Union counterposing to the trend toward "compensation"?

The purpose of the Murmansk program is to make the north of the planet a zone of peace by way of a radical reduction in the level of military confrontation. The shortest route to this goal is to commence negotiations on a reduction in military activity in the North as a whole—in both the Eastern and Western hemispheres. Problems of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe, the limitation of military activity in the waters of the adjacent seas and the extension thereto of confidence-building measures could be the subject of these negotiations.

Our Norwegian companions are commenting positively on this set of proposals. But notes of skepticism, the sources of which can be traced to the position of Washington, which is blocking measures to lower the level of confrontation in the region, show through in many of the replies. The problem of strengthening the nuclear-free status of North Europe has been discussed, we would recall, for quarter of a century now—and without decisive progress as yet. The position of the Soviet side consists of firm support for this idea and a readiness to act as guarantor of the zone, regardless even of the decision of the other nuclear powers. How to structure such a guarantee more expediently? Multilateral or bilateral agreements, government declarations or any other form which the participants choose could be such, it was observed in Murmansk. A call for the discussion of urgent questions of security and cooperation in the Arctic was heard in the Appeal to the Parliaments and Members of Parliament of North European States, the United States and Canada adopted at a joint session of the foreign affairs commissions of the Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Soviet proposals were greeted attentively in parliamentary circles of North Europe and Canada. But in Washington? The American reaction may be judged by the statement of Rozanne Ridgeway, former U.S. ambassador to Finland and now assistant secretary of state. Addressing journalists, she expressed doubt as to the expediency of meetings of members of parliament on the Arctic inasmuch as such meetings "are hardly suitable for a discussion of security issues."

The positions of the North European countries are equivocal. This is natural: it is hard to expect a concurrence of their military-political interests considering the North Atlantic status of Norway, Denmark and Iceland, Sweden's traditional neutrality and Finland's policy, in which the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union plays an important part. Even now, however, the statements of certain politicians sound hopeful. For example, during a recent visit to Finland Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland definitely supported broader contacts based on the recent Soviet proposals. A resolution of the Danish parliament contains an appeal to the government to support negotiations on a reduction in military potentials in the northern seas. The USSR's proposals are being carefully studied by a Finnish parliamentary group which has been created specially.

Of course, there are objective circumstances impeding constructive dialogue. As far as Norway is concerned, everyone who responded to our questions believes the hidden reef to be the problem of demarcation of the shelf in the Barents Sea. A solution has not been found for 17 years now.

The Soviet Union, just like Norway, would like to have precise and clear borders. But the state interests of the two countries (security interests primarily) are so intricately interwoven in this region that a mutually acceptable clear-cut boundary on the shelf and in the expanses of the Barents Sea cannot be established simply by drawing a line on the map. Any configuration of the line would upset a delicate balance of interests. Having weighed these difficulties, the Soviet Union has attempted in its new proposals to take account of the interests of both parties and convert the disputed expanses in the Barents Sea from a subject of disputes into an area of interaction and a confidence-building instrument.

It was to this end that during his visit to Oslo N.I. Ryzhkov submitted at the political level a proposal concerning the creation here of a special Soviet-Norwegian partnership zone which could incorporate joint activity in the form, for example, of the creation of a joint venture for the search and exploration, production, refining and sale of oil and gas. At a press conference in the Norwegian capital N.I. Ryzhkov emphasized: "Such activity would be undertaken in a spirit of complete equality and mutual benefit on the principles of the parties' equal several participation in capital investments and profit—50-50" (3). We would note that all the interviewees expressed greater or lesser interest in this proposal. In practice, however, the creation of joint ventures is as yet spinning its wheels. It is interesting that (Ch.)Kjellsbekk and T. Koritzinsky see as the reasons for the wheel-spinning solely organizational squabbles, while Norwegian CP Chairman K.A. Nilsen is inclined to attribute it primarily to circumstances of a political nature.

The range of potential Soviet-Norwegian cooperation undoubtedly affords the broadest prospects. Joint projects in the sphere of the peaceful conquest of space, health care,

social security, industrial construction and city planning, agriculture and the most diverse humanitarian problems are possible here. The numerous meetings and discussions with representatives of Norway's academic circles, parties and alternative movements and ordinary inhabitants persuade us that the changes in our country and the policy of perestroika and glasnost are valued highly by Norwegians, more, are engendering feelings which could contribute to the realization of a wide spectrum of specific initiatives.

Footnotes

1. In 1981 a Soviet submarine unintentionally violated the boundary of Sweden's territorial waters. This episode, which became possible in connection with an accident situation and had absolutely no underlying political motive, was used by circles of the right of Sweden and the NATO Scandinavian countries to stir up an anti-Soviet mood. As far as the USSR is concerned, it respects Sweden's borders and aspires to the establishment of good-neighbor relations with this country. No one either in Sweden or in other northern countries, of course, had or has any evidence of the "activity" in others' territorial waters ascribed to the Soviet Navy (editor's note).

2. It was a question, we recall, of the installation at a shipbuilding yard in Leningrad of four Japanese machine tools with programmed control designed for the manufacture of propellor screws. Norwegian computer specialists participated in the assembly of the machine tools. Norway also supplied auxiliary equipment. The United States deemed the sale of the machine tools a breach of the rules of the sale of science-intensive products to the Soviet Union, maintaining that they afford an opportunity for the manufacture of "silent" screws for submarines, which would be harmful to NATO security (editor's note).

3. IZVESTIYA, 16 January 1988.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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Gist of Levin Report on Conventional Military Balance Approved

18160009i Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 103-104

[Comment by Sergey Yevgenyevich Blagovolin, doctor of economic sciences, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, on Sen C. Levin's report: "Approaching the Realities"]

[Text] The report of Sen C. Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance (NATO) Defense, "Beyond the Bean Count. Realistically Assessing the Conventional Military Balance in Europe," was put out at the end of January 1988 in Washington (1).

We would mention immediately that the document has a very substantial basis. As is clear from an accompanying note sent by C. Levin to Sen S. Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the report was prepared on the basis of hearings in the subcommittee, but also with the use of secret material submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and also intelligence data and studies conducted by various congressional services and annual reports of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies. In addition, a series of meetings was held with politicians and military personnel representing various NATO bodies and the states which are a part of this bloc.

So representative a nature of the information which was made the basis of the report is very important. As has frequently been the case previously apropos this assessment or the other concerning the correlation of forces in Europe (and not only there, what is more), doubts are expressed, and perfectly justified, furthermore! The essence thereof amounted to the fact that the assessments had been made on the basis of a superficial or insufficient knowledge of the situation and had failed to take account of a whole number of highly important items of information, circumstances, intentions and so forth. Such complaints can hardly be considered warranted with reference to C. Levin's report.

So we have before us a document which, in its authors' words, "attempts to determine and examine the components of a realistic assessment of the military situation in Europe." Unfortunately, in what concerns a number of important aspects of this situation the report proceeds from the same stereotypes of the "old thinking" which should seemingly have been, if not cast aside (which requires both time and more profound changes in the overall atmosphere), then, at least, critically reconsidered (what is needed for this is only commonsense, as to whose possession by the compilers of the report there should really be no doubt). In particular, there is reiteration many times over of the proposition concerning the possibility of a surprise "nonnuclear" attack by the Warsaw Pact forces against NATO and the "defensive" nature of the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and the "offensive" nature of the Warsaw Pact. NATO's "weak points," which have arisen, the author maintains, as a result, specifically, of the concentration of Warsaw Pact divisions directly on the borders of the FRG and so forth, are studied in detail—precisely in the light of a probable attack.

The most interesting point, and this will be discussed in more detail below, is that the analysis which has been made in the report essentially refutes very convincingly the presence in Europe of an "ominous" imbalance in general forces so dangerous for the NATO countries and virtually automatically condemning them to defeat as a result of an attack by the USSR and its allies. Of course, NATO has certain weaknesses, which could disturb the bloc's leadership, but the Warsaw Pact has its problems also.

The report contains much information in the way of figures, which are very close to those already known in the West. Thus in the region from the Atlantic to the Urals the ratio of tanks is given as 2.4:1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact, and of combat aircraft, 2.3:1 and 1.6:1 (as published). In other words, in this respect the report is quite traditional, which is not, however, surprising. After all, if we are speaking of serious research, it is obviously difficult "varying" to any extent purely quantitative data.

However, the report is geared precisely against a primitive "bean count," which, as Senator Levin observes, not only does not provide a sufficiently full picture but, in addition, leads to mistaken conclusions.

It is well known that the Warsaw Pact's preponderance in tanks is considered the most "painful" from NATO's viewpoint. But here is what the report observes in this connection. Only 5.6 percent of the total number of Warsaw Pact tanks in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals are types which have been accepted since 1975, whereas their percentage in NATO is 40.9 percent. In Central Europe the Warsaw Pact countries' percentage of such tanks is 13.9, NATO's, 68.4. As a result NATO is superior to the Warsaw Pact in the number of modern tanks in a ratio of 3.1:1 in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, and in Central Europe, of 3.5:1.

Of course, we should not go to the other extreme here and believe that the older tanks do not have to be considered at all. This would be wrong, of course. But it is clear that the entire "tank imbalance," for both parties, what is more, looks completely different from that given the conventional arithmetical approach, and the problem of its elimination should be resolved with regard for the quality factor.

Pronounced changes to the assessment of the correlation of forces in terms of combat aircraft are made by their "breakdown" by category—depending on purpose—and an analysis of the correlation within these groups. Thus of the Warsaw Pact's 7,500 combat aircraft, 65 percent are interceptors, which can be used almost exclusively for the defense of airspace. As far as fighter bombers capable of launching shock attacks against ground targets are concerned, here, according to the report's estimates, the parties have a roughly equal number of them—not counting the 1,500 American aircraft of these classes based in the United States, but intended for rapid reinforcement of NATO air forces in Europe. Mention is made of Warsaw Pact preponderance in bombers and interceptors.

Finally, the numbers of the armed forces of the two sides—with regard for the trained reserve—are practically identical (if also the expanse from the Atlantic to the Urals is considered).

Thus as a result of the more realistic assessments the customary picture built up over the years in the West of the "absolute" one-sided superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in Europe proves largely not to correspond to reality. There is undoubtedly a preponderance in respect of some categories on the side of the Warsaw Pact, of others, on the side of NATO. All this must be the subject of candid, constructive negotiations aimed at a sharp lowering of the level of military confrontation and preservation of the balance of interests on the basis of a careful consideration of the sides' mutual security.

However, the enumerated qualitative "adjustments" to the situation by no means exhaust the new approaches and assessments contained in the report. Senator Levin, in particular, pays very close attention to such aspects thereof as the level of training of the human resources, the combat readiness of the deployed forces and so forth, in which he gives preference to NATO.

It is particularly important that the report also studies such a most important long-term factor of the correlation of forces as the two alliances' economic possibilities. Here also, as can be seen from the data adduced in the report, there is a manifest preponderance on the side of NATO (by a factor of more than 2.5 in terms of GNP, for example). The North Atlantic alliance is appreciably ahead in terms of such categories as military spending and also numbers of the population (including the number of males aged 18-30).

All told, in respect of the 13 most important highlighted components characterizing the correlation of conventional forces in Europe (2) the report gives the advantage in respect of 5 indicators to NATO, and of 4, to the Warsaw Pact, in respect of 3 the situation appears uncertain (in one instance preference is given NATO, in two, the Warsaw Pact), and in respect of 1 there is approximate equality.

Of course, all positions can and should be considered increasingly. But as a whole the report represents a step in the right direction—toward a truly realistic assessment of the situation in Europe and, consequently, toward the parties occupying reasonable positions at the negotiations, not sticking fast to cliches and prejudices which they themselves have created.

At the same time, however, I would like to emphasize that the Soviet Union is prepared for the maximum flexibility at the negotiations and is ready to discuss all proposals aimed at freeing Europe from the threat of military conflict and making it equally secure for all countries and peoples of the continent.

Footnotes

1. January 20, 1988.

The author of the report calls a "bean count" particularly arithmetical computations characterizing the correlation of forces without regard for certain most important factors determining it to a large extent.

2. Among these: 1. Opportunities for a surprise attack and effective defenses. 2. Number of main weapons systems ("bean count"). 3. Quality of main weapons systems. 4. Forces' combat readiness. 5. Capacity for prolonged operations. 6. Personnel in formation and the reserve. 7. Quality of the personnel. 8. Capacity of the forces for operational interaction. 9. Battle management, communications and reconnaissance system. 10. Reliability of allies. 11. Economic and industrial power. 12. Geographical factor. 13. Capacity for mobilization prior to exacerbation of the situation.

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Dukakis' Mooted Defense Spending Cuts Noted
18160009j Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 105-108

[Political portrait by MEMO Science Editor Oleg Vladimirovich Kuchkin: "Michael Dukakis: Orthodox Neoliberal"]

[Text] It has traditionally been the case that only white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males have been able to hope for the highest offices of state—primarily the presidency—in the United States. Just 60 years ago the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, the Catholic A. Smith, caused a real sensation and bitter arguments. Only just over 30 years later was another Catholic, J. Kennedy, able to overcome settled prejudices and not only be the candidate but also the election winner. Now, to judge by everything, ethnic and religious factors do not have for the American electorate the former significance. For the first time a black American, J. Jackson, laid serious claim to nomination from one of the main parties in 1984, and the name of a woman (and Catholic, what is more), vice presidential candidate G. Ferraro, also appeared on the ballot for the first time. And now a new example this year: Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, from a Greek Orthodox immigrant family, is leading in the struggle to be the Democratic Party's presidential candidate.

True, malicious tongues in Washington maintain that the combination of the title "President of the United States" and the name Dukakis grates on the ear, but it remains a fact that the Massachusetts governor is confidently picking up points in the election race, and his chances of victory at the July Democratic Convention appear increasingly realistic. As an American journalist put it, "only he could lose his grip on the nomination

now." In the eyes of the majority of the electorate Dukakis is by no means a "stranger". He does not draw attention to his origins, of course, but neither does he make any particular secret of this—on the contrary, he likes to occasionally quote some Greek saying remembered from childhood.

Michael Stanley Dukakis was born on 3 November 1933 in the Boston suburb of Brookline (Mass.). From his childhood his parents instilled in him politeness, a serious outlook, diligence and conscientiousness—attributes which had helped them, naturalized Americans, become successful and enjoy a decent life.

Graduating from Swarthmore College (near Philadelphia) in 1955, Dukakis then served for 2 years in the U.S. Army in South Korea. In 1960 he attended a law course at Harvard, after which he practiced law and from 1960 through 1974 was a partner in the Boston law firm of Hill and Barlow.

However, law was not to be his life. Back in high school even Dukakis had revealed a propensity for public activity and had displayed the instincts of an organizer and leader. In his student years he had joined the Students for Democratic Action liberal organization and participated actively in the fight for racial equality and in local political campaigns, and in 1952, in the Democrat A. Stevenson's presidential campaign. The political views of the future governor were shaped in the period when Sen J. McCarthy of ill-renew was at the height of his power. "This individual simply infuriated us," Dukakis recalls, naming McCarthy as one of two politicians who had the greatest influence on his philosophy. If McCarthy was the "negative hero," the idol of the young man from Massachusetts was, of course, J. Kennedy, from the same district.

In 1962 Dukakis was elected to the Massachusetts Legislature and was for 8 years a member of the state House of Representatives. In 1970 he ran for deputy governor, but was unsuccessful. In 1971-1973 he hosted a local television program and in 1974 once again entered the election fray—this time for the governorship—and won. Dukakis was governor of the state in the period 1975-1979, but he was unsuccessful in his attempt at a second term in 1978: he lost in his party's primary elections. Dukakis filled in the interruption in his political career with a job in the Political Sciences Institute of Harvard's Kennedy Management School, where he taught a course in political leadership and studied problems of economic development. His return to "big politics" occurred very quickly. At the next election, in 1982, he regained the governorship, which he retains still (he was reelected in 1986, with a very impressive majority, what is more).

Dukakis' achievements as governor are generally recognized, and it was with good reason that a poll conducted in 1986 by NEWSWEEK among his colleagues throughout the country named him the "most effective" state

leader. Nor is it surprising that Dukakis is building his presidential campaign primarily on the publicizing of the results which Massachusetts has achieved during his governance.

This state is today considered the embodiment of prosperity and a showcase of America's technological restructuring. Unemployment, which exceeded 11 percent in 1975 (the second worst indicator of all the states), has declined to almost 2.5 percent (compared with the 6 percent for the country as a whole). The level of taxation, which previously was one of the highest in the United States, is now somewhat below the national level even—in Dukakis' term in office there have been five tax cuts. The governor has for nine times now produced a deficit-free state budget, and the deficit of the end of the 1970's has been replaced by an impressive surplus. The state's social security system here, which is considered one of the most developed in America, not only has not been reduced but has been expanded even more.

True, critics maintain that the "Massachusetts miracle" is explained primarily by the overall improvement in economic conditions in the country and, specifically, by the propitious conditions of this state. Some 120 universities and colleges, which serve as a base for the development of science-intensive sectors of production, are concentrated here; there is a virtual absence of immigration, which is holding back the growth of unemployment; and big military orders, in terms of the sum total of which (\$8.7 billion in 1986) the state is in fourth place in the country, have a stimulating impact. So that, according to the critics, there would have been an "economic miracle" "even if there had been no Dukakis."

However, even the skeptics are forced to admit that Dukakis has made highly adept use of the propitious conditions in which Massachusetts has found itself and has achieved the maximum effect. The main emphasis was put on a restructuring of the state's economy on the basis of the latest technology, the retraining of manpower, the stimulation of private investment and the cultivation of a working consensus among all groups concerned: employers, unions, management, the colleges, consumers, environmentalists and so forth.

Dukakis' main innovation has been the creation and development of a system of so-called "quasi-governing" institutions for coordinating and extending credit to private enterprise activity. It is largely with their help that, for example, a revival of the old city neighborhoods, which had fallen into steep decline, has been possible. Another innovation—the Job Training Program—has made it possible to provide occupational training and find jobs in the private sector for over 40,000 social aid recipients. In this connection welfare spending has been reduced 10 percent, although the volume of social services and their envelopment of the population as a whole have grown. The amounts of the benefits have increased by a factor of almost 1.5. The

country's first general social insurance system has been introduced in Massachusetts; Dukakis is now seeking the adoption of just as broad a medical insurance system.

Dukakis has carried through a reform of the tax-collection system, which he contemplates implementing nationally also. According to him, "more thorough" tax collection alone would provide the federal budget with up to \$35 billion extra.

As a whole, Dukakis' activity has been a successful example of the practical implementation of the principles of neoliberalism propounded by the new generation of Democrat politicians, to whom the governor of Massachusetts himself belongs. The essence of these principles is an attempt to combine traditional liberal values and ideals with a recognition of the need for a restructuring of the economy on a new technological basis. Of course, how far the methods which have proven so effective on the scale of one comparatively small state are suitable for the whole country could be debatable. But Dukakis maintains that he has the capacity, ability and experience for solving America's socioeconomic problems—and the electorate is inclined to believe him. His record in this sphere looks quite impressive.

One of Dukakis' weakest points as presidential candidate, on the other hand, is his lack of foreign policy experience. Nonetheless, Dukakis has a quite wide-ranging consistent program based on an emphatic abandonment of the international hard line. Dukakis considers the main priorities a lowering of the level of military confrontation, an end to the support for authoritarian regimes of the right and the abandonment of a policy of strength and interference in other states' internal affairs. "Do we have the right to intervene and oust a government with which we have a difference of views? No. This is unlawful. And we must recognize this," the aspirant declares. This position also determines Dukakis' sharply negative attitude toward the policy being pursued by the present administration in Central America. Dukakis believes that the United States is making a serious mistake in supporting the Nicaraguan "contras," waging an undeclared war against the Sandinistas and increasing military assistance to such Central American countries as El Salvador and Honduras, which are in need not of militarization, which is ruinous for them, but the solution of acute socioeconomic problems. In his opinion, the explosive situation in Central America may only be settled peacefully, and he cites as the best means for this the Arias Plan.

Dukakis welcomed the signing in December 1987 of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, evaluating it as the first real step in the right direction. He is a supporter of active negotiations with the Soviet Union in the disarmament sphere, considers possible not only a sharp reduction in strategic nuclear arms but conventional types of weapons also and supports the conclusion of agreements on a total ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices and missile test launches. Dukakis is also emphatically

opposed to the "star wars" program, proposing that the appropriations for it be limited to the 1983 level (which would in practice mean virtually the complete suspension of all in any way large-scale efforts).

In the context of his military-strategic and budget program Dukakis proposes a freeze on real military spending and, even better, a reduction therein. In this connection he is prepared to abandon further purchases of the MX strategic missiles (declaring that he has from the very outset opposed the deployment of this system) and suspend the development of the new Midgetman missile and believes that future Soviet-American agreements will permit the abandonment of the deployment of the Stealth strategic bomber and the submarine-launched Trident 2 ballistic missiles.

If some people are of the impression that the governor from New England, who has not until recently been all that widely known, is simply an ambitious outsider attempting to take advantage of the uncertainty in the Democratic camp and break into the ranks of the party elite, this is a manifest error. Dukakis enjoys the trust and support of most influential political forces. The fact that as of the present Dukakis is generally the sole aspirant among the Democrats from the Northeast, the bastion of the country's old financial and political establishment, calls attention to itself. It would seem that these circles are prepared to gamble precisely on the governor of Massachusetts. Dukakis has close ties to such strategic think tanks of the northeastern establishment as Harvard and MTI, which are located in his home state. At the official ceremony at which Dukakis announced his candidacy Sen E. Kennedy, the heir of a most influential clan and a pillar of American liberalism, endorsed him as his successor in the fight for the presidency. In addition to him, Dukakis has been supported by such important figures as P. Kirk, chairman of the National Democratic Committee, T. O'Neill, former speaker of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, E. Koch, mayor of New York, and others.

Dukakis' campaign has been joined by many veterans of the party machinery such as political adviser P. (Talli) (who worked for the same E. Kennedy and subsequently in the presidential campaigns of W. Mondale in 1984 and G. Hart in 1987), press relations specialist (D. Peyn) (who prepared the publicity releases for M. Udall's 1976 presidential campaign and who has been working with Dukakis since 1981), M. Rosen, one of the best fund raisers (who came from G. Hart's entourage in 1987), and others. Some of them have been working together with Dukakis for a long time now, like, for example, R. Farmer, the "financial genius" of the 1980 presidential campaign of the independent J. Anderson, who has raised funds for two of Dukakis' election campaigns in Massachusetts.

As far as finances are concerned, Dukakis has altogether pronounced advantages over all his rivals. By mid-March he had managed to collect for his election fund

approximately \$20 million—almost as much as the remaining Democratic aspirants together. According to the American press, Dukakis is receiving large amounts from the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities (from the latter thanks to connections of his wife).

The first months of the election campaign have shown that Dukakis had correctly assessed the impending course of the struggle and opted for the correct strategy. While the press was exaggerating in every way possible the significance of the first caucuses and primaries and many candidates were gambling on the winner of the race for the nomination being determined no later than "Super Tuesday"—8 March (when almost one-third of the delegates to the forthcoming party convention are elected in the course of voting in 21 states)—Dukakis was trying to spread his forces as evenly as possible to go the whole distance. "Super Tuesday" would not decide things but merely determine two-three real aspirants, one of which would go on to win the nomination of "primaries after primaries," Dukakis predicted. His campaign has been carefully organized throughout the country, and Dukakis has in this respect the advantage over his competitors, who expended a disproportionate amount of effort in the first rounds of the election struggle. True, even now any Democratic aspirant has only a purely theoretical chance of winning an absolute majority of convention delegate votes by the time it opens (this is explained primarily by the fact that the very system of Democratic primaries provides for a proportional division of delegate votes exactly in accordance with the share of the vote obtained by the candidate in the course of this primary election or the other). Dukakis' forecast for this contingency was as follows: the convention will not have to look for a suitable candidate from the floor, and a compromise candidate will be chosen from the ranks of those who have made the strongest showing at the preliminary stage. Time will tell to what extent he was right, but there is increasing talk in the Democratic leadership about the possibility of precisely such a version—the nomination of Dukakis teamed with the other leading aspirant—the more conservative senator from the South A. Gore.

Some skeptics doubt that a candidate with the reputation of a liberal in domestic policy and a "dove" in foreign policy will constitute serious competition for the Republicans at the November election. Having become in this campaign the standard-bearer of the neoliberals, Dukakis is attempting to confound this viewpoint. "Idealism Which Works"—such is the slogan under which he intends to win.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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More Glasnost Seen in International Dialogue
18160009k Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 126-133

[Article by Viktor Leonovich Israelyan, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR, professor-consultant at the USSR Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy; for many years headed various USSR delegations at bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations: "International Dialogue in the Light of the New Thinking"]

[Excerpt]

II

The times in which the world is living now are fundamentally different from all preceding stages of historical development. On the one hand boundless opportunities for social and economic progress and prosperity have been afforded mankind, on the other, the threat of nuclear self-annihilation looms.

Recognition of the fact that the contradictions, disputes and disagreements which exist between states and groups of states must be resolved by peaceful means and that it is necessary to overcome these for the sake of values common to all mankind, for the sake of the salvation of humanity, and seek a balance of interests constitutes the essence of the new thinking. The foundation of relations between states should be not arsenals of weapons but potentials of good will, and the arena of their interaction, not battlefields but conference halls.

The process of the democratization of international relations, which was initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution, has been reflected since the war in the growth in the role and change in the nature of international dialogue. The exceptionally important role of negotiations and dialogue in our time is determined primarily by the fact that the alternative thereto in the nuclear-space age can only be confrontation and military conflicts, any of which could develop into a nuclear war with all the ensuing consequences.

Whereas in the past the fate of many peoples and problems of general interest were decided, as a rule, in narrow conferences with the participation of several large states or in the course of backstage bilateral negotiations of the great powers, in the modern era the situation has changed fundamentally. The victory of socialist revolutions in a number of European, Asian, Latin American and African countries and also the successes of the national liberation movement and the collapse of imperialism's colonial system have led to the fact that over 160 sovereign states are operating on the international scene in the final quarter of the 20th century.

The movement into the arena of world politics of many dozens of young states and increased interstate interaction and interdependence have led to the increased significance of multilateral negotiations and their conversion into a dominating factor of world politics.

Another important point determining the increased role of multilateral dialogue is the global nature of many current international problems. A radical and all-embracing solution, for example, of such problems as general and complete disarmament, environmental protection and use of the oceans and space without the participation of all states cannot be imagined.

The proposal advanced by the Soviet Union in conjunction with the other socialist countries concerning the creation of an all-embracing system of international security presupposes close and productive cooperation between all governments, parties and social organizations and movements concerned for the fate of peace on Earth. The proposed system cannot be a product of the work of one state. Each people has its own views, problems and interests. A secure world cannot be built without their comprehensive consideration. And the broadest international dialogue could make an inestimable contribution here.

The threefold increase in the number of international government and nongovernment organizations since the war testifies, in particular, to the growth of the role of multilateral negotiations. Whereas in 1909 there were 37 intergovernmental organizations in the world, in 1951 there were 123, in 1960, 154, and in 1984, more than 365. The growth of international nongovernment organizations has been even more rapid: 176 in 1909, 4,615 in 1984 (5).

The substantial number of international forums at which multilateral dialogue is conducted reflects the ever growing universalization of world politics on the one hand and the continued democratization of international relations on the other. The figures in this connection are really impressive. In just one year there are in Geneva, for example, 30,000 of the most varied conferences, congresses, meetings and sessions, 7,500 of them in the Palace of Nations, what is more. The approximately 30 excellently equipped conference halls of the latter are almost constantly filled with participants in various negotiations. In June—the special “conference activity” month—the Palace of Nations accommodates up to 7,000 delegates and staff of the UN Secretariat (6). Up to 3,000 representatives of member-states, not counting the representatives of other intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, journalists and Secretariat staff arrive in New York annually for the UN General Assembly session (7).

In practice the universal nature of contemporary international dialogue is also manifested in the fact that all UN members have the right to participate in all conferences conducted under its aegis. The principle of the

“open composition” of the United Nations’ auxiliary bodies permitting the participation in their activity of any state displaying an interest in them is most prevalent.

Another point is of importance also. The times when at international conferences or negotiations some participants had more votes than others have receded into the past. “One participant, one vote” is the principle on which international dialogue is now built. All the participants in negotiations have equal rights, which also manifests the democratization of contemporary international relations.

III

There is one further important feature of contemporary international dialogue. It is not confined to the official negotiations of representatives of states at various levels, as was the case in the past. Representatives of practically all strata of society are actively involved therein now. International dialogue has ceased to be the privilege of professional diplomats.

Recognition of the impermissibility of nuclear war is being transformed into numerous actions of various social organizations against the military danger and into the advancement of specific proposals aimed at lessening or eliminating it. “In our day foreign policy is the field of activity of virtually everyone not officially connected with it,” the American T. Hughes wrote discontentedly two decades ago. “All cabinet members, all governors, all congressmen, all university deans, the majority of mayors, all influential businessmen and union leaders, many farmers and all professors, ministers, journalists and students, as, equally, devotees of safaris and numerous other members of the ‘affluent society,’ are offering their voluntary assistance” (8).

Regardless of whether the problem of man’s survival is on the agenda of this conference, meeting and symposium or the other, it invariably proves to be at the center of any international dialogue. Solutions of many complex problems of world politics have frequently come to light in the course of discussions, meetings and negotiations of scientists, public figures and physicians. It is sufficient to recall the proposals pertaining to strategic arms limitation, nuclear disarmament, the banning of nuclear testing, prevention of an arms race in space and other arms limitation and disarmament proposals—proposals which were put forward within the framework of the Pugwash Movement, the Dartmouth meetings, the Palme Commission, the Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War and other international public forums. A useful contribution to an enhancement of the efficiency of the United Nations and the solution of a number of acute questions of its agenda are being made by the World Federation of UN Assistance Associations, the Stanley Foundation and other organizations.

International public forums of a universal composition are of special value. They afford a unique opportunity for familiarization with the broadest spectrum of the opinion not only of all countries but also of the various approaches to the solution of the problems in question within many of them. The "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind" international forum should be attributed to these primarily.

The participants in international public dialogue are not fettered by sets of instructions and are not empowered to express the opinion of the government of the country which they represent. For this reason the debates at such forums are, as a rule, of a more unconstrained, unfettered nature; the palette of opinions expressed at them is frequently considerably more extensive and striking than at negotiations on this question or the other between states' official representatives. In Pugwash, for example, 30 years ago scientists met not simply as their countries' delegates but as representatives of the human race. Having discussed the question of the nuclear arms race, they concluded that it could serve no intelligent purpose.

I have participated in many meetings of scientists and public representatives devoted to disarmament. I recall one, for example. The Scientific Culture Center of the local university conducted in Erice (Sicily) in August 1983 a session of the "International Seminar on Nuclear War". Many world-renowned scientists were invited to the seminar from the USSR, the United States, Britain, France and other countries—Ye.P. Velikhov, A.M. Markov, E. Teller, E. Wigner, R. Garvin. And although conventional arms and operational-tactical missiles were the subject of the seminar, the debate concentrated on the "star wars" program proclaimed in March of the same year by President R. Reagan. The spirited speeches of the supporters and opponents of the SDI, of American scientists included, were received with great attention. In terms of depth and scientific validity they were manifestly superior to the debate on this same question—preventing an arms race in space—at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. I sensed that we diplomats lacked the scientists' competence. I subsequently reproduced many of the arguments of the opponents of "star wars" in speeches at the conference.

In the course of the Washington meeting M.S. Gorbachev declared: "Scientists suggested much of value to us, and we made use of this and found approaches to the INF Treaty."

The appeals and recommendations which are adopted in the course of international public dialogue exert in certain instances considerable influence on governments' position. Thus when the public, politicians and scientists requested that the Soviet leadership separate intermediate-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, the Soviet Union responded to this positively. In addition, it agreed to eliminate operational-tactical missiles also, thereby making practicable the possibility of the elimination of two classes of nuclear arms.

The appeals, meetings and discussions of representatives of the public with official delegates at bilateral and multilateral negotiations should be considered a particular form of its participation in the international dialogue on questions of world politics. Views on issues which are the subject of intergovernmental negotiations are conveyed to states' representatives. On the eve of the Washington meeting M.S. Gorbachev reported that in 1987 he had received from Americans 80,000 letters, a considerable number of which expressed opinions and proposals pertaining to questions of war and peace and the elimination of nuclear weapons. "What Americans say in their letters to me and the government of the Soviet Union," the Soviet leader observed, "is very comprehensible and close to our people, to all of us Soviet people. I see this as the emergence of a new situation, which permits and, perhaps, obliges even the politicians and governments of our two vast states to attempt to understand the mood of our peoples and express their will in their policy." Similar appeals are addressed to the leaders of other states also. The number of letters and appeals of international nongovernment organizations and also citizens of various countries to the Conference on Disarmament for the negotiations to be stepped up grows from year to year, for example.

Appeals are received from persons of different political persuasions, from citizens of socialist, nonaligned and Western states. Those who took part in WWII and schoolchildren, scientists of world renown and housewives, Catholics and Lutherans send their emotive messages. A message to the Geneva Conference, for example, from the International Ravensbruck Committee, which unites the representatives of 18 countries who fought for liberation from Nazi oppression and who underwent the tortures of this concentration camp, observed: "We would like the Geneva Conference—the disarmament negotiating body—to seriously examine specific proposals concerning nonuse of force, the freezing, reduction and then prohibition of nuclear weapons and any other type of weapon of mass annihilation and the conclusion of an international treaty banning chemical weapons" (9).

The majority of appeals of the public, of nongovernment organizations particularly, to international conferences, official delegations and participants in negotiations are distinguished not only by a high degree of awareness of urgent world problems but also knowledgeability concerning the work of the conferences and the positions of the participants.

The forms of contacts are highly varied. In addition to written appeals, meetings of groups of the public, members of parliament and scientists with the participants in negotiations, in the course of which there is a relaxed dialogue on the broadest range of issues, are a frequent practice. For example, groups of American congressmen regularly head for Geneva and there meet with the participants in the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms and delegations at the

Conference on Disarmament and other forums. Visits to Geneva by delegations of the Defense and Armaments Committee of the WEU Parliament for discussions with the participants in various disarmament negotiations have become habitual. Unfortunately, Soviet members of parliament do not have recourse to such practice, as a rule, although it would undoubtedly help toward a better understanding of the position of the other party.

Such a form of dialogue of public representatives with the participants in negotiations as public debates outside of the conference framework is frequently encountered also. Usually some social organization, research center or university invites simultaneously the representatives of several of the states participating in the negotiations—from a socialist, Western and nonaligned country, say—and affords them an opportunity to have their say on basic issues. The delegates' speeches, their answers to questions and the argument between them afford the audience an opportunity to obtain at first hand, so to speak, information on the state of affairs at the negotiations. The subsequent debate enables the participants in the negotiations to familiarize themselves with commentaries and the evaluation of the position of the states they represent.

Speeches at such meetings setting forth the Soviet Union's position on questions of UN activity, disarmament and other problems invariably evoke tremendous interest in any audience. As far as the American participants in negotiations are concerned, those dealing with arms limitation issues, in any event, they are greatly reluctant to meet with the public, have no desire to conduct a dialogue with it and in some cases simply refuse to speak. I recall the following instance, for example. When, in April 1981, the Palme Commission invited the heads of the delegations of the USSR, the United States and Britain to report at its session on the trilateral negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear testing, the Soviet and British representatives accepted the invitation, whereas the U.S. representative declined at the last minute to participate.

The American political scientist and diplomat L. Sloss maintains that the representatives of the USSR and the United States are in an "asymmetrical" position: while the Americans are "subject to public pressure," the Soviet participants in the negotiations, "representing a closed society," do not perceive such pressure (10). We may, perhaps, agree with the first statement. As far as the second is concerned, disregarding the propaganda cliché concerning the "closed society," the Soviet representatives are not subjected to "asymmetrical" pressure on the part of the public because the position which they uphold meets with understanding on the part of the former, as a rule.

In recent years representatives of various social circles have been incorporated increasingly often in official delegations at intergovernmental negotiations and conferences. Thus prominent public figures and scientists

are often appointed members of Soviet delegations. Their authority and knowledge contribute to the successful accomplishment of the tasks confronting the delegation. For example, a notable contribution to the General Assembly First Special Disarmament Session was made by Academician N.N. Inozemtsev, of the Assembly 41st Session (during discussion of questions of the prevention of an arms race in space), by Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev, and the UN Disarmament for Development Conference, by Academician Ye.M. Primakov. Prominent trade union figures and representatives of other working people's organizations render Soviet delegations at conferences on economic and humanitarian issues great assistance.

The example of the Soviet Union, which initiated the enlistment in intergovernmental negotiations of representatives of the public, has been followed by many other countries also, including the United States. Thus in addition to congressmen individual popular figures show up from time to time in American delegations at the General Assembly session.

Thus an important feature of the contemporary international dialogue is the active and ever increasing participation therein of the public. The discussion on key issues of the life of our planet is assuming a truly democratic nature.

IV

Granted all the importance of international dialogue, it cannot be an end in itself. Although since time immemorial preference has been given to the talk of diplomats over the talk of guns, nor should it be forgotten that many armed conflicts, including both world wars, were preceded by intensive diplomatic negotiations. International dialogue in the nuclear-space age must be dynamic, productive and fruitful—such is the command of our times. A striking example of such dialogue has been the intensification of the political dialogue between the leadership of the USSR and the United States and the achievement of a number of most important accords. The hopes and expectations of the peoples are now focused on the upcoming top-level Soviet-American meeting in Moscow.

What is important now is not so much the mere fact that the negotiations are being conducted as the direction in which they are being conducted and the foundation on which they are built. If one party conducts them with a view to damaging the interests of the other and gaining time to accomplish its military programs, they could only harm international relations. If, however, all participants possess the due political will and an aspiration to the achievement of the sought-for agreement, such negotiations will correspond to current demands.

There is one indispensable rule for skillful, creative dialogue—the need for a precise and clear idea of both its purpose and one's position. An elementary truth, it

would seem. At the same time I have in many years in the diplomatic profession heard from my colleagues from other delegations confessions (not public, of course) that they did not entirely understand what the state which they represented was strictly seeking at this set of negotiations or the other. It is no lie, I have also been puzzled by some of our conditions, which were known to be unacceptable to the other party. The question involuntarily arises as to whether this was done to reach a mutually acceptable agreement or for short-term propaganda effect.

Entering into negotiations with an insufficiently studied position or proposals and the presentation in their initial phase of hastily prepared documents do not facilitate but, on the contrary, complicate and prolong the process of the achievement of accords. The point being that discussion unfolds from the beginning around the document which has been placed on the negotiating table first. A contradictory, poorly argued document naturally gives rise to many questions and disputes and diverts attention at times away from an examination of the essence of the problem. Unfortunately, in the practice of Soviet diplomacy of recent years also there have been individual instances of the advancement of a sound idea having outpaced its serious and in-depth study, which might have provided for the achievement of an international accord. In a word, the participants in international dialogue are not to look for its success without the thorough, all-around elaboration of their position. Negotiations need to be conducted with a sound knowledge of what one wants and without the creation of impasse situations either for oneself or for the other party. There is no proceeding from the fact that the partner is more foolish than us.

Only the negotiations whose participants are prepared to listen to the opinion of the other party and understand it can be effective. Of course, it does not follow from this that we have necessarily to agree with this opinion—this merely testifies to a serious attitude toward the negotiations. The experienced American diplomat R. Fisher advises: "Always consult before making a decision on questions of mutual interest. The practice of consultations is intended to demonstrate that I have not yet made a decision; I am treating your opinion as one meriting attention; your concerns are of particular importance; I am open to persuasion; we are maintaining contact with one another; I am talking with you, but not about you to others" (11). Useful advice!

Both those who are prepared to cooperate and listen and those who are taking part merely to lecture and, at times, simply to slander are rapidly ascertained in the course of any international dialogue. With how many of the latter, American "hawks" particularly, I have had to deal in recent years! But it has to be acknowledged that among the Soviet participants in international dialogue also "popularity" was at one time enjoyed by those who with unconcealed pleasure summed up the discussion or debate with the words: "I cut him (them) up pretty well!"

It is perfectly obvious that the result of such "dialogue" was, as a rule, a toughening of positions and a deferral of the prospects of an agreement being reached. "We must not allow," M.S. Gorbachev observed, "perseverance in the defense of this position or the other to develop into pointless stubbornness and Soviet representatives to be called 'Mr No'" (12).

Counterposed to "pointless stubbornness" should be a readiness for compromise and flexibility. Particular significance is attached to these qualities in international dialogue in the nuclear-space age. V.I. Lenin pointed out that a solution of the question of the permissibility of compromise should be approached in dialectical and specific-historical fashion. Vladimir Ilich believed that when deciding the question of the possibility of consenting to compromise all would depend on what kind of agreement was being concluded and under what circumstances. Specifically, he pointed out that sometimes a concession "is made to avoid a greater evil" (13).

The greatest evil in our time is the preparation for nuclear war. For this reason any compromise capable of averting the danger of it breaking out is well-founded and justified. This explains the flexibility of the Soviet Union in the disarmament negotiations, primarily on the entire complex of nuclear and space-based arms.

The hitherto unknown standards of openness and glasnost and the extent of mutual trust and verification proposed by the Soviet Union could lend international dialogue powerful impetus. Our country's bold, enterprising steps in this field have ensured the marked acceleration and, in certain directions, the successful completion of a number of important negotiations, on INF particularly.

Particular mention should be made of verification—a key issue of international dialogue on disarmament. The method of its solution merely with the aid of national verification measures, a supporter of which the Soviet Union was in past years, has not been broadly supported and has not secured the achievement of agreements. In addition, in individual instances a refusal to implement wide-ranging international verification measures has impeded progress at negotiations.

What has been said by no means signifies an underestimation of the obvious fact that the opponents of disarmament have taken advantage of the principle of verification merely with the aid of national measures as an excuse for blocking and foiling many important disarmament talks. Providing them with such an excuse evidently made no political sense.

And one final point: trust and international dialogue. Trust and the achievement of agreement at negotiations are interconnected. One without the other is inconceivable. Suspending negotiations and trying to "create a climate of trust" in isolation from them and then resuming the negotiations, for example, is impossible. Trust

grows as the parties to the dialogue display a readiness to understand the arguments of the other party and to explain plainly and candidly, without, of course, harming the interests of one's country, the difficulties of accepting this proposal or the other and to respond to questions.

I shall cite the following example. For 8 years I was entrusted with heading our delegation at the negotiations on banning chemical weapons. The negotiating partners naturally repeatedly asked the Soviet delegation: does the USSR have chemical weapons or not, and if so, in what quantity and of what kind? It was invariably necessary to answer all these questions of our interlocutors evasively and ambiguously—the delegation lacked the authority to deny the presence in the Soviet Union of chemical weapons or, incidentally, to confirm the reverse either. Did this position assist the negotiations and promote the creation of a climate of trust? Of course not.

M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 10 April 1987 to the effect that the production of chemical weapons had ceased in the Soviet Union, that the USSR had no such weapons beyond its borders and that the construction of a special enterprise for their destruction had begun in our country put an end to the false interpretations and speculation and stimulated the negotiations considerably.

A tremendous impression was made on the participants in the negotiations and on the whole world community by the showing of the Soviet military chemical facility in Shikhany in October 1987, at which the representatives of 45 participants in the negotiations on a ban on chemical weapons and a large group of correspondents were familiarized with the various kinds of these weapons and the methods of their destruction. Even thinking of such a possibility 3 years ago, for example, would have been sedition. The Soviet action may rightly be considered a model of confidence-building measures in the military sphere.

Honest and frank dialogue will always contribute to the formation of trust, and the latter, to the achievement of understanding. Summing up the Washington meeting, the Soviet leader declared: "It seems to me that the President and I have greater mutual understanding. There is more professionalism and a constructive approach in our dialogue, and I would even venture to say that we have come to trust one another more."

The openness of international dialogue—a principal indicator of its democratic essence—is also inseparably connected with a climate of trust.

As is known, backstage negotiations were the favorite method of the diplomacy of states of exploiter formations. In the 19th century all negotiations and conferences were conducted behind closed doors. Any public statement or interview with representatives of the press on the part of any conferee invariably gave rise to protest

on the part of his partners. Opening the 1878 Congress of Berlin, for example, O. Bismarck declared plainly that he expected the complete unanimity of all its participants concerning preservation of the secrecy of the content of the negotiations.

The turning point came after the October Revolution. In its very first document—the 8 November 1917 Decree on Peace—the Soviet Government proclaimed renunciation of imperialist secret diplomacy. At the peace negotiations in Brest it demanded the openness of all the sessions, and hitherto unprecedented procedures for the publication of daily reports of all that was happening at them were established.

The principle of glasnost has acquired particular resonance since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum. The speeches of Soviet leaders on the broadest range of issues of world politics, including a detailed exposition of the USSR's positions on various questions of international relations, many of which are the subject of bilateral and multilateral relations, are enabling the world community to obtain a full idea of our country's position, and from the most authoritative sources, what is more.

The open nature of the sessions of the vast majority of forums of both government and nongovernment organizations, press conferences of participants in international dialogue, their meetings and discussions with the public, the publication and dissemination of documents—such are some of the methods of conducting dialogue, which attest the continued establishment of the principle of glasnost in contemporary international relations.

In our time, when the use of force to solve international disputes is fraught with the danger of nuclear confrontation, dialogue must assume predominant significance in world politics and be the sole means of political communications between states and peoples. Dialogue is the opposite of confrontation. The broader it is, the greater the possibilities of mutually acceptable solutions being found. It should be conducted in practice at all levels. Mankind is entering an era of genuine international dialogue and greater openness and glasnost. And the sooner this is recognized by all those living on our planet, the more actively the peoples will be enlisted in it and the surer the prospects of the survival and prosperity of mankind.

Footnotes

5. "Yearbook of International Organizations, 1984/1985," vol I, p 1627.
6. "The United Nations Office of Geneva". UN Department of Public Information. Information Service, 1986, p 2.
7. See "The United Nations: Image and Reality". UN Department of Public Information, 1986, p 51.

8. T.L. Hughes, "Policy-Making' in a World Turned Upside Down" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1967, p 209).
9. Conference on Disarmament Document CD/NGC, p 8.
10. See "A Game for High Stakes," Cambridge, 1984, p 4.
11. Ibidem, p 151.
12. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 1, 5 August 1987, p 6.
13. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 8, p 357.

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8850

Publication Data

18160009m Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 5, May 88

[Text] English title: WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS

Russian title: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDU-
NARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA

Editor: G.G. Diligenskiy

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda"

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: May 1988

Signed to press: 14 April 1988

Copies: 25,000

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnoshe-
niya", 1987